Bob- Don'tConfessConfessВ: 10 yearsJ: 10 yearsВ: 20 yearsJ: 1 yearConfessJoeВ: 1 yearJ: 20 yearsВ: 2 yearsJ: 2 yearsDon'tConfessThe tal above shows the payoff matrix for a prisoners' dilemma. In the NashequilibriumO Joe will serve 20 years, and Bill will serve 1 year.Bill will serve 20 years, and Joe will serve 1 year.O Both prisoners get 2 years in jail.Both prisoners get 10 years in jail.

Answer to the question is as follows:

Don't Confess Confess В: 10 years J: 10 years B: 20 years J: 1 year Confess Joe Don't Confess В: 1 year J: 20 years В: 2 years J: 2 years he tal above shows the payoff matrix for a prisoners' dilemma. In the Nash quilibrium )Joe will serve 20 years, and Bill will serve 1 year. ) Bill will serve 20 years, and Joe will serve 1 year. OBoth prisoners get 2 years in jail. O Both prisoners get 10 years in jail.

Don't Confess Confess В: 10 years J: 10 years B: 20 years J: 1 year Confess Joe Don't Confess В: 1 year J: 20 years В: 2 years J: 2 years he tal above shows the payoff matrix for a prisoners' dilemma. In the Nash quilibrium )Joe will serve 20 years, and Bill will serve 1 year. ) Bill will serve 20 years, and Joe will serve 1 year. OBoth prisoners get 2 years in jail. O Both prisoners get 10 years in jail.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider a modified Traveler’s Dilemma. In terms of strategy options that the players have and the dollars they earn, it is like the standard Traveler’s Dilemma, but the players do not have endless appetite for money. Up to 100 dollars, each dollar feels like a dollar. But any moneybeyond 100 is psychologically like 100 dollars. Assuming that players are maximizers of ‘psychological’ dollars instead of real dollars, describe all the Nash equilibria of this modified Traveler’s Dilemma.
2 questions refer to the games above. (Fun fact, as an aside: the payoffs reflect the frequencies of the letter pairs formed by the names of the strategies in the English language, per 10,000 words.)
Please show me the correct answer and step, thank you so much for your help
Consider the infinite repeated two-player game where at each stage the play- ers play the non-zero-sum game given by A В A (5, 5) (0,7) В (7, 0) | (2, 2) (a) Consider the following strategies: SA: always play A. SB: always play B. • St: play A on the first stage, thereafter copy what the other player did in the preceding stage. Suppose that the total payoff involves a discount factor 8, and that both players are restricted to the pure strategies SA, SB, and sT. Determine the set of d for which (ST, ST) is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Use the one stage deviation principle to determine whether the pair (ST, ST) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for some range of val- ues of 8.
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1. The technology of interaction for a contractual relationship is given by the matrix below. 2 H L 1 H 5,5 0,8 L 7,0 1,1 Suppose the players write an incomplete contract stating that they agree to play the jointly-efficient outcome (that which maximizes the joint payoff as found in last week's homework). Assume that the court can verify exactly the outcome of produc- tion. (a) Suppose that the court uses expectation damages. Can the jointly- efficient outcome be implemented? Briefly explain. (b) Suppose that the court uses reliance damages. Can the jointly-efficient outcome be implemented? Briefly explain. (c) Suppose that the court uses restitution. Can the jointly-efficient out- come be implemented? Briefly explain.