3) (20 points) Consider the following voting problem: There are four alternatives A,B,C,D and five voters with the following rankings: Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 A B C A B B D B D D C A A C C D C D B A The order of voting is such that, first A competes against B, next the winner competes with C, and finally the survivor competes with D to determine the final winner. (At each step winner is determined by the majorly rule.) Voters 1 and 2 are strategic voters and voters 3,4, and 5 are sincere voters. Voter 1 and 2 mistakenly think that all voters are strategic voters. Find the outcome of this voting game. Clearly indicate the vote of each voter in the first two rounds of votes.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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3) (20 points) Consider the following voting problem: There are four alternatives A,B,C,D and five
voters with the following rankings:
Voter 1
Voter 2
Voter 3
Voter 4
Voter 5
A
B
C
A
B
B
D
B
D
D
C
A
A
C
C
D
C
D
B
A
The order of voting is such that, first A competes against B, next the winner competes with C,
and finally the survivor competes with D to determine the final winner. (At each step winner is
determined by the majorly rule.) Voters 1 and 2 are strategic voters and voters 3,4, and 5 are
sincere voters. Voter 1 and 2 mistakenly think that all voters are strategic voters. Find the
outcome of this voting game. Clearly indicate the vote of each voter in the first two rounds of
votes.
Transcribed Image Text:3) (20 points) Consider the following voting problem: There are four alternatives A,B,C,D and five voters with the following rankings: Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 A B C A B B D B D D C A A C C D C D B A The order of voting is such that, first A competes against B, next the winner competes with C, and finally the survivor competes with D to determine the final winner. (At each step winner is determined by the majorly rule.) Voters 1 and 2 are strategic voters and voters 3,4, and 5 are sincere voters. Voter 1 and 2 mistakenly think that all voters are strategic voters. Find the outcome of this voting game. Clearly indicate the vote of each voter in the first two rounds of votes.
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