If discouraged workers are included in the determination of the unemployment rate, what effect will it have on the computed rate? There is no relationship between discouraged workers and the unemployment rate determination. O It will lower it because it will reduce the number of unemployed. There will be no impact. It will raise it because there are always discouraged workers.

If discouraged workers are included in the determination of the unemployment rate, what effect will it have on the computed rate? There is no relationship between discouraged workers and the unemployment rate determination. O It will lower it because it will reduce the number of unemployed. There will be no impact. It will raise it because there are always discouraged workers.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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