4The following table shows the payoff matrix of the two firms (Firm X and Firm Y), in dollars, when they advertise and when they do not advertise.Table 12.1Firm YFirm XAdvertiseFirm X 100Firm Y 150Firm X 180Not Advertise Firm Y 80AdvertiseNot AdvertiseFirm X 50Firm Y 200Firm X150Firm Y 180According to Table 12.1, if both the firms follow their dominant strategies,firm X earns $50 and firm Y earns $200.firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $150.O firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $100.O firm X earns $100 and firm Y earns $150.O firm X earns $150 and firm Y earns $180.

Let's analyze the given payoff matrix in Table 12.1:The values in each cell represent the payoffs…

The following table shows the payoff matrix of the two firms (Firm X and Firm Y), in dollars, when they advertise and when they do not advertise Table 12.11 Firm Y Advertise Firm X Advertise Firm X 100 Eirm Y 150 Firm X 160 Not Advertise Firm Y 80 Not Advertise Firm X 60 Firm Y 200 Fem X 150 Firm Y 180 According to Table 12.1, if both the firms follow their dominant strategies, O firm X earns $50 and firm Y earns $200. O firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $150. O firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $100. firm X earns $100 and firm Y earns $150. firm X earns $150 and firm Y earns $180.

The following table shows the payoff matrix of the two firms (Firm X and Firm Y), in dollars, when they advertise and when they do not advertise Table 12.11 Firm Y Advertise Firm X Advertise Firm X 100 Eirm Y 150 Firm X 160 Not Advertise Firm Y 80 Not Advertise Firm X 60 Firm Y 200 Fem X 150 Firm Y 180 According to Table 12.1, if both the firms follow their dominant strategies, O firm X earns $50 and firm Y earns $200. O firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $150. O firm X earns $180 and firm Y earns $100. firm X earns $100 and firm Y earns $150. firm X earns $150 and firm Y earns $180.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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