. Consider a market with inverse demand P(Q) = 100 Q and two firms with cost function C(q) = 20q. (A) Find the Stackelberg equilibrium outputs, price and total profits (with firm 1 as the leader).
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1. Consider a market with inverse
(A) Find the Stackelberg
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- There are two firms selling differentiated products. Firm A faces the following demand for his product: QA=20-1/2PA+1/4PB Firm B faces the following demand: QB=220-1/2PB+1/4PA PA represents the price set by firm A. PB represents the price set by firm B.Assume that the marginal cost is zero both for firm A and firm B.What are the equilibrium prices of a simultaneous price competition?What would the equilibrium prices be if A is the leader and B is the follower?Suppose that Raleigh and Dawes are the only sellers of bicycles in the UK. The inverse market demand function for bicycles is P(Y)=200-2Y. Both firms have the same total cost function: TC(Y)=12Y and the same marginal cost: MC(Y)=12. Suppose this market is a Stackelberg oligopoly, and Raleigh is the first mover. Write down a formula for the reaction function of Dawes. Calculate the equilibrium quantity that each firm produces and the equilibrium price in the market. Give typing answer with explanation and conclusionAdditional Problem 3: Assume two companies (C and D) are Cournot duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: ? = 600 − ?C − ?D where ?C and ?D are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the price. Total cost functions for the two companies are ??C= 25,000 +100?C 2 ??D = 20,000 + 125?D c. Determine the equilibrium price and quantities sold by each firm. d.Determine the profits for the market as well as eachfirm.
- Consider a market with the demand curve Q(P) = 3700– 100P. Two companies compete in Bertrand setting, where the first company has a marginal cost of $10 and a capacity of 100 units, and the second firm has a marginal cost of $20 and a capacity of 1000 units. Assume that fixed costs are zero. a) Show that both firms will sell in this market at a price above $20. b) Assume that the first firm is capacity constrained. From the perspective of the second firm, find the quantity sold in the market and the price set by the second firm. c) Now, using the result from the previous part, from the perspective of the first firm, find the quantity sold in the market and the respective price set by the first firm.Question 3 Suppose that the cost function of a firm is C(q)=4q. Suppose that this is the only firm in the market, and demand is Q(p)=10-p. What is the amount of the good produced in a competitive equilibrium in this economy? 7 4 6 3 51. marginal costs e, = c, = c, = 20. The inverse demand function is given by P = 100 - Q. where Q = q, + 4: + 93- Consider a market with three firms (i - 1, 2, 3). which have identical a) Identify the reaction functions for each firm and compute the Cournot equilibrium, i.e., the market price and quantity. b) What happens to the market price if all three firms merge compared to part (a)?
- Problem 3. Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3 are the only competitors in a market for a good. The price in the market is given by the inverse demand equation P=10 (Q1+Q2+Q3) where Q, is the output of Firm i (i=1,2,3). Firm 1's total cost function is C₁ = 4Q₁+1, Firm 2's total cost function is C₂ = 2Q2 +3, and Firm 3's total cost function is C3 = 3Q3 + 2. Each firm wants to maximize its profits and they simultaneously choose their quantities. Determine a Nash equilibrium in this market.Consider the Cournot competition between two firms with different marginal costs. For firm 1, let the cost function be: C1(q1)-3*q1 For firm 2, let the cost function be: C2(q2)-6*q2 The inverse demand function is: P(Q)=12-Q, where Q=q1+q2 In this game, write down the profit functions for firm 1 and firm 2 (as functions of q1 and q2). Then, find the Nash equilibrium quantities for firm 1 and firm 2. In the NE, which firm produces more: the one with the low or the high marginal cost? Note: To get credit, you need to show your calculations and explain your answer.Two firms - firm 1 and firm 2 - share a market for a specific product. Both have zero marginal cost. They compete in the manner of Bertrand and the market demand for the product is given by: q = 20 − min{p1, p2}. 1. What are the equilibrium prices and profits? 2. Suppose the two firms have signed a collusion contract, that is, they agree to set the same price and share the market equally. What is the price they would set and what would be their profits? For the following parts, suppose the Bertrand game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both firms δ ∈ [0, 1). 3. Let both players adopt the following strategy: start with collusion; maintain the collusive price as long as no one has ever deviated before; otherwise set the Bertrand price. What is the minimum value of δ for which this is a SPNE. 4. Suppose the policy maker has imposed a price floor p = 4, that is, neither firm is allowed to set a price below $4. How does your answer to part 3 change? Is it now…
- C2) Consider an industry with only two firms: firm A and firm B. The industry's inverse demand is P(Q) = 400 - ¹1/Q, 10 where P is the market price and Q is the total industry output. Each firm has a marginal cost of $10. There are no fixed costs and no barriers to exit the market. a) Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits NEA and NEB for each firm. marks] b) Suppose the two firms engage in Stackelberg competition, with firm A moving first, and firm B moving second. Find the equilibrium price PS in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QS and QBS, as well as the profits π and TSB for each firm. в c) For this subquestion only, suppose that firm B has a fixed cost of $200 000: What will firm B's optimal decision be, and what will be the resulting market structure? Now assume that instead of having two firms in the market, we have a monopoly facing the inverse…PROBLEM (5) In a dominant firm market with demand Q = 30 − p, the dominant firm has MC(Q) = 2Q (that is, with TC(Q) = Q^2) and the fringe is composed of 5 identical firms, each with MC(Q) = 10Q (that is, with TC(Q) = 5Q^2). (a) Calculate the market price in the dominant firm model. Calculate the quantity produced by the fringe. (b) Now assume that the 5 fringe firms form a “union”, and act as 5 “plants” of the union firm and this union firm competes as one single firm against the dominant firm in quantities, as in Cournot competition. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity in this market organization? (c) Now, the dominant firm convinces the “union” not to compete with it but instead collude (to maximize the sum of profits) to form a cartel. What is the market price and quantity? (d) Back to the problem description. If all the firms (the dominant firm and the 5 fringe firms) acted as price takers, as in the perfect competition, what would be the market equilibrium…2.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 1 2 q; the demand function for the firms' output is Q = 1.5-p, where Q is the total output. Firms compete in prices. That is, firms choose simultaneously what price they charge. Consumers will buy from the firm offering the lowest price. In case of tying, firms split equally the demand at the (common) price. The firm that charges the higher price sells nothing. (Bertrand model.) (a) Formally argue that there could be no equilibrium in prices other than p1 = p2 = 1 2. (b) Solve the same problem, but this time assuming that firms compete in quantities.Now, suppose that firm 1 has a capacity constraint of 1/3. That is, no matter what demand it gets, it can serve at most 1/3 units. Suppose that these units are served to the consumers who are willing to pay the most. Thus, even if it sets a price above that of firm 1, firm 2 may be able to sell some output. (c) Obtain the (residual) demand of firm 2 (as a function of its own…
