2. Consider the following game table: Colin Rowena North East Top 4, 3, 1 Middle 3,5 2, 2,3 Bottom 3 3,4 4,2 a. Complete the payoffs of the game table above so that Colin has a dominant strategy. State which strategy is dominant and explain why. (Note: There are many equally correct answers.) Complete the payoffs of the game table above so that neither player has a dominant strategy, but also so that each player does have a dominated strategy. State which strategies are dominated and explain why. (Again, there are many equally correct answers.) b. South ,2

2. Consider the following game table: Colin Rowena North East Top 4, 3, 1 Middle 3,5 2, 2,3 Bottom 3 3,4 4,2 a. Complete the payoffs of the game table above so that Colin has a dominant strategy. State which strategy is dominant and explain why. (Note: There are many equally correct answers.) Complete the payoffs of the game table above so that neither player has a dominant strategy, but also so that each player does have a dominated strategy. State which strategies are dominated and explain why. (Again, there are many equally correct answers.) b. South ,2

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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In the game theory diagram. Is it firstly okay that I use decimals? And what is the Nash equilibrium and dominant strategies of each player. Where high = high price and low = low price. For the two companies
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7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Felix and Janet are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Felix chooses Right and Janet chooses Right, Felix will receive a payoff of 7 and Janet will receive a payoff of 4. Felix Left Right Left 6,3 3,3 Janet Right 6,4 7,4 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Felix chooses and Janet chooses
8. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Tim and Alyssa are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Tim chooses Right and Alyssa chooses Right, Tim will receive a payoff of 3 and Alyssa will receive a payoff of 6. Tim Left Left 5, 6 Right 4, 2 Alyssa Right 5,5 3,6 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Tim chooses and Alyssa chooses
3. The following is an interpretation of the rivalry between the United States (USA) and the Soviet Ünion (USSR) during the cold war. Each side has the choice of two strategies: Aggressive and Restrained. The payoff table is given as follows: USSR Restrained Aggressiveness Restrained 4,3 1,4 USA Aggressiveness 3,1 2,2 a) Consider this game when the two countries move simultaneously. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Next consider three alternative ways in which the game could be played with sequential moves: (i) The USA moves first and the USSR moves second. (i) the USSR moves first and the USA moves second. (i) The USSR moves first, and the USA moves second, but the USSR has a further move after the USA moves. For each case, draw the game tree and find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. c) What are the key strategic issues (commitment, credibility and so on) for the two countries. (Note: Be concise. Your answer should not exceed 300 words].
1. Consider the following game in strategic or normal form. A2 B2 C2 A1 1,0 | 1,2 -2,1 B1 6,2 0,3 2,3 c1 2,2 -2,1| 2,3 a. Use the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. b. What is the set of rationalizable strategies for each player? c. What is/are Nash equilibrium(s) in this game? d. Explain the differences between cooperative and non- cooperative games. What are the fundamental hypotheses about the behavior of the persons in Game theory?
Up Down Up Down Player 1 In the game above, what is/are the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium? (up,up) (up,down) (down, up) (down, down) No equilibrium exists Up Down Player 2 eLearning Help P1 gets $45 P2 gets $155 P1 gets $100 P2 gets $10 P1 gets $85 P2 gets $85 P1 gets $95 P2 gets $95
In the following games, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. GAME 33 Player A Player B B1 10, 12 A1 A2 9,3 A3 8, 10 In Game 33 above, B2 B3 8,8 12, 10 7,6 11, 1 9,4 14, 3 B1 is a dominated strategy for Player B B2 is a dominated strategy for Player B B3 is a dominated strategy for Player B Player B has no dominated strategies.
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Refer to the following payoff table: Firm A's Advertising Budget Multiple Choice Low O Medium High Firm A High Firm A High A Firm B Medium D G Low $900, $900 $1,000 $800 Firm B's Advertising Budget Medium B E H $820, $1,220 $950, $1,025 $875, $920 $800, $875 After the first round of elimination, are there any dominant strategies? If so, which one(s)? C Neither firm has a dominant strategy after the first round. F High $1,060, $1,100 $1,040, $1,000 $1,025, $1,175
Q:3 a,b and c