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Consider a game where both players have 4 possible moves, di, i = 1,...4 for player 1 and 6j, j = 1,...4 for player. The payoff matrix is as follows: 81 82 83 84 d₁ (0,9) (0,1) (3,4) (8,1) d2 (6,0) (3,2) (6,4) (7,2) d3 (4,6) (10,0) (3,8) (10,5) d4 (7,7) (6,3) (4,9) (0,4) What are the rewards received by the players at the equilibrium/equilibria? O a. (8,1) O b. There is no equilibrium O c. (0,4) O d. (0,9) O e. O f. Another answer O g. (4,9) Oh. (7,2) Oi. (7,7) O j. (3,2) (10,0)

Consider a game where both players have 4 possible moves, di, i = 1,...4 for player 1 and 6j, j = 1,...4 for player. The payoff matrix is as follows: 81 82 83 84 d₁ (0,9) (0,1) (3,4) (8,1) d2 (6,0) (3,2) (6,4) (7,2) d3 (4,6) (10,0) (3,8) (10,5) d4 (7,7) (6,3) (4,9) (0,4) What are the rewards received by the players at the equilibrium/equilibria? O a. (8,1) O b. There is no equilibrium O c. (0,4) O d. (0,9) O e. O f. Another answer O g. (4,9) Oh. (7,2) Oi. (7,7) O j. (3,2) (10,0)

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter18: Auctions
Section: Chapter Questions
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n Consider a game where both players have 4 possible moves, di, i = 1,...4 for player 1 and 8j, j = 1,...4 for player. The payoff matrix is as follows: 81 82 83 84 d₁ (0,9) (0,1) (3,4) (8,1) d₂ (6,0) (3,2) (6,4) (7,2) d3 (4,6) (10,0) (3,8) (10,5) d4 (7,7) (6,3) (4,9) (0,4) What are the rewards received by the players at the equilibrium/equilibria? O a. (8,1) O b. There is no equilibrium O c. (0,4) O d. (0,9) O e. O f. O g. (4,9) Oh. (7,2) O i. (7,7) O j. (3,2) (10,0) Another answer
Transcribed Image Text:n Consider a game where both players have 4 possible moves, di, i = 1,...4 for player 1 and 8j, j = 1,...4 for player. The payoff matrix is as follows: 81 82 83 84 d₁ (0,9) (0,1) (3,4) (8,1) d₂ (6,0) (3,2) (6,4) (7,2) d3 (4,6) (10,0) (3,8) (10,5) d4 (7,7) (6,3) (4,9) (0,4) What are the rewards received by the players at the equilibrium/equilibria? O a. (8,1) O b. There is no equilibrium O c. (0,4) O d. (0,9) O e. O f. O g. (4,9) Oh. (7,2) O i. (7,7) O j. (3,2) (10,0) Another answer
Consider a game between player A with a choice between moves d₁, d2 and d3, and player B with a choice between 81, 82 and 83, and the following pay-off matrix: 81 82 83 d₁ (3,2) (2,0) (1,-1) d2 (1,0) (3,1) (2,-2) d3 (0,0) (2,3) (1,2) Is that game solvable? (We consider strong Pareto optimality for that question.) O a. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d₁, 61, (d2, 62) O b. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solution (d₁, 81) О с. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 61), (d2, 82) Od. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d1, 61), (d3, 82), (d2, 82) O e. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 81), (d3, 82), (d2, 62), (d3, 83) O f. The game is not solvable Og. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 61), (d3, 62), (d2, 82) Oh. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d1, 81), (d3, 82)
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a game between player A with a choice between moves d₁, d2 and d3, and player B with a choice between 81, 82 and 83, and the following pay-off matrix: 81 82 83 d₁ (3,2) (2,0) (1,-1) d2 (1,0) (3,1) (2,-2) d3 (0,0) (2,3) (1,2) Is that game solvable? (We consider strong Pareto optimality for that question.) O a. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d₁, 61, (d2, 62) O b. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solution (d₁, 81) О с. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 61), (d2, 82) Od. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d1, 61), (d3, 82), (d2, 82) O e. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 81), (d3, 82), (d2, 62), (d3, 83) O f. The game is not solvable Og. The game is solvable in the completely weak sense, with solutions (d₁, 61), (d3, 62), (d2, 82) Oh. The game is solvable in the strict sense, with solutions (d1, 81), (d3, 82)
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