3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly andunexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider thefollowing simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in thesame unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win anybattle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Talibanwins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier willbe killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering abounty to any soldier that deserts. ne soldier does not care about this, and would not take thebounty, while the other values the bounty at 50 utility.a. Draw the game based on this scenario.b.Find all pure strategy Nash equilibriac. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibriumd. What does this game and the equilibria say about why the Afghan army collapsedso suddenly? Consider that there are multiple equilibria in this game. Part 2: Nash equilibria by converting to strategic formIn the following problems, convert the extensive form game into a normal/strategic form game.Then find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (Note, I am asking you to find the basic Nashequilibria, not the subgame perfect Nash equilibria)5)4,1W22,3AX2,4A3,2BQY3,3B22D1, 11,2

A mathematical framework known as game theory can be used to analyze and forecast how rational…

3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly and unexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider the following simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in the same unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win any battle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Taliban wins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier will be killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering a bounty to any soldier that deserts One soldier does not care about this and would not take the

3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly and unexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider the following simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in the same unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win any battle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Taliban wins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier will be killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering a bounty to any soldier that deserts One soldier does not care about this and would not take the

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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d) Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your preferences remained the same), how would your answers to parts (a) and (b) change? Which of the two classmates would you prefer as a partner? Would she also want you as a partner?
Bleecker Street runs from A to B, as shown in the diagram. The lone convenience store currently in operation along this street is at A. An entrepreneur who wants to open another store in the neighborhood is weighing a choice between the only two available locations, C and D. If customers, who are uniformly distributed along Bleecker Street, always shop at the store nearest to where they live, which of the locations C or D would be optimal from the perspective of customers and why? A C D B O Location D because that would minimize the average travel time for customers. O Location D because that would mean each store would get an equal share of the market. O Location C because that would give the new entrepreneur higher profits. O Locations C and D would be equally attractive because consumers have no reason to care about the relative profitability of different entrepreneurs.