Alice and Bob participate in a two-person exchange economy. Alice has the utility function u(x1, x2) = x8x2.2 and Bob has the utility function u(x₁, x₂) = x4x06, where ₁ and 2 denote cucumbers and dragon fruits respectively. Alice and Bob are each endowed with 32 cucumbers and 32 dragon fruits. For the remainder of this question, suppose Alice and Bob reached a competitive equilibrium. The number of cucumbers Alice ends up with is The number of dragon fruits Alice ends up with is The number of cucumbers Bob ends up with is The number of dragon fruits Bob ends up with is The price of cucumbers in terms of dragon fruits (if we set dragon fruits to be the numeraire) is

Alice and Bob participate in a two-person exchange economy. Alice has the utility function u(x1, x2) = x8x2.2 and Bob has the utility function u(x₁, x₂) = x4x06, where ₁ and 2 denote cucumbers and dragon fruits respectively. Alice and Bob are each endowed with 32 cucumbers and 32 dragon fruits. For the remainder of this question, suppose Alice and Bob reached a competitive equilibrium. The number of cucumbers Alice ends up with is The number of dragon fruits Alice ends up with is The number of cucumbers Bob ends up with is The number of dragon fruits Bob ends up with is The price of cucumbers in terms of dragon fruits (if we set dragon fruits to be the numeraire) is

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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