11:07 1✔ ccdc.instructure.comAllBUA203 - 2024 FallDiscussion: CompetitiveAdvantageSearch entries or author...View Split Screen↓ SortNo Due Date12 Replies (12)Discussion: CompetitiveAdvantage10 pointsRespond to the prompt below in 200 - 300words. Reply to at least one other student in 50- 100 words.Why might competitive advantage for a firm befleeting?◄ PreviousNext▸

A competitive advantage is a unique advantage a company has over its competitors, allowing it to…

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Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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Name: 1. Consider the following simultaneous move game: a. 2.5 4 Row Top Up Down Bottom N 16xe mszbiM Left 5,5 2,6 3,1 3,5 Column Center 8,4 10,1 5,4 9,7 Middle (6,6 2,4 3,3 4,5 Right 5,4 2,4 16 3,4 20hunini 02:hobe Use the method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies to eliminate as many strategies as possible for each player. Briefly explain your steps. (4 marks) 26 5100W sed mexa pm/ ebul b. Using the method of best responses, find the Nash Equilibrium of this game. Mark the best response on the matrix and circle the NE. Briefly explain why this is a NE. (4 marks) anatibunenk c. Consider the outcome (Bottom, Center), briefly explain why this is NOT a Nash Equilibrium. (2 marks)
what are the formulas? how do you complete the matching?
QUESTION 38 What are the two routes that we use to process information, according to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)? O central & minor O central & peripheral O fundamental & peripheral O dominant & central QUESTION 39 Which statement best explains the Extended Parallel Processing Model's take-home message? O Fear appeals are most effective when they get the attention of their audience but are not so intense as to induce too high levels of fear. The more intense a fear appeal, the less successful it will be at enacting behavior change. Fear appeals are more successful if they are more intense. O Fear appeals simply do not work in changing behaviors.
(This is an intermediate mircoeconomics question) Arif and Aisha agree to meet for a date at a local dance club next week. In their enthusiasm, they forget to agree which venue will be the site of their meeting. Luckily the town has only two dancing venues, Palms and Oasis. Having discussed their tastes in dancing venues last week, both know that Arif prefers Palms to the Oasis and Aisha prefers the Oasis to Palms. In fact, their payoffs reflect that if both go to Oasis, Aisha’s utility is 3 and Arif’s 2, while if both go to Palms Arif’s utility is 3 and Aisha’s is 2. If they do not go to the same venue, then they both have a utility of 0. (a) Write the payoff matrix and explain whether there are any pure Nash equilibria. Carefully explain what these are and why. Comment on the existence of any dominant strategy equilibria. (b) Please calculate mixed strategy equilibria, if any, and then derive the probability that Arif and Aisha will find themselves at the same venue. (Carefully…
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Subject: Manegerial economic & policy Q#1) In your answer to each part below, include references to specific games discussed in thechapter as appropriate.a. If a game has a dominant strategy equilibrium, does it have a Nash equilibrium?b. If a game has a Nash equilibrium, does it have a dominant strategy equilibrium?c. If one firm has a dominant strategy, can another firm take advantage of that fact in decidingon its optimal strategy?d. Can a game have more than one dominant strategy equilibrium? Can a game havemore than one Nash equilibrium?
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Problem 10-03 (algo) Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. с 9, 8 23, 13 a. What is player 1's optimal strategy? Strategy A B Player 1 O Strategy A O Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. O Strategy B b. Determine player 1's equilibrium payoff. Player 2 D 14, 14 10, 18 E 18, 25 14, 26 F 12, 19 19, 21

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