3) (20 points) Consider the following voting problem: There are four alternatives A,B,C,D and fivevoters with the following rankings:Voter 1Voter 2Voter 3Voter 4Voter 5ABCABBDBDDCAACCDCDBAThe order of voting is such that, first A competes against B, next the winner competes with C,and finally the survivor competes with D to determine the final winner. (At each step winner isdetermined by the majorly rule.) Voters 1 and 2 are strategic voters and voters 3,4, and 5 aresincere voters. Voter 1 and 2 mistakenly think that all voters are strategic voters. Find theoutcome of this voting game. Clearly indicate the vote of each voter in the first two rounds ofvotes.

The response effectively breaks down the given voting problem, providing a clear explanation of the…

Answered: 3) (20 points) Consider the following…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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5.q1
HW (Ch 13) The following scenario examines the relationship between marginal and average values. Suppose Nalah is a high school basketball player. The following table presents their game-by-game results for foul shots. Fill in the columns with Nalah's foul-shooting percentage for each game and their overall foul-shooting average after each game. Game Foul-Shooting Percentage Average Foul-Shooting Percentage 80 Game 1 CENTAGE 2 345 -100 90 On the following graph, use the orange points (square symbol) to plot Nalah's foul-shooting percentage for each game individually, and use the green points (triangle symbol) to plot Nalah's overall average foul-shooting percentage after each game. Note: Plot your points in the order in which you would like them connected. Line segments will connect the points automatically. 80 70 Game Result 60 4/5 2/5 1/4 1/2 4/4 Total 4/5 6/10 7/14 8/16 12/20 43. 80 Game Foul-Shooting Percentage Average Foul-Shooting Percentage ?
(a) Assuming that each fishery chooses fi ∈ (0, F), to maximize its payoff function, derive the players’ best response functions and find a Nash equilibrium. (b) Is the equilibrium you found in (a) unique or not? What are equilibrium payoffs? 4 (c) Suppose that a benevolent social planner wants maximize the utility of both fisheries. In other words, the social planner solves the following problem: max w(f1,f2) w(f1, f2) = u1(f1, f2) + u2(f1, f2) =2 ln(f1) + 2 ln(f2) + 2 ln(F − f1 − f2). Find the social planner’s solution. (d) What are the fisheries’ payoffs if the quantities of fish they catch are solutions to the social planner’s problem? What can you say about the Nash equilibrium quantities of fish being caught as compared to the social planner’s solution? (e) If fishery j decides to follow the recommendation of the social planner, how much fish will firm i catch?
This is a two-player, simultaneous one-move game represented as a game table (normal form). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred?
Prepare 3 interview questions about this economic topic that you plan to ask your guest. Your questions should be thoughtfully prepared and reflect your depth of knowledge about the topic and the concepts we have learned in this course. (2 sentences for each question)
a) What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? (solved)b) Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred? (solved)c) Do all three solution approaches for simultaneous games work independently (not together)? If not, which do not? (solved) d) Draw the game as a game tree (extensive form). (to be solved)e) Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? (to be solved)
please help me answer this question. 0.162 is incorrect
15. (15 points) Suppose that the values of y are generated by the following equation: ŷ=a+Bx+e Where a and ẞ are unknown parameters and e is the random error. The table below gives the observed values of y and x for a sample of size 4. obs y x y น 2 1 24 24 10 10 1 6 9 = +Bxte 28-3+8+(0.5) 25 25 S 3 4 5 28 -8 7 -1 Consider the regression estimates of the unknown parameters a and ẞ: a 3 β 5 Fill in the missing values in the table. Calculate the sum of squared residuals and write it below. SSR =
Question 59 Comparing San Francisco to Los Angeles and San Diego, which had the highest % voting for Hillary Clinton in 2016 O Los Angeles San Francisco O They had equal percentages in favor of Clinton O San Diego Question 60 California can pass a law - or even a state Constitutional amendment - without involving the Governor or the State legislature. True O False
The "backstop" approach to carbon tax refers to: (Select one) a. A shared value of carbon tax between the federal and provincial governments b. A minimum standard set by the federal government, which the provinces must meet or exceed c. A revenue neutral tax d. A maximum standard set by the provinces, which the federal government can meet or exceed
Please show how to solve this You consider buying a lot on which you will build a small apartment complex. The asking price for the lot is $2,000,000 and the estimated cost to build the apartment complex is $5,000,000 (construction should take one year). One year from the date you intend to purchase the lot the city is going to make an important decision regarding the use of the land just across from your lot. You believe that there is a 35% chance that the decision would be favorable to you and a 65% chance that it would be unfavorable. In case of a favorable or unfavorable outcome your complex should generate an NOI of $400,000 or $300,000 respectively. For simplicity, you may assume that at any time you can sell your complex for a 5% CAP and your required rate of return is 8%. a. Calculate the value of the lot using the traditional approach.b. Calculate the value of the lot using the real option approach.c. Should you buy the lot?d. In case that you decided to buy the lot, should…

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