3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly andunexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider thefollowing simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in thesame unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win anybattle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Talibanwins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier willbe killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering abounty to any soldier that deserts. ne soldier does not care about this, and would not take thebounty, while the other values the bounty at 50 utility.a. Draw the game based on this scenario.b.Find all pure strategy Nash equilibriac. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibriumd. What does this game and the equilibria say about why the Afghan army collapsedso suddenly? Consider that there are multiple equilibria in this game. Part 2: Nash equilibria by converting to strategic formIn the following problems, convert the extensive form game into a normal/strategic form game.Then find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (Note, I am asking you to find the basic Nashequilibria, not the subgame perfect Nash equilibria)5)4,1W22,3AX2,4A3,2BQY3,3B22D1, 11,2

A mathematical framework known as game theory can be used to analyze and forecast how rational…

3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly and unexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider the following simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in the same unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win any battle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Taliban wins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier will be killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering a bounty to any soldier that deserts One soldier does not care about this and would not take the

3) Recently, a major question in the news is why the Afghan army collapsed so quickly and unexpectedly in the face of the Taliban offensive. To help understand the situation, consider the following simplified model of the situation. Assume that there are two Afghan soldiers in the same unit. Each can stay and fight the Taliban or desert. If both stay and fight, they will win any battle against the Taliban, which each values at 100 utility. If either soldier deserts, the Taliban wins, which they each values at 0 utility. In addition, if only one soldier stays, that soldier will be killed by the Taliban, which he values at -1000 utility. In addition, the Taliban is offering a bounty to any soldier that deserts One soldier does not care about this and would not take the

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Explain the relevancy of reaction time to “real life.” Provide one example in real life where reaction time could affect one’s life positively or negatively. Why is reaction time important? Please include references.
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In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
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Consider the following game - one card is dealt to player 1 ( the sender) from a standard deck of playing cards. The card may either be red (heart or diamond) or black (spades or clubs). Player 1 observes her card, but player 2 (the receiver) does not - Player 1 decides to Play (P) or Not Play (N). If player 1 chooses not to play, then the game ends and the player receives -1 and player 2 receives 1. - If player 1 chooses to play, then player 2 observes this decision (but not the card) and chooses to Continue (C) or Quit (Q). If player 2 chooses Q, player 1 earns a payoff of 1 and player 2 a payoff of -1 regardless of player 1's card - If player 2 chooses continue, player 1 reveals her card. If the card is red, player 1 receives a payoff of 3 and player 2 a payoff of -3. If the card is black, player 1 receives a payoff of 2 and player 2 a payoff of -1 a. Draw the extensive form game b. Draw the Bayesian form game
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The chicken game has often been used to model crises. Recall that in this game, the two players drive straight at each other. They can choose to swerve or keep going straight. If one swerves, and the other goes straight, assume that the one that swerves gets -10 utility and the one that goes straight gets 10 utility, since the one that swerves is deemed the loser. If both swerve, both get 0 utility. If both go straight, they crash and get -50 utility. Assume both players have a discount rate of 0.9 Draw the stage game of date night List all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the single stage game Consider an infinite horizon version of Chicken. Can you get an SPNE in which the both players swerve using a grim trigger type strategy? Consider the following strategies: both players swerve, as long as neither ever went straight. If one player ever plays straight, in all subsequent rounds the player that swerved goes straight and the player that went straight swerves. Can you think…
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