For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses price. Considering all of the information given, pricing low v a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses price. Considering all of the information given, pricing low v a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
![Pictech Pricing
High
Low
High
8, 8
4, 13
Flashfone Pricing
Low
13, 4
7,7
For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will
earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms.
If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a
v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses
price.
price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses
If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a
price.
a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech.
Considering all of the information given, pricing low
If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?
O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F353d9390-9d86-4b30-b14b-c5063d2ffce9%2Fc474ec81-0951-4020-b80a-a67e3edfa5f9%2F5uslt7k_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Pictech Pricing
High
Low
High
8, 8
4, 13
Flashfone Pricing
Low
13, 4
7,7
For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $13 million, and Pictech will
earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms.
If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a
v price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses
price.
price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses
If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a
price.
a dominant strategy for both Flashfone and Pictech.
Considering all of the information given, pricing low
If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?
O Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price.
![If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?
Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price.
True or False: The game between Flashfone and Pictech is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma.
True
O False](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F353d9390-9d86-4b30-b14b-c5063d2ffce9%2Fc474ec81-0951-4020-b80a-a67e3edfa5f9%2Fozpesl_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?
Flashfone will choose a high price, and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a high price.
O Both Flashfone and Pictech will choose a low price.
O Flashfone will choose a low price, and Pictech will choose a high price.
True or False: The game between Flashfone and Pictech is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma.
True
O False
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