Q5 **Graph of TB & TC from Hours Working:**The graph illustrates the benefits and costs from working, from the perspective of a worker. The horizontal axis represents the number of work hours per week, denoted by the variable $ Q $.**Formulas:**- **Total Benefit (TB):** $ TB = 1.335Q $ - This formula implies a constant hourly wage of "1.335."- **Total Cost (TC):** $ TC = Q(0.463) + Q^2(0.027) $ - This formula reflects the increasing cost with more hours worked, considering effort and exertion.The graph shows two curves:- A blue line representing TB, which is linear, increasing consistently.- A red curve for TC, which starts low and increases at an accelerating rate, becoming steeper as $ Q $ increases.**Intersection Points:**- At point B (32.3 hours), TC becomes greater than TB, indicating costs outweigh benefits beyond this point.**Table with Points and Values:**- **Point I:** $ Q = 8.075 $, TB = 10.78, TC not provided- **Point C:** $ Q = 16.15 $, TB = 21.57, TC = 14.520, Net Benefit (NB) = 7.041, Marginal Cost (MC) = 1.335- **Point F:** $ Q = 24.23 $, TB = 32.34, TC not provided- **Point B:** $ Q = 32.3 $, TB not provided, TC = 43.120, NB not provided, MC = 2.207**Question:**Which point corresponds to hours worked where Net Benefit (NB) is zero?- The options suggest analysis points like A, B, C, D, F, and E. Point B likely corresponds to zero NB given TC equals TB, as costs surpass benefits here.This analysis teaches the balance between work benefits and costs, emphasizing the concept of diminishing returns when excessive hours lead to higher costs than benefits.

Net benefit is the difference between total benefit and total cost. NB = TB - TC

Graph of TB & TC from Hours Working: The graph below measures the benefits and costs from working, from the perspective of a worker. The variable Q stands for the number of hours the worker works, such that the horizontal axis measures the hours of work per week. On the assumption that they can choose their hours, the worker estimates a total benefit ( TB) from working according to the equation, TB = 1.335Q. (The value "1.335" might be interpreted as the hourly wage paid to the worker.) The worker estimates their total cost from working with the equation, TC = Q(0.463)+Q (0.027). (The TC of each Q might be interpreted as including the displeasure of effort and exertion from working Q hours.) It can be assumed that TC > TB for all hours beyond point B (32.3). TB, TC A 40 H For the question below, use the following table in conjunction with the Figure: Graph of TB & TC of Hours Working. 30 Point TB TC NB MC 8.075 10.78 16.15 14.520 7.041 1.335 F 24.23 20 B 32.3 43.120 2.207 Which of the points corresponds to the amount of hours worked where the NB is zero? O A.I O B. B OC.C O D.F O E. None of the above D 10 10 20 30 40

Graph of TB & TC from Hours Working: The graph below measures the benefits and costs from working, from the perspective of a worker. The variable Q stands for the number of hours the worker works, such that the horizontal axis measures the hours of work per week. On the assumption that they can choose their hours, the worker estimates a total benefit ( TB) from working according to the equation, TB = 1.335Q. (The value "1.335" might be interpreted as the hourly wage paid to the worker.) The worker estimates their total cost from working with the equation, TC = Q(0.463)+Q (0.027). (The TC of each Q might be interpreted as including the displeasure of effort and exertion from working Q hours.) It can be assumed that TC > TB for all hours beyond point B (32.3). TB, TC A 40 H For the question below, use the following table in conjunction with the Figure: Graph of TB & TC of Hours Working. 30 Point TB TC NB MC 8.075 10.78 16.15 14.520 7.041 1.335 F 24.23 20 B 32.3 43.120 2.207 Which of the points corresponds to the amount of hours worked where the NB is zero? O A.I O B. B OC.C O D.F O E. None of the above D 10 10 20 30 40

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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