Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. How much output does firm 1 produce?Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and no fixed cost. How much profit does firm 2 make?Now assume a collusive equilibrium. What is firm 1's output? **Understanding Market Demand and Marginal Costs in a Duopoly**In the context of a homogeneous-good duopoly, where two firms produce indistinguishable goods, the market dynamics can be described by specific demand and cost functions. ### Inverse Market Demand FunctionThe inverse market demand function presented is:\[ p = 110 - \frac{1}{2}Q \]Where:- $ p $ represents the price of the good.- $ Q $ is the total quantity demanded in the market.### Marginal Costs of FirmsThe marginal cost is the additional cost incurred by producing one more unit of a good.- **Firm 1** has a constant marginal cost represented by: \[ MC_1 = 30 \]- **Firm 2** has a constant marginal cost represented by: \[ MC_2 = 40 \]In this scenario:- The price at which the good is sold decreases as the total quantity demanded (Q) increases.- Firm 1 incurs a lower marginal cost of $ 30 $ per unit.- Firm 2 incurs a higher marginal cost of $ 40 $ per unit.Understanding these concepts is crucial for analyzing how each firm in the duopoly will make production decisions based on the costs they incur and the demand they face in the market.

A market structure in which there are only two firms or sellers that produce and sell a homogeneous…

Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. How much output does firm 1 produce? Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and no fixed cost. How much profit does firm 2 make? Now assume a collusive equilibrium. What is firm 1's output?

Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. How much output does firm 1 produce? Assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and no fixed cost. How much profit does firm 2 make? Now assume a collusive equilibrium. What is firm 1's output?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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a) Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits πANE and πBNE, for each firm. b) Suppose the marginal cost for firm B increases from $20 to $140, while everything else remains unchanged. Find the new equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the new equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the new profits πANE and πBNE for each firm. c) Suppose that, in addition to the marginal cost increase from $20 to $140 from sub question b), firm B also has a fixed cost of $2500, out of which $2100 may be recouped if it shuts down; everything else remains unchanged. In this case, what will firm B’s optimal output be? (Justify your answer.) What will firm A’s profit be?
HP and Sony compete primarily by price. Each firm must choose either a high price or a low price simultaneously. Use the following information to create the profit matrix: If HP and Lenovo both set high prices, HP’s profit is $40 million and Sony’s profit is $35 million. If HP sets high price and Sony sets low price, HP’s profit is $25 million and Sony’s profit is $40 million. If HP sets low price and Sony sets high price, HP’s profit is $50 million and Sony’s profit is $10 million. If HP and Sony set low prices, HP has $20 million and Sony has $15 million. Please answer the follow questions: Does Sony have a dominant strategy? HP? If so, which one? If HP and Sony maximize their profits non-cooperatively, what is the Nash-equilibrium for this profit matrix? Instead, if HP and Sony maximize their joint profits cooperatively, what is the equilibrium? Assume they keep their agreements.
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
2) Assume that there are 2 firms producing an identical product. Both firms have the same total cost function TC(q) =q2. The inverse demand function for the firms' output is p=120 Q, where Q is the total output and p is price. 1. What are the equilibrium price, output and profits of each firm if they are competing with each other? (Hint: Consider the equilibrium in a Cournot game.) 2. What happens if they form a cartel? Calculate the equilibrium price, output, and profits for the cartel? 3. If a single firm cheated, what would its output and profits be, assuming the other firm maintains the cartel price? Calculate the new outputs and profits for bath firms: 4. Discuss why it is hard to enforce a cartel. Explain using words. DO NOT do any calculations. DO NOT draw any graphs. 5. What can the cartel members do to enforce the cartel agreement? Propose a method. Describe the method using words. DO NOT do any calculations. DO NOT draw any graphs.
Suppose the market for fast-food value meals is monopolistically competitive, with many restaurants selling their own brand of food. Assume the restaurants in the industry behave optimally by maximizing profit. The figure to the right represents the market for one monopolistically competitive firm's value meals. How will this figure change as the market moves toward long-run equilibrium? In the long run, O A. the average cost curve and the marginal cost curve will shift up because the firms are currently making profit. O B. the demand curve will shift to the left and become more elastic because the firms are currently making profit. nothing will change because monopolistically competitive markets have barriers to new firms entering. OC. O D. the demand curve will shift to the right and become more elastic because the firms are currently experiencing losses. O E. nothing will change because the firms in this market are breaking even. Price and cost (per value meal) 8.00- 7.60- 7.20 6.80…
Let ci be the constant marginal and average cost for firm i (so that firms may have different marginal costs). Suppose demand is given by P=1-Q. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities assuming there are two firms in a Cournot market. Also compute market output, market price, firm profits, industry prof- its, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Represent the Nash equilibrium on a best-response function diagram. Show how a reduction in firm 1’s cost would change the equilibrium. Draw a representative isoprofit for firm 1.
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Cournot competition: P=200-Q (hint: Q is industry output), both firms have constant MC=5. What are the Nash Equilibrium price and quantity for both firms? Please show all steps
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QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)
21. In the industry, only two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) operate and they produce a homogenous good. They collude: they maximize their joint profit and split it equally between them. Firm I has the total cost of producing q; units of output given by the function TC(q)-8q1. The total cost of producing q: units of output for Firm 2 is TC(q)-q. Only integer quantities are allowed (no fractions). The market demand for the good is Q(P)-72-P, where Q is the quantity demanded and P is the unit price of the good. How many units of the good do cach firm produce in the equilibrium? A. Each firm produces 14 units. B. Firm I produces 32 units, and Firm 2 produces 2 units. C. Firm 1 produces 28 units, and Firm 2 produces 4 units. D. Each firm produces 16 units. E. None of the above
cost function is c(y) An industry has two firms. Firm 1's cost function is c(y) = 3y + 200 and firm 2's 3y + 100. The demand curve for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line. In a Cournot equilibrium, where both firms produce positive amounts of output: = The firm with higher fixed costs produces more. Both firms produce the same amount of output. There is less output than there would be if the firms colluded to maximize joint profits. It is not possible to tell because the demand function is not specified. The firm with lower fixed costs produces more.