The market demand function is Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is Profits for the firms are and Q-7,000-1,000p. 9₁ units and 92= units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) p=$(Enter your response rounded to two decimal places) x₁ =$ ₂=$(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places)

The market demand function is Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is Profits for the firms are and Q-7,000-1,000p. 9₁ units and 92= units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) p=$(Enter your response rounded to two decimal places) x₁ =$ ₂=$(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

The market demand function is
Each firm has a marginal cost of m = $0.28. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits.
The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are
The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is
Profits for the firms are
and
92
p = $
π2
$
=
Q=7,000 1,000p.
91
and
units
units. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.)
(Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)
π₁ = $
(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.)

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