Consider a duopolistic market in which the two identical firms compete by selecting their quantities. The inverse market demand is P(Q) = 210−Q and each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume that fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Cournot Model Determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this market.(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1= ? units. Firm 2's quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P= ? Stackelberg Model Determine the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for this market, assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1 = ? units Firm 2s quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P = ?
Consider a duopolistic market in which the two identical firms compete by selecting their quantities. The inverse market demand is
P(Q) = 210−Q and each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume that fixed costs are negligible for both firms.
Cournot Model
Determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this market.(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.)
Firm 1's quantity: q1= ? units.
Firm 2's quantity: q2 = ? units.
Market price: P= ?
Stackelberg Model
Determine the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for this market, assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.)
Firm 1's quantity: q1 = ? units
Firm 2s quantity: q2 = ? units.
Market price: P = ?
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