midterm review sheet

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UN 1611

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Political Science

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Oct 30, 2023

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POL 700 International Politics Midterm Review Sheet Midterm: Wednesday, October 25 12:30 PM Format: Multiple choice; identifications/brief answers; problems Introduction Strategic perspective of international relations Three principles of international politics Social Science & Theory (Chapter 1) Theory Dependent and independent variables Assumptions Hypotheses Attributes of a good theory (logical consistency, accuracy, etc.) Necessary and sufficient conditions Preferences & Rationality (Intro chapter) Politics and resources (the allocation of scarce resources) Preferences Preference ordering Rationality (instrumental rationality) Conditions for rationality Constraints Strategies Outcomes vs. choices Preference Aggregation & the National Interest (Intro chapter) Majority rule Aggregating preferences/Condorcet winner Social choice problem/ Condorcet’s paradox Problems associated with the “National Interest” Tools for Analyzing International Politics (Chapters 3&4) Utility/utility function Spatial utility function/Quadratic loss function Ideal point Single-peaked preference Decision Theory (Chapter 3) Utility, costs and probability Subjective probability/ beliefs Calculating expected utility Lessons from expected utility Game Theory (Chapter 4) Strategic form games Strategy Nash equilibrium

Dominant strategy Extensive form game Backwards induction Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Lessons from game theory Structural Theories of War (Chapter 5) Structural Theories Realism - Classical Realism - Anarchy - Power maximization The Security Dilemma Neorealism (Structural Realism) - Assumptions of neorealism - Hypotheses of neorealism - Balancing - Bipolarity - Multipolarity - Stability - System stability/ resource stability - Relative gains - Problems/Limitations of neorealism (whether hypotheses follow logically from the assumptions; other critiques/issues) - Empirical evidence concerning neorealism Balance of Power - Empirical evidence of balance of power Power Transition Theory - Assumptions of power transition theory - Hierarchy of power - Dominant state/hegemon - Hypothesis and empirical evidence

Extra Practice Problems 1. Consider the following strategic form game: Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up (5, 3) (9, 1) Down (4, 5) (2, 6) a) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it? b) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it? c) What is/are the Nash equilibrium/a to the game? 2. ( This is obviously an old question ) Upon coming to office, President Obama has called for a review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Among the things that he needs to decide is whether or not to call for a “surge”: sending 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan, which would double the U.S. contingent fighting against the Taliban-led insurgency. There is debate among military experts as to whether such a surge would work successfully in Afghanistan (as it appears to have in Iraq). The president’s utility if the surge is successful is 24,000. However, if the surge is unsuccessful, the president’s utility would be -9,000. The president’s utility from the status quo is 0. Assume that the president believes that the probability that a surge would be successful is 0.30. Assume the costs of a surge are 600. If the president is rational (and risk neutral), what will he do? Explain why. (You must show any calculations in detail; make sure to properly label what it is you are calculating).

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3. Identify the Nash Equilibrium for each of the following games: a) State B C D State A C (3, 4) (5, -1) D (3, -2) (-5, -4) b) State B C D State A C (10, 9) (-1, 25) D (25, -1) (1, 2) c) Player 2 a b c A (10, 0) (-5, 1) (2, 2) Player 1 B (-6, 3) (0, 0) (4, 5) C (5, 1) (1, -1) (2, 3)

4. Find the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria for the following games: a) b)