ccording to research, couples who live together before marriage are more like vorced, even after controlling for relevant variables.3 From an economic po why might this be the case? Because the opportunity cost of seeking a more suitable partner is too hig people just keep cohabiting. Because those who cohabit before marriage are treating their partner like chat should be test driven, instead of a human being who should be loved.4 Because divorce is less expensive when the marginal benefit of divorce equa marginal cost. Because traditional religions prohibit cohabitation before marriage.

ccording to research, couples who live together before marriage are more like vorced, even after controlling for relevant variables.3 From an economic po why might this be the case? Because the opportunity cost of seeking a more suitable partner is too hig people just keep cohabiting. Because those who cohabit before marriage are treating their partner like chat should be test driven, instead of a human being who should be loved.4 Because divorce is less expensive when the marginal benefit of divorce equa marginal cost. Because traditional religions prohibit cohabitation before marriage.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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