In the novel and film The Princess Bride, the villain Vizzini kidnaps the princess. In an attempt to rescue her, the hero, Westley, challenges Vizzini to a battle of wits. Consider this variation on the actual plot. (I do not want to reveal the story.) In the battle, Westley puts two identical glasses of wine behind his back, out of Vizzini's view, and adds iocane powder to one glass. locane is “odorless, tasteless, dissolves instantly in liquid, and is among the more deadly poisons known to man." Westley decides which glass to put on the table closest to Vizzini and which to put closest to him- self. Then, with Westley's back turned so that he cannot observe Vizzini's move, Vizzini decides whether to switch the two glasses. Assume the two simultaneously drink all the wine in their respective glasses. Assume also that each player's payoff from drinking the poisoned wine is -3 and the payoff from drinking the safe wine is +1. Write the payoff matrix for this simultaneous-moves game. Specify the possible Nash equilibria. Is there a pure-strat- egy Nash equilibrium? Is there a mixed-strategy Nash eguilihrium?

In the novel and film The Princess Bride, the villain Vizzini kidnaps the princess. In an attempt to rescue her, the hero, Westley, challenges Vizzini to a battle of wits. Consider this variation on the actual plot. (I do not want to reveal the story.) In the battle, Westley puts two identical glasses of wine behind his back, out of Vizzini's view, and adds iocane powder to one glass. locane is “odorless, tasteless, dissolves instantly in liquid, and is among the more deadly poisons known to man." Westley decides which glass to put on the table closest to Vizzini and which to put closest to him- self. Then, with Westley's back turned so that he cannot observe Vizzini's move, Vizzini decides whether to switch the two glasses. Assume the two simultaneously drink all the wine in their respective glasses. Assume also that each player's payoff from drinking the poisoned wine is -3 and the payoff from drinking the safe wine is +1. Write the payoff matrix for this simultaneous-moves game. Specify the possible Nash equilibria. Is there a pure-strat- egy Nash equilibrium? Is there a mixed-strategy Nash eguilihrium?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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solve all parts as soon asap wiith explanantion