Lobbyist 1 considers whether to spend money for lobbying for a new bill in favor of his interest group or not. If he invests, lobbyist 2 from the opposite interest group will also join in investing into lobbying. If lobbyist 1 chooses not to lobby, the game ends, and both groups receive a payoff of 2. If he decides to lobby, both lobbyists simultaneously decide between spending a high or a low amount of money. If both choose a high amount or both choose a low amount, the bill will not be passed and both groups end up with a payoff of zero. If lobbyist 1 chooses a high amount and lobbyist 2 a low amount, the bill will be passed in favour of lobbyist 1, leaving him with a payoff of 3, while lobbyist has a payoff of 1 (a bill is better than no bill).If lobbyist 1 chooses a low amount and lobbyist 2 a high amount, then lobbyist 1 has
Lobbyist 1 considers whether to spend money for lobbying for a new bill in favor of his interest group or not. If he invests, lobbyist 2 from the opposite interest group will also join in investing into lobbying. If lobbyist 1 chooses not to lobby, the game ends, and both groups receive a payoff of 2. If he decides to lobby, both lobbyists simultaneously decide between spending a high or a low amount of money. If both choose a high amount or both choose a low amount, the bill will not be passed and both groups end up with a payoff of zero. If lobbyist 1 chooses a high amount and lobbyist 2 a low amount, the bill will be passed in favour of lobbyist 1, leaving him with a payoff of 3, while lobbyist has a payoff of 1 (a bill is better than no bill).If lobbyist 1 chooses a low amount and lobbyist 2 a high amount, then lobbyist 1 has
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![Exercise IV.5.) - Imperfect information
Lobbyist 1 considers whether to spend money for lobbying for a new bill in favor of
his interest group or not. If he invests, lobbyist 2 from the opposite interest group
will also join in investing into lobbying. If lobbyist 1 chooses not to lobby, the game
ends, and both groups receive a payoff of 2. If he decides to lobby, both lobbyists
simultaneously decide between spending a high or a low amount of money. If both
choose a high amount or both choose a low amount, the bill will not be passed and
both groups end up with a payoff of zero. If lobbyist 1 chooses a high amount and
lobbyist 2 a low amount, the bill will be passed in favour of lobbyist 1, leaving him
with a payoff of 3, while lobbyist has a payoff of 1 (a bill is better than no bill).If
lobbyist 1 chooses a low amount and lobbyist 2 a high amount, then lobbyist 1 has
a payoff of 1 and lobbyist 2 a payoff of 3.
(a) Represent this game as a normal-form and an extensive-form game
(b) Solve for all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fb430af59-8a3c-4bf2-a5a7-fa3d60572d80%2F20bb102d-cf21-4b08-8d3d-4469bad922d1%2Fwi4ndfc_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Exercise IV.5.) - Imperfect information
Lobbyist 1 considers whether to spend money for lobbying for a new bill in favor of
his interest group or not. If he invests, lobbyist 2 from the opposite interest group
will also join in investing into lobbying. If lobbyist 1 chooses not to lobby, the game
ends, and both groups receive a payoff of 2. If he decides to lobby, both lobbyists
simultaneously decide between spending a high or a low amount of money. If both
choose a high amount or both choose a low amount, the bill will not be passed and
both groups end up with a payoff of zero. If lobbyist 1 chooses a high amount and
lobbyist 2 a low amount, the bill will be passed in favour of lobbyist 1, leaving him
with a payoff of 3, while lobbyist has a payoff of 1 (a bill is better than no bill).If
lobbyist 1 chooses a low amount and lobbyist 2 a high amount, then lobbyist 1 has
a payoff of 1 and lobbyist 2 a payoff of 3.
(a) Represent this game as a normal-form and an extensive-form game
(b) Solve for all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies
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