5. Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00-9:00 P.M. and the 9:00-10:00 P.M. slots on a given night. Each has two shows to fill these time periods. Each can choose whether to put its more popular show in the early or the 9:00-10:00 P.M. slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following results for “rating points." CBS Early Slot Late Slot NBC Early Slot 20, 30 18, 18 Late Slot 15, 15 30, 10 (A) Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time. (B) What will be the equilibrium if NBC makes it selection first? If CBS makes it selection first?

5. Two major networks are competing for viewer ratings in the 8:00-9:00 P.M. and the 9:00-10:00 P.M. slots on a given night. Each has two shows to fill these time periods. Each can choose whether to put its more popular show in the early or the 9:00-10:00 P.M. slot. The combination of decisions leads to the following results for “rating points." CBS Early Slot Late Slot NBC Early Slot 20, 30 18, 18 Late Slot 15, 15 30, 10 (A) Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both networks make their decisions at the same time. (B) What will be the equilibrium if NBC makes it selection first? If CBS makes it selection first?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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O Cell A O Cell C O Cell E O Cell I None of the above