A local real estate investor in Orlando is considering three alternative investments: a motel, a restaurant, or a theater. Profits from the motel or restaurant will be affected by the availability of gasoline and the number of tourists; profits from the theater will be relatively stable under any conditions. The following payoff table shows the profit or loss that could result from each investment. Based on the Maximax criteria, the investor should choose Investment Motel Restaurant Theater Motel O Restaurant Theater Any of the three Shortage $-8,000 2,000 6,000 Gasoline Availability Stable Supply $15,000 8,000 6,000 Surplus $20,000 6,000 5,000

A local real estate investor in Orlando is considering three alternative investments: a motel, a restaurant, or a theater. Profits from the motel or restaurant will be affected by the availability of gasoline and the number of tourists; profits from the theater will be relatively stable under any conditions. The following payoff table shows the profit or loss that could result from each investment. Based on the Maximax criteria, the investor should choose Investment Motel Restaurant Theater Motel O Restaurant Theater Any of the three Shortage $-8,000 2,000 6,000 Gasoline Availability Stable Supply $15,000 8,000 6,000 Surplus $20,000 6,000 5,000

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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