4) Suppose there are two firms that compete in prices, say firms 1 and 2, but that the firms produce differentiated products. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is 91 (P₁, P2) 10-2p₁ + P2 and the demand for firm 2 is q2 (P2, P₁) = 10 - 2p2 + P₁. Also, assume that firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of C₁ = 2 and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of C₂ = 3. - a) What are the reaction functions for both firms? b) Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in prices. c) Now, suppose firms 1 and 2 agree to merge. However, under the merger only firm 1 will operate and firms 1 and 2 will split the resulting profits equally. Will both firms agree to such a plan or do they prefer the Bertrand outcome?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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4) Suppose there are two firms that compete in prices, say firms 1 and 2, but that the
firms produce differentiated products. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is
9₁(P₁, P2) = 10 - 2p₁ + P₂ and the demand for firm 2 is q2 (P2, P₁) = 10 - 2p₂ + P₁.
Also, assume that firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of c₁ = 2 and firm 2 has a constant
marginal cost of c₂ = 3.
a) What are the reaction functions for both firms?
Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in prices.
b)
c) Now, suppose firms 1 and 2 agree to merge. However, under the merger only
firm 1 will operate and firms 1 and 2 will split the resulting profits equally. Will
both firms agree to such a plan or do they prefer the Bertrand outcome?
Transcribed Image Text:4) Suppose there are two firms that compete in prices, say firms 1 and 2, but that the firms produce differentiated products. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is 9₁(P₁, P2) = 10 - 2p₁ + P₂ and the demand for firm 2 is q2 (P2, P₁) = 10 - 2p₂ + P₁. Also, assume that firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of c₁ = 2 and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of c₂ = 3. a) What are the reaction functions for both firms? Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in prices. b) c) Now, suppose firms 1 and 2 agree to merge. However, under the merger only firm 1 will operate and firms 1 and 2 will split the resulting profits equally. Will both firms agree to such a plan or do they prefer the Bertrand outcome?
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