Marie and Mike usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. Can you explain the scenario above?

Marie and Mike usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. Can you explain the scenario above?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.10P

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Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 30 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 30 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 15 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mr. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mrs. Ward Vote Mr. Ward-15, Mrs. Ward: -15 Mr. Ward: 30, Mrs. Ward: 15 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to payoff of False Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 15, Mrs. Ward: -30 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of This agreement not to vote. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. O True and for Mrs. Ward to units of utility a Nash equilibrium, Under this outcome, Mr.…
Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 6 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 6 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 3 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -3, Mrs. Ward: -3 Mr. Ward: 3, Mrs. Ward: -6 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -6, Mrs. Ward: 3 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. True…
Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 4 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 4 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 2 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -2, Mrs. Ward: -2 Mr. Ward: 2, Mrs. Ward: -4 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -4, Mrs. Ward: 2 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to (vote/not vote) and for Mrs. Ward to (vote/not vote) . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash…
Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections, so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 10 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 10 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 5 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Using the given information, fill in the payoffs for each cell in the matrix. For example, in the top left cell, fill in the payoffs for Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward if they both vote. (Hint: Be sure to enter a minus sign if the payoff is negative.) Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: , Mrs. Ward Mr. Ward: , Mrs. Ward Don't Vote Mr. Ward: , Mrs. Ward Mr. Ward: , Mrs. Ward
Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow’s election. Would such an agreement improve utility? Would such an agreement be an equilibrium?
Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 24 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 24 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 12 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mr. Ward Vote Vote Mrs. Ward Mr. Ward: -12, Mrs. Ward: -12 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -24, Mrs. Ward: 12 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to payoff of Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 12, Mrs. Ward: -24 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of and for Mrs. Ward to units of utility. Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a
Tom, Dick, and Harry live in the same apartment building in downtown Los Angeles. Tom and Dick work at local auto parts stores, and each of them has an income of y dollars per week. Harry is less fortunate. He used to have a good job at the LAPD, but his penchant for firing large caliber weapons in crowded public places led to his dismissal. He currently has no income. Tom and Dick (who are originally from Texas) firmly believe in a man’s right to draw his gun in the defence of just about anything, and are happy to financially support Harry. Tom gives Harry zT dollars each week, and Dick gives Harry zD dollars each week Tom’s utility UT depends upon the dollar value of his own weekly consumption, cT , and of Harry’s weekly consumption, cH : Likewise, Dick’s utility UD depends upon the dollar value of his own weekly consumption, cD, and of Harry’s weekly consumption: Harry spends all of the money that he receives from Tom and Dick. Tom and Dick spend…
Poornima and Valerie are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a weekend getaway. Since a public park is a public good, both Poornima and Valerie will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.70 of benefit. For example, if both Poornima and Valerie choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Poornima and Valerie would each receive $420 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Poornima chooses to spend $300 on a weekend getaway, Poornima would get $300 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Valerie wouldn't receive any benefit from Poornima's choice. If Poornima still spends $300 on a weekend…
Kyoko and Rina are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a weekend getaway. Since a public park is a public good, both Kyoko and Rina will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Kyoko and Rina choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Kyoko and Rina would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Kyoko chooses to spend $300 on a weekend getaway, Kyoko would get $300 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Rina wouldn't receive any benefit from Kyoko's choice. If Kyoko still spends $300 on a weekend getaway and Rina chooses to contribute…
Type out the correct answer ASAP with proper explanation of it In the Ultimatum Game, player 1 is given some money (e.g. $10; this is public knowledge), and may give some or all of this to player 2. In turn, player 2 may accept player 1’s offer, in which case the game is over; or player 2 may reject player 1’s offer, in which case neither player gets any money, and the game is over. a. If you are player 2 and strictly rational, explain why you would accept any positive offer from player 1. b. In reality, many players reject offers from player 1 that are significantly below 50%. Why
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