4. Third-Degree Price Discrimination. A monopolist has two sets of customers: low demand and high demand. Suppose that the demand functions for both types of consumers are given by the following equations: QL-1600-2PL and Qi-4800 - P.The monopolist faces constant marginal cost of $200. Suppose that the monopolist can separate the two groups and charge separate, profit maximizing prices to each. Suppose that cannot discriminate between the two groups (Hint: be careful in your analysis and think of reservation prices) 1. What price will the monopolist set? 2. What is consumer surplus in this case?

4. Third-Degree Price Discrimination. A monopolist has two sets of customers: low demand and high demand. Suppose that the demand functions for both types of consumers are given by the following equations: QL-1600-2PL and Qi-4800 - P.The monopolist faces constant marginal cost of $200. Suppose that the monopolist can separate the two groups and charge separate, profit maximizing prices to each. Suppose that cannot discriminate between the two groups (Hint: be careful in your analysis and think of reservation prices) 1. What price will the monopolist set? 2. What is consumer surplus in this case?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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