Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 24 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 24 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 12 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mr. Ward Vote Vote Mrs. Ward Mr. Ward: -12, Mrs. Ward: -12 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -24, Mrs. Ward: 12 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 12, Mrs. Ward: -24 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a

Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 24 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 24 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 12 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mr. Ward Vote Vote Mrs. Ward Mr. Ward: -12, Mrs. Ward: -12 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -24, Mrs. Ward: 12 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to Don't Vote Mr. Ward: 12, Mrs. Ward: -24 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote.
John and Jane usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. A. Diagram a game in which John and Jane choose whether to vote or not to vote.
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John and Jane usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections. A. Diagram a game in which John and Jane choose whether to vote or not to vote. B. Suppose John and Jane is in agreement not to vote during the election. 1.) Would such an agreement improve utility? Justify your answer. 2.) Would such an agreement be an equilibrium? Justify your answer.