First Welfare Theorem: Suppose we have an endowment economy with two consumers i = 1, 2. Let e (1,1) be the endowment for both consumers. Let preferences be given by = U¹(x¹, y¹; x²) = (x¹y¹)¹/2 + 7x² and U²(x², y²; y¹) : (x²y²) ¹/² + 7y¹. := = When maximimizing utilty each consumer takes the others choices as given. Show that p*= (1,1) is a competitive equilibrium where each consumer demands her own endowment. Find a feasible allocation that is a Pareto improvement. Why does the first welfare theorem not apply?

First Welfare Theorem: Suppose we have an endowment economy with two consumers i = 1, 2. Let e (1,1) be the endowment for both consumers. Let preferences be given by = U¹(x¹, y¹; x²) = (x¹y¹)¹/2 + 7x² and U²(x², y²; y¹) : (x²y²) ¹/² + 7y¹. := = When maximimizing utilty each consumer takes the others choices as given. Show that p*= (1,1) is a competitive equilibrium where each consumer demands her own endowment. Find a feasible allocation that is a Pareto improvement. Why does the first welfare theorem not apply?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 agents. The Örst agent has the utilityfunction, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2, and the other one has u (y1; y2) = 2 ln y1 + ln y2.The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (50; 100). Suppose there is asocial planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem b) Calculate the first-best outcome (i.e., the social plannerís solution).
= 5. Consider an economy with a single (representative) agent with utility function u(x, lc) = x¹/514/5 and an endowment of 0 units of x and 10 units of time, which the agent can use as leisure (c) or labor (L) (i.e., L + lc = 10). The agent owns a firm that produces good x using L as an input, with technology of production given by x(L) = 3√L. Let the price of x be p = 1 and let w denote the price of time (i.e., the price of leisure and the wage). Find the competitive price of time w and the competitive allocation.
5.18 In a two-good, two-consumer economy, utility functions are u¹ (x₁, x₂) = x₁(x₂)², u² (x₁, x₂) = (x₁)²x₂. Total endowments are (10, 20). (a) A social planner wants to allocate goods to maximise consumer 1's utility while holding con- sumer 2's utility at u² = 8000/27. Find the assignment of goods to consumers that solves the planner's problem and show that the solution is Pareto efficient. (b) Suppose, instead, that the planner just divides the endowments so that e¹ = (10, 0) and e² = (0, 20) and then lets the consumers transact through perfectly competitive markets. Find the Walrasian equilibrium and show that the WEAs are the same as the solution in part (a).
Suppose there are two consumers, A and B, and two goods, X and Y. Consumer A is given an initial endowment of 3 units of good X and 5 units of good Y. Consumer B is given an initial endowment of 5 units of good X and 3 units of good Y. Consumer A's utility function is given by: UA(X,Y)= X + 4Y, and consumer B's utility function is given by UB(X,Y)= MIN (X, 2Y). If the prices are Px = 1 and Py = 3, if each consumer sells her initial endowment and buys back her optimal bundle, which of the following statements is true? Group of answer choices Both Markets are in Equilibrium There is Excess Demand in the Market for Good X = 2.4 There is Excess Demand in the Market for Good Y = 0.8 There is Excess Supply in the Market for Good Y = 1.6 There is Excess Supply in the Market for Good X = 1.6 E
Suppose that consumer has the following utility function: U(X,Y) - X1/2y1/4. Suppose also that P 2, P -3 and 1=144. What would be the optimal consumption of X and Y at the equilibrium. respectively? 36, 24 12,40 24,32 48.16
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