5. There are five agents and four states of the world. Agents' valuations in each stateare listed below.state A state B state C state DAgent 1 14842Agent 2 369.7Agent 3 510311Agent 4 710Agent 5 8What is an outcome of a VCG mechanism in this setting?4127

In economics, auctions are a valuable instrument for assessing asset value and redistribution. They…

5. There are five agents and four states of the world. Agents' valuations in each state are listed below. Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 state A state B state C state D 14 3 5 8 6 10 4 9 2 7 10 12 11 Agent 4 7 Agent 5 8 4 What is an outcome of a VCG mechanism in this setting? 6 7

5. There are five agents and four states of the world. Agents' valuations in each state are listed below. Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 state A state B state C state D 14 3 5 8 6 10 4 9 2 7 10 12 11 Agent 4 7 Agent 5 8 4 What is an outcome of a VCG mechanism in this setting? 6 7

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

1) Define Cartel and give an example. 2) Thelma and Louise are being charged for a murder/robbery. They are separated by police and interrogated. They are given the choice to confess or not to confess. The payoff matrix below identifies the years that they will each spend in jail, for the various outcomes. Louise Confess Don't Confess Confess (2 10,10 15.2 Thelma Don't Confess 2,15 3,3 a. Identify the Dominant Strategy for either player, or state that there isn't one. Remember, a "Strategy" is the players move. In this example, state "Confess" or "Don't Confess" for each player, not the payoff. b. Identify the Nash Equilibrium.
88 10 ino 91 p on 12 of 20 > Which trigger strategy does NOT allow for any forgiveness when one player deviates from the cooperative strategy? O trembling hand trigger tit-for-tat O ultimatum trigger 10:45 PM Rain... ENG 11/21/2021 delete home pua prt sc dn 6d 4+ 144 114 num lock backspace 00 6 L home D. enter pause ↑ shift
See attachments
a) Consider that 2 agents make up the demand side of a market. Person A's marginal benefits are MBA 60-0.25Q, and person B's marginal benefits are MBB 60 GB Find market-level marginal benefits
2. Briefly explain four ways in which sellers can convince buyers that they are offering a product of high quality. Which methods apply to the following products: Hyundai automobiles, McDonald's hamburgers, diamonds? Explain.
Please no written by hand solution A local KFC franchisee is evaluating the number of fried chickens to produce each day. The following table shows the 4 alternatives, the states of nature and their payoffs Daily Supply 40 50 60 70 Daily Demand 40 $80 $0 -$80 -$160 50 $80 $100 $20 -$60 60 $80 $100 $120 $40 70 $80 $100 $120 $140 What would your decision be if the following rules are applied? (show your calculation) Maximax Maximin La Place Minimax-regret
6. There are two players. The strategy of player 1 is x, the strategy of player 2 is y. The payoffs are U (x, y) = 2xy – x² and U2(x, y) = 12y + xy – y². What is the NE?
Asap
4. A model of network externalities. Suppose that there are 50 potential consumers in the market for a new technology that exhibits network effects. There is a uniform distribution of consumers with individual valuations, v, ranging from S1, $2,.., S50. Consumer valuation from consuming the technology is given by vN, where N is the number of consumers adopting the technology. Consumers with purchase the product as long as their valuation is greater or equal to the price, so that the marginal consumer has a valuation such that p3vN. The number of consumers adopting the technology is given by the number of people with valuation greater than y, i.e. N = 50 - v. %3D a) Using the information above, derive the relationship between the price of the product and the number of consumers adopting the product, N. Characterize this relationship – does it reflect a typical market demand curve? b) If the price for the product is $600, find the three equilibrium number of adopters in the market. c)…
8. Migros and CarrefourSA use prices as strategic variables. The sale price (SP) for a certain product is 55 TL and the normal price (NP) is 60 TL the unit cost is 45 TL. These supermarkets choose between sales price and the normal price. There are two types of consumers uninformed who buy regardless of the price and they show up randomly and informed buyers who shop around for the lowest price. There are 1000 uninformed and 1200 informed buyers. a. Please construct the payoff table of this game. Compute the equilibrium of this game. b. What happens if Migros announces its price first? Construct the game tree and find the solution. Discuss the results.
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Gabriel and Nia are playing a game that requires both to simultaneously choose an action: Up or Down. The payoff matrix that follows shows the earnings of each person as a function of both of their choices. For example, the upper-right cell shows that if Gabriel chooses Up and Nia chooses Down, Gabriel will receive a payoff of 6 and Nia will receive a payoff of 4. Gabriel Up Down Up 6,3 3,3 Nia Down 6, 4 7,4 In this game, the only dominant strategy is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Gabriel chooses and Nia chooses
11. Game theory terminology Complete the following table by selecting the term best described by each definition. A set of strategies (one for each player) in which each player's strategy is the best option for that player, given the chosen strategy of the player's opponents A strategy in which a player cooperates until the other player defects and then defects until the other player cooperates again The event that occurs when agents in a game form an agreement about which strategies to implement Tit-for- Definition Payoff Matrix Dominant Strategy Nash tat Prisoners' Dilemma Equilibrium Strategy Game Collusion A player's best choice, if it exists, regardless of their opponent's strategy O O O O O O O O O O