Suppose we have two identical firms A and B, selling identical products. They are the only firms in the market and compete by choosing quantities at the same time. The Market demand curve is given by P=390-Q. The only cost is a constant marginal cost of $14. Suppose Firm A produces a quantity of 57 and Firm B produces a quantity of 44. If Firm A decides to increase its quantity by 1 unit while Firm B continues to produce the same 44 units, what is the Marginal Revenue for Firm A from this extra unit? Enter a number only, no $ sign. Don't forget to include the negative sign if revenue decreases. 231

Suppose we have two identical firms A and B, selling identical products. They are the only firms in the market and compete by choosing quantities at the same time. The Market demand curve is given by P=390-Q. The only cost is a constant marginal cost of $14. Suppose Firm A produces a quantity of 57 and Firm B produces a quantity of 44. If Firm A decides to increase its quantity by 1 unit while Firm B continues to produce the same 44 units, what is the Marginal Revenue for Firm A from this extra unit? Enter a number only, no $ sign. Don't forget to include the negative sign if revenue decreases. 231

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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