3. The (market) inverse demand function for a good is as follows: Pp(q) = {12-2q if g € (0,6], if q> 6. There are two firms: N = {1,2}. Each firm's cost function is such that producing r units of the good incurs cost 2r. We consider the Cournot competition of the two firms. That is, they simultaneously choose their quantities. The firms are profit-maximizers. (1) Find a Nash equilibrium. (2) What is the size of the deadweight loss incurred by the Duopoly, compared to the competitive equilibrium allocation?

3. The (market) inverse demand function for a good is as follows: Pp(q) = {12-2q if g € (0,6], if q> 6. There are two firms: N = {1,2}. Each firm's cost function is such that producing r units of the good incurs cost 2r. We consider the Cournot competition of the two firms. That is, they simultaneously choose their quantities. The firms are profit-maximizers. (1) Find a Nash equilibrium. (2) What is the size of the deadweight loss incurred by the Duopoly, compared to the competitive equilibrium allocation?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider an industry comprised of three identical firms faced with a linear cost function given by: C(qi) = cqi; for i = 1; 2; 3. Let inverse market demand be given by: P(Q) = a - bQ; where Q = q1 + q2 + q3.a. Compute the Cournot equilibrium; that is, find prices, quantities, and profits.b. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 merge, converting the market into a duopoly consisting of the “superfirm” and firm 3. Compute the new Cournot equilibrium. Once again find prices, quantities, and profits.c. Suppose that all three firms merge. Compute quantities, prices, and profits for the cartel solution.d. Suppose that firm 1 and 2 represent two members of OPEC – Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, say – while firm 3 is a non-OPEC oil exporting country – Russia, say. Describe the dynamics of OPEC. (Hint: re-interpret the solution to part 2, as 1 firm deviating from the fully cartelized solution. Is it convenient to have a partial cartel?)
Consider an industry with two identical firms (denoted firm 1 and 2) producing a homogenous good. Firms compete in quantities. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 20. Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 80. Demand in the industry is given by D(p) = 380 - p. Let q1 and 92 denote the quantities of firm 1 and 2, respectively. Derive the Nash equilibrium in quantities. What is the total production in this industry?
Two firms, A and B, sell the same good X in a market with total demand Q = 100 – P. The two firms compete on quantities and decides how much to produce simultaneously. Firm A cost function is C(qA) = 40qA. Firm B cost function is C(qB) = 60qB. 1. Find the best reply functions of both firms and represent them in a graph. 2. Find the quantity produced by each firm in a Nash equilibrium. 3. Find the firms and consumers surplus. 4. Compare the surplus of firms found above with the surplus arising when both firm cooperate to sustain a monopoly outcome. 5. Assume now that A and B compete as in a Stackelberg model. A chooses first and B chooses after observing the choice of A. Find equilibrium quantities produced by each firm and the market equilibrium price.
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(Preferably answered digitally as I have a hard time understanding paper hand writing.)
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1. marginal costs e, = c, = c, = 20. The inverse demand function is given by P = 100 - Q. where Q = q, + 4: + 93- Consider a market with three firms (i - 1, 2, 3). which have identical a) Identify the reaction functions for each firm and compute the Cournot equilibrium, i.e., the market price and quantity. b) What happens to the market price if all three firms merge compared to part (a)?