Question 3. There is an election with 100 voters and 5 alternatives (A, B, C, D, and E). The voter profile is: Votes 18 13 17 19 8 3 9 2 14 A B B C C D E E E D A C A B A C A B Preferences B D A D A B B B C C C D B D C D с D E E E E E E A D A Calculate the social ranking under the following voting systems: Q3)a) Plurality: Q3)b) Two round runoff (plurality with runoff):

Question 3. There is an election with 100 voters and 5 alternatives (A, B, C, D, and E). The voter profile is: Votes 18 13 17 19 8 3 9 2 14 A B B C C D E E E D A C A B A C A B Preferences B D A D A B B B C C C D B D C D с D E E E E E E A D A Calculate the social ranking under the following voting systems: Q3)a) Plurality: Q3)b) Two round runoff (plurality with runoff):

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Only help with 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 please
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