Find the answers to questions Answer:equilibrium uniform price of firm A =profit of firm A under uniform pricing=equilibrium price of firm A on interval 1equilibrium price of firm B on interval 1 19:58 Thu 12 Decmoodle4.city.ac.uk74%Consider a standard Hotelling model of competition with quadratic transportationcosts. The consumers are located uniformly along a segment of unit length. Thereare two firms, A and B, located at the opposite ends of the segment. Each firm hasconstant marginal costs 0. Each consumer buys at most one unit of product andgets utility 16. Each consumer incurs travel cost of 5 times the square of traveleddistance.Find equilibrium price and profit of firm A when firms set a unform price for theentire Hotelling segment.Suppose now that firms can price discriminate between consumers located in theinterval [0,1] (interval 1) and those located in the interval [4.1] (interval 2). Find4equilibrium prices of firm A and B on the interval 1.Answer:

Step 1:Equilibrium price is the price at which the quantity of a good or service demanded by…

Answered: Answer: equilibrium uniform price of…

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $14 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit- maximizing firms. If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does not If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ not advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does S If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose not to advertise. O Lucky Bird will choose not to…
. When Chinese automakers began exporting cars, rather thanfocusing on developed nations in the West, they shippedautos to emerging markets in countries such as Algeria, Russia,Chile, and South Africa. In these markets, even used vehiclesfrom multinational manufacturers are relatively scarce—andrelatively expensive. The Chinese automakers, who prioritizelow cost rather than design or even safety, applied a penetration-pricing strategy. A woman in Santiago, Chile, who boughta new Chery S21 explained, “The price factor is fairly decisive.I paid $5,500 new and full. Toyota with similar features costsaround $12,000.” Why do you think Chinese automakerschose that pricing strategy? Do you think it was successful?As Chinese regulators pressure these manufacturers to maketheir cars safer, do you think they will be able to keep theirprices low compared with those of the international automakers? Why or why not?26
fnan421 Word Gözden Geçir Görünüm Varam V Ne yapmak isted ginzi soyieyin 2) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: FIRM Y TV LAPTOP PHONE FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 20, 50 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 50,80 PHONE 50,20 80,50 10,10 A) Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. (explain the decision step by step)i B) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? (explain the decision step by step);
Assume that the competition between Boeing and Airbus can be characterized by the following mnatrix Aórbus Produce Qut] Produce -15/ – 5 90/0 Boeing Quit 0/140 0/0 where the first number in each cell denotes the payoff that Boeing receives and the second nunber is the payoff that Airbus receives. Assume that Boeing has a first mover advantage. Then a subsidy of 10 provided to Airbus by the European government will change nothing will increase European welfare will negatively affect European welfare result in both firms leaving the market
The following graph depicts the costs incurred by a Local egg seller, Rahim. Rahim is faced with strong competitors who are selling exactly the same product. Use the graph to answer the following questions- Price/Cost per egg MC 12 ATC 8 MR3 AVC 6. MR2 MR1 Quantity 100 200 300 400 a)At what price will Rahim try to minimize loss by selling eggs in the market? b)At what price will there be a break-even point?
fnan421 - Word Teri Gozden Geçir Görünum Yardım Ne yapmak istediğinizi soyleyin 2) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrixi FIRM Y TV LAPTOP PHONE FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 20, 50 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 50,80 PHONE 50,20 80,50 10,10 A) What will be the equilibrium if Firm X makes its selection first? If Firm Y goes first? ; (Ctrl) -
Alpha Gear is a fitness apparel company. One of their best selling products are their joggers. The company sells joggers under a block pricing scheme that charges $13 per pair of joggers if the customer buys up to 10 joggers and $8 if they buy 11 to 20 joggers. The demand curve is Q-1400 - 25P, and the marginal cost of making a pair of joggers is $5. What are the profits for Alpha Gear under this pricing scheme? 8975 8600 3600 12200 000
Would it be wise for a brick-and-mortar retailer thatwants to stop showrooming to use wireless-jammingtechnologies to prevent people from using smartphonesinside its stores? Why or why not?
RAGERIAL ECO X Question 3 Chapter 17 & 19 P X 13.1 Objectives and Methods of X a the more elastic the demand for x + https://ezto.mheducation.com/ext/map/index.html?_con=con&external_browser=0&launchUrl... A to 9 ( & 19 Problems Saved Help Save & Exit In an oligopolistic market, Multiple Choice the smaller the number of firms and the more elastic the demand, the greater the markup. the larger the number of firms and the more elastic the demand, the greater the markup. the larger the number of firms and the less elastic the demand, the greater the markup. the smaller the number of firms and the less elastic the demand, the greater the markup. Submit g 53
mall Dynaco Jains Pynaco gains 4. Synergy and Dynaco are the only two firms in a specific high - tech industry. They face the following payoff matrix as they determine the size of their research budget: Synergy's Deeision Small Bodget Lange Budget Synergy gain $420M Symedgy Dynaco ins Large budget Dynaro gains $30M Synergy Small Dynaco Jains Budget Jains zero Dynae's 2ero gains $70m Synergy Pynaco gains gains #50M Decision a. Does Synergy have a dominant strategy? Explain. b. Does Dynaco have a dominant strategy? Explain. c. Is there a Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Explain. (Hint: Look closely at the definition of Nash equilibrium.)
Next Question Consider the network scheduling profit matrix Can the Pareto Critenon hep me networks sette on a single equibrum? Explain The Pareto Criterion Ne O A cannot help the networks sette on a singlo equibrum because the Wednesday Thursday networks cannot communicate OB. can help the networks settle on a single equibrum because the networks have dominant strateges Wednesday OC. cannot help the networks settie on a singie equilbnum because no Nash equilibria is better for both networks 40 Nebok 2 O D. can help the networks settle on a single equibrium because one Nash equilibrium has the highest joint payoffs O E. cannot help the networks settle on a single equilbrum because the networks must schedule simultaneously Thursdey
Kate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand tunction is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses her output belore Alice. What is the difference in Alice's profit when Kata enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultanecusly select ther outputa? When Kate entors the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower. O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is 513,333.33 lower. O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5,000 lower. O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,

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