Given the following sequential game: 1 B 05 e 2 8 10 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is 35 15 The Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE is: [Choose ] [Choose ]

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.3P
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Given the following sequential game:
1
B
05
e
2
8
10
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) is
35
15
The Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE
is:
[Choose ]
[Choose ]
Transcribed Image Text:Given the following sequential game: 1 B 05 e 2 8 10 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is 35 15 The Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE is: [Choose ] [Choose ]
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