Karolina drives by a eye-catching outdoor advertisement on her way to campus every morning. As she drives by, she finds that the print is too small to read. What principle does this demonstrate? Select one: а. Adaptation b. Absolute threshold. C. Perceptual vigilance d. Exposure

Karolina drives by a eye-catching outdoor advertisement on her way to campus every morning. As she drives by, she finds that the print is too small to read. What principle does this demonstrate? Select one: а. Adaptation b. Absolute threshold. C. Perceptual vigilance d. Exposure

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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