8. Collusive outcome versus Nash equilibrium Suppose there is a remote stretch of highway along which two restaurants, Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner, operate in a duopoly. Neither restaurant invests in keeping up with health code regulations, but regardless they both have customers as they are the only dining options along a 79- mile portion of the road. Both restaurants know that if they clean up and comply with health codes they will attract more customers, but this also means ans that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $11,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $5,000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $15,000, and the other restaurant will make only $3,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) Desolate Diner Cleans Up Doesnt Clean Up Cleans Up Doesnt Clean Up

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8. Collusive outcome versus Nash equilibrium
Suppose there is a remote stretch of highway along which two restaurants, Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner, operate in a duopoly. Neither
restaurant invests in keeping up with health code regulations, but regardless they both have customers as they are the only dining options along a 79-
mile portion of the road. Both restaurants know that if they clean up and comply with health codes they will attract more customers, but this also
means that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning.
If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $11,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $8,000. However, if one cleans
and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $15,000, and the other restaurant will
make only $3,000.
Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.)
Last Chance Cate
Cleans Up
Doesnt Clean Up
Cleans Up
Desolate Diner
11
Doesn't Clean Up
Last Chance Cafe and Despiate Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: Last Chance Cafe
and Desolate
both restaurants deode to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: Last
Chance Cale
57°F Mostly clow
Transcribed Image Text:8. Collusive outcome versus Nash equilibrium Suppose there is a remote stretch of highway along which two restaurants, Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner, operate in a duopoly. Neither restaurant invests in keeping up with health code regulations, but regardless they both have customers as they are the only dining options along a 79- mile portion of the road. Both restaurants know that if they clean up and comply with health codes they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $11,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $8,000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $15,000, and the other restaurant will make only $3,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) Last Chance Cate Cleans Up Doesnt Clean Up Cleans Up Desolate Diner 11 Doesn't Clean Up Last Chance Cafe and Despiate Diner decide to collude, the outcome of this game is as follows: Last Chance Cafe and Desolate both restaurants deode to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows: Last Chance Cale 57°F Mostly clow
Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Cafe and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.)
arch
Last Chance Cate
Cleans Up
Doesn't Clean Up
Cleans Up
E
Desolate Diner
1 Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner decide to collude, the outcome of the game is as follows: Last Chance Café
Diner
A
S
Doesn't Clean Up
cleans
If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibour does not clean as follows: Last
Chance Cale
and Desolate Diner
6
and Desolate
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57°F Mostly clou
Transcribed Image Text:Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Cafe and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) arch Last Chance Cate Cleans Up Doesn't Clean Up Cleans Up E Desolate Diner 1 Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner decide to collude, the outcome of the game is as follows: Last Chance Café Diner A S Doesn't Clean Up cleans If both restaurants decide to cheat and behave noncooperatively, the outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibour does not clean as follows: Last Chance Cale and Desolate Diner 6 and Desolate Grade It Now Save & Continue Continue without saving 57°F Mostly clou
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