Please show your work. Where there are explanations, justify your answer. 1. Consider a game with two players, player 1 and player 2. Player 1 has the possible actions: A and B. Player 2 has the possible actions: C and D. a. If this is a static game, give an example strategy for player 1 and an example strategy for player 2. b. Now assume this is a sequential game with player 1 going first and player 2 moving second (and then the game ends). Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example for player 2. c. Now assume this is a repeated game (so, the stage game is the same as (a.)). The game is played twice. Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example of a strategy for player 2

Please show your work. Where there are explanations, justify your answer. 1. Consider a game with two players, player 1 and player 2. Player 1 has the possible actions: A and B. Player 2 has the possible actions: C and D. a. If this is a static game, give an example strategy for player 1 and an example strategy for player 2. b. Now assume this is a sequential game with player 1 going first and player 2 moving second (and then the game ends). Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example for player 2. c. Now assume this is a repeated game (so, the stage game is the same as (a.)). The game is played twice. Give an example of a strategy for player 1 and an example of a strategy for player 2

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. Consider two players playing a simultaneous moves game. These players can be one of the two states of the world, state 1 or state 2, while playing the game. The payoffs-matrix for the two state games are as follows: State 1 P1 U D P2 L R 1,4 1,0 1,6 2,16 0,0 0,24 M State 2 P1 U D P2 L M R 1,0 1,4 1,6 2,16 0,24 0,0 Each players believes that the two states are equally likely, Derive the BNE of the game.
The game, "the battle of the sexes" (discussed in class) has pure strategy Nash Equilibria and mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (again in numbers). Of these 3 strategy, are pareto efficient. true or false?
**Practice*** Amy and Bob are playing the following board game:(I) Amy starts. She has three possible actions: Pass, Attack, or Defend.(II) Bob observes what Amy chose, and then chooses between three actions with the same names: Pass, Attack, or Defend.(III) If either player passes, or one attacks and the other defends, then the game ends. But if either both players attack, or if both players defend, then Amy has to choose between two actions: Respond or Not Respond. The payoffs are as follows:- If both players pass, both players get a payoff of 0.- If a player attacks and the other player defends, the player that attacks gets a payoff of 1, while the player that defended gets a payoff of 2.- If a player passes but the other player attacks or defends, the player who passes gets a payoff of -1, and the player who attacked or defended gets a payoff of 3.- If both players attack or both players defend:– If Amy responds, she gets a payoff of 4, and Bob gets a payoff of 0.– If Amy does…
Use the following extensive-form game to answer the questions below. A B W Z (60, 120) (50, 50) (0, 0) (100, 150) Use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium. What are the equilibrium strategies? Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. O Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B.
Please explain how to solve the question and arrive at the provided answer. Thank you.
3. Consider the following game with nature: 6, 8 X Y 4, 5, 0 X 4, 6 Y 2 (p) L (1-P) High Low L' H 1 M (1/2) (1/2) 2 M' (9) (1-q) X' 3, 3 Y 10,7 X' 3, 0 Y' 8, 4 Does this game have any separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium? Show your analysis and, if there is such an equilibrium, report it (only one is required).
1. We can use game theory to model everyday interactions. Consider a game that you're well familiar with: The choice of which side of a hallway to select if someone is coming from the other direction and has not yet made their own selection clear. How many Nash equilibria are in this game? Remember, an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if nobody has a profitable unilateral deviation; if no one has reason to be the only one to change what they're doing. 2. Consider following scenario which we can think of as a game played between two oligopoly firms, Timmer's snow removal & Jack's snow removal services. It costs Timmer $200 per customer per year. It costs Jack's $225 per customer per year. If the firms compete by strategically setting prices, what Nash equilibrium price do we expect? Explain. Remember, an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if nobody has a profitable unilateral deviation; if no one has reason to be the only one to change what they're doing.
Consider the following sequential-move game: This game involves three players, each making sequential decisions. The game proceeds as follows: • Player 1 initiates the game by choosing between two actions: Left and Right. • Depending on Player 1's choice, Player 2 then decides, choosing between two actions, left (I) and right (`r`). • Finally, Player 3 makes the last move in the sequence, choosing between actions `a` and `b`. The payoffs are determined by the sequence of choices made by all three players. Each payoff is represented by the triplet (x,y,z), where x, y, and z denote the payoffs for Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3, respectively. For example, if Player 1 chooses 'Left', Player 2 chooses 'I', and Player 3 chooses `a` the resulting payoff would be (3,1,2). This indicates that Player 1 receives a payoff of $3, Player 2 receives a payoff of $1, and Player 3 receives a payoff of $2 for this particular sequence of actions. Left Player 2 Player 1 Right Player 2 Player 3 Player 3…
Could you help me with part 2 please?
Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy C D E F Player 1 A 9, 8 14, 14 18, 25 12, 19 B 23, 13 10, 18 14, 26 19, 21 a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy? multiple choice Strategy B Strategy A Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff. Prev
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Please help with two images Just the answer