Firm 1 Silence Disclosure Silence -200, -200 0,-590 Firm 2 Disclosure -590, 0 -450, 450 fine (a hundred million won) 1. Where is the Nash Equilibrium? - find out the dominant strategy O a. (Silence, Silence) = (-200, -200) O b. (Silence, Disclosure) = (-590, 0) c. (Disclosure, Silence) = (0, -590) d. (Disclosure, Disclosure) = (-450, -450)

Firm 1 Silence Disclosure Silence -200, -200 0,-590 Firm 2 Disclosure -590, 0 -450, 450 fine (a hundred million won) 1. Where is the Nash Equilibrium? - find out the dominant strategy O a. (Silence, Silence) = (-200, -200) O b. (Silence, Disclosure) = (-590, 0) c. (Disclosure, Silence) = (0, -590) d. (Disclosure, Disclosure) = (-450, -450)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Economic
60B- What is the Nash equilibrium for this game and identify the profit each player gets at this solution 5 m
age Which of the following statements is the best description of a Nash equilibrium? Select one: O a. An equilibrium outcome achieved by cooperation between players in the game b. An outcome that is achieved when players in the game have jointly maximized profits and divided those profits according to market share of each player O c. An outcome where each player's strategy depends on the behaviour of its opponents d. An outcome where each player's best strategy is to maintain its present behaviour given the present behaviour of the other players Next page
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Player 2 Left Right P1: $4 Player 1 Up P2: $1 P1: $10 Down P2:s10 Which of the Nash Equilibrium to this game are efficient? [Check all that apply] A) (up, left) B) (down, left) C None are efficient (D) (up right) E (down, right) Last saved 4:31:15 PM P1:S1 P2: $6 P1: $0 P2: $11 Grading
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