GoJex and Grav are both considering whether to charge a low price or a high price to their customers. If both firms charge a low price, each firm will make a profit of $5 million. If GoJex charges a low price while Grav charges a high price, GoJex will make a profit of $25 million and Grav will only make a profit of $2 million. On the other hand, if GoJex do not charges a low price while Grav does, GoJex will make a profit of $2 million while Grav will make a profit of $25 million. Finally, if both firms charge a high price, each firm will make a profit of $15 million. a. Use the information above to construct a payoff matrix for GoJex and Grav and What is the dominant strategy for each firm? Explain. b. Based on your answer (point b) above, what is the Nash equilibrium for this game? Explain. c. What is the cooperative (collusion) outcome? Explain

GoJex and Grav are both considering whether to charge a low price or a high price to their customers. If both firms charge a low price, each firm will make a profit of $5 million. If GoJex charges a low price while Grav charges a high price, GoJex will make a profit of $25 million and Grav will only make a profit of $2 million. On the other hand, if GoJex do not charges a low price while Grav does, GoJex will make a profit of $2 million while Grav will make a profit of $25 million. Finally, if both firms charge a high price, each firm will make a profit of $15 million. a. Use the information above to construct a payoff matrix for GoJex and Grav and What is the dominant strategy for each firm? Explain. b. Based on your answer (point b) above, what is the Nash equilibrium for this game? Explain. c. What is the cooperative (collusion) outcome? Explain

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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