answer the following questions regarding the matrix below, which represents the strategic nteraction between the two largest movie production studios, Universal Pictures and 20th Century ox. They are each deciding the release dates for their own summer blockbuster action movies. They can release their movies in June, July, or August. Because of limited demand for going to the novies, each firm would generally rather release their movies earlier than later. Similarly, they would rather not release their movies at the same time, as it dilutes the demand for their movies. The matrix form of the game is as follows: Universal June July August June 5,5 4,6 7,8 Fox July 6,4 5,5 4,6 August 8,6 6,5 5,4 ) Suppose Universal and Fox make their decisions simultaneously. Are there any Nash equilibria? If so, what are they? Show your work. ) Suppose they move sequentially, and that Fox moves first. First set up the game tree. What will be the equilibrium path of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome? Would Fox want this to happen? Explain intuitively why or why not.
answer the following questions regarding the matrix below, which represents the strategic nteraction between the two largest movie production studios, Universal Pictures and 20th Century ox. They are each deciding the release dates for their own summer blockbuster action movies. They can release their movies in June, July, or August. Because of limited demand for going to the novies, each firm would generally rather release their movies earlier than later. Similarly, they would rather not release their movies at the same time, as it dilutes the demand for their movies. The matrix form of the game is as follows: Universal June July August June 5,5 4,6 7,8 Fox July 6,4 5,5 4,6 August 8,6 6,5 5,4 ) Suppose Universal and Fox make their decisions simultaneously. Are there any Nash equilibria? If so, what are they? Show your work. ) Suppose they move sequentially, and that Fox moves first. First set up the game tree. What will be the equilibrium path of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome? Would Fox want this to happen? Explain intuitively why or why not.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Transcribed Image Text:Answer the following questions regarding the matrix below, which represents the strategic
interaction between the two largest movie production studios, Universal Pictures and 20th Century
Fox. They are each deciding the release dates for their own summer blockbuster action movies.
They can release their movies in June, July, or August. Because of limited demand for going to the
movies, each firm would generally rather release their movies earlier than later. Similarly, they
would rather not release their movies at the same time, as it dilutes the demand for their movies.
The matrix form of the game is as follows:
Universal
June
July
August
June
5,5
4,6
7,8
Fox
July
6,4
5,5
4,6
August
8,6
6,5
5,4
d) Suppose Universal and Fox make their decisions simultaneously. Are there any Nash equilibria?
If so, what are they? Show your work.
e) Suppose they move sequentially, and that Fox moves first. First set up the game tree. What will
be the equilibrium path of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome? Would Fox want
this to happen? Explain intuitively why or why not.
f) Suppose now that Universal moves first. Set up the game tree and find the equilibrium path of
the Nash equilibrium. Would Fox want this to happen? Explain intuitively why or why not.
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