9. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that the presidents of two auto manufacturing companies exchange text messages in which they discuss jointly raising prices on their new lines of hybrid SUVs. This illegal communication would violate which of the following laws? The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 O The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 O The Clayton Act of 1914

9. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that the presidents of two auto manufacturing companies exchange text messages in which they discuss jointly raising prices on their new lines of hybrid SUVs. This illegal communication would violate which of the following laws? The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 O The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 O The Clayton Act of 1914

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4) Which of the following companies is least likely to operate in an oligopoly? Burger King, which sells fast food Frontier, which provides Internet services AHF pharmacy Verizon, which provides cell phone coverage
Suppose that a small town has seven burger shops whose respective shares of the local hamburger market are (as percentages of all hamburgers sold): 18 percent, 24 percent, 20 percent, 11 percent, 10 percent, 9 percent, and 8 percent. The four-firm concentration ratio for the hamburger industry in this town is percent. (Enter your response as a whole number.) The Herfindahl index for the hamburger industry in this town is (Enter your response as a whole number.) Suppose the top three sellers combined to form a single firm. The four-firm concentration ratio would be percent. (Enter your response as a whole number.) Suppose the top three sellers combined to form a single firm. The Herfindahl index would be (Enter your response as a whole number.)
8. Two firms, the only firms in the market, sell the same product and have the same marginal cost. They realise they would be better off if they didn't compete with each other. They enter an alternating offers bargaining game to decide how they will divide the monopoly profit, n. They have three periods to come to an agreement. If no agreement is reached after three periods, the firms will compete simultaneously in prices. The firms toss a coin to decide who makes the first offer in the bargaining game. Firm 1 wins and decides to go first. Each firm has a discount factor o. a) Draw the game tree. b) What is the subgame perfect equilibrium when 8 = 0.5? c) What is the equilibrium payoff for each firm? d) Was Firm 1 wise to opt to make the first offer? Explain your answer. %3D
QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)
1. What do we mean by market power in economics? What are some ways firms can attain market power? How can we, as economists, know when a firm has "too much" market power? Give an example of a firm you think has a lot of market power.2. Chapter 3 is all about game theory. Imagine you are in charge of pricing at a firm that has 20% market share in an industry where the leading firm has 50% market share. Imagine that the leader increases prices on their products. How do you think you would react? Why?
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Assume that the market for oil is made up of two firms: Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also assume that New England has dozens of breweries and each of these make beers with different tastes, colors, and aromas. Which of the following statements is true? The market structure for oil is an oligopoly, and the one for beer is monopolistic competition. The market structure for oil is monopolistic competition, and the one for beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is monopolistic competition.
The following table reports the four firm concentration ratio for five different industries: Part 1: Refer to the table above. In which industry do the four largest firms have the most market power? Part2: Refer to the table above. I'm which industry do the four largest firms have the least market power?
1. which compete in quantities (Cournot -Nash equilibrium = C) 2. which compete in quantities with the first firm (the Leader) choosing the output first (Stackelberg competition = S). 3. which collude and choose quantities in order to maximize the joint profits (behave like two plants of a multiplant monopoly = M).
2. Consider the following game: Soapy Inc. and Suddies Inc. are the only producers of soap powder. They collude and agree to share the market equally. If neither firm cheats on the agreement, each makes $1 million profit. If either firm cheats, the cheat makes a profit of $1.5 million, while the complier incurs a loss of $0.5 million. If both cheat, they break even. Neither firm can monitor the other's actions. a) Construct the payoff matrix. b) What is the dominant strategy? c) What is the nash equilibrium for this game?
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Suppose a duopoly market can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Which of the following statements is correct? Group of answer choices -At the equilibrium, firms produce less total output than if there was a monopoly. Consumers are better off than with a monopoly. -At the equilibrium, firms produce more total output than if there was a monopoly. Consumers are better off than with a monopoly. -At the equilibrium, firms produce the same total output as if there was a monopoly. Consumers are better off than with a monopoly. -At the equilibrium, firms produce more total output than if there was a monopoly. Consumers are worse off than with a monopoly. -At the equilibrium, firms produce the same total output as if there was a monopoly. Consumers are worse off than with a monopoly. -At the equilibrium, firms produce less total output than if there was a monopoly. Consumers are worse off than with a monopoly.