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research question ■ Ladder of abstraction: the more abstract, the less grounded in detail ■ Concept stretching if too abstract ■ Concepts influence the number of available cases ○ Study concepts are crucial ■ Theda skocpol, states and social revolutions (1979): ■ What is a social revolution? ■ Not all forms of contentious collective action - largest set ■ Not merely a political revolution - large set ■ But violent political overturn combined with transformation of economic and social power - small set ■ Skocpol aims to generalize, but only based on her limited set of cases: france, russia, china ○ Theory ■ Meaningful statements about the relationship between phenomena - e.g. change in X effects a change in Y ■ Captures the way the world works at some level of generality ■ Role of theory ● Source of questions and puzzles, predictions and anomalies ● Basis for framing concepts - as in skocpol ● Guidance in pursuing research - where to start? ● Assistance in interpreting findings, drawing implications ○ Study theoretical approaches ■ Broad theoretical perspectives, operative at various levels (individual group, region, nation-state, international): ■ Rationality - self-interest, maximize highest ranked preferences ■ Culture - values, beliefs, ideas, identities ■ Socioeconomic structuralism - material conditions shape interests constrain actos, with an emphasis on class ■ Institutionalism - formal and informal rules shape interests and action ○ Comparative - cases ■ What is the case? ● Hall: “units in which the relevant outcome takes on a specific value” ● Key questions: what is it a case of? ● So cases must be constructed - states, movements, episodes ■ Single case study ● Great detail possible ● More than just variables ● Powerful if well selected: e.g., representative or deviant cases ○ Systematic process analysis ■ Aka process tracing ■ Alternative to correlation-based approaches, including comparative method: ■ Emphasize key explanatory theories ■ Draw out their predictions in full ■ Identify observations relevant to these predictions each case is a rich source

international organization ○ Descriptive analysis can help us to assess the real scope of differences versus similarities ○ A deeper concern with broad patterns of change taking place simultaneously across countries is in line with the preoccupation of fundamental social and political change similar to the preoccupation with the breakdown of democracies between the two world wars or the rise of communist regimes after World war 2. ○ Research designs based on the selection of most different system designs take up the ambition of the behavioural age not to limit comparative analysis to area studies and niches ○ The focus on different system can help us to deal with ■ Broad changes in given areas that we would be unable to explain were we to include only cases of that area ■ Diffusion effects and problems of interdependence. Almond and Verba’s study of five political cultures was a typical MDSD research. It was able to explain commonalities by bringing european cases into a larger set and thus introduce variation in a phenomenon that in continental europe had been a general one with very few exceptions Week 3: The State ● What is the state? ○ Most common and influential definition - - Max Weber’s ○ How to define the state? ■ “The state cannot be defined in terms of its ends” ■ But only in terms of its means ● How the states goes about pursuing its goals ■ Those that distinguish it from all other types of human organizations ■ The Weberian Definition ● The state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” ● A human community ○ A group of people who all fall under the authority of the state and must follow the same rules and actions as each other within the territory of the state ● Claims the monopoly of the use of physical force ○ The state is sovereign and holds ultimate authority, they have the right and ability to punish offenders as they please according to the severity of their actions ● Legitimate ○ Involves the people's acceptance of the monopoly due to what the government can do for them. ○ Monopoly used in a reasonable and fair fashion ■ State formation

○ Separation of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from the material means of administrative organization is completed ● The state has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right ● Politics just as economic pursuits may be a man's avocation or his vocation. ○ Politics as an avocation is today practiced by all those party agents and heads of voluntary political associations who, as a rule, are politically active - Posner Abstract War Making and state making as organized crime Charles Tilly ● This paper concerns the place of organized means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states: ○ Relatively centralized ○ Differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large contiguous territory ● The argument grows from historical work on the formation of national states in western europe focusing on the growth of the french state from 1600 onwards ○ The trimmed down argument stresses the interdependence of war making and state making and the analogy between both of these processes and what, when less successful and smaller scale, we call organized crime. ● Double edged protection ○ Governments use the word protection to connote a positive tone for what they do as if they are sheltering people or something of the Likes. They disregard and condemn those who disagree claiming they are only charging for what covers this protection ○ Tilly compares them to a racketeer who creates the danger in itself and then charges for the reduction of such a danger. The only difference he sees is that they are within a governmental organization ● Violence and Government ○ Asks what distinguishes violence from states and individuals and what makes it legitimate or illegitimate ● Protection as a business ○ Referring to the economic gains of a strong military ● History talks ○ Looking back we see the symbiotic relationship between the state, military power and private economy's effect opulent banking families ● What do states do ○ War making ■ Eliminating or neutralizing rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force ○ State making ■ Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories ○ Protection ■ Eliminating the enemies of their clients ○ Extraction

○ Ernest Renan: the nation is a daily plebiscite ○ Builds on the past and present: “the common possession of a rich legacy of memories” combined with “actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value and heritage that has been received in common” ○ memory , but also forgetting ● Defining the nation - (d) Modernist ○ Benedict Anderson: an imagined community ○ Imagined as limited and sovereign ○ National relations are mediated by signs and symbols ○ Historical product of ■ Capitalism ■ Print and ■ The fatality of human linguistic diversity ○ Not false, potentially powerful ● The nation and economic modernity ○ Nationalism as expression of modern social forces - e.g. rising middle class (Eric Hobsbawn) ○ Nationalism as a new integrating force, better suited to modernizing society ○ Ernest Gellner ■ Nationalism is not awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.” ● The nation and political modernity ○ War drove need for contribution sacrifice ○ State formation ■ Enhanced contact ■ Standardized language culture religion ■ Promoted national identity ● The french case: old regime ○ Historically ■ Territorial continuity ■ Monarchical regime ■ Recognition of difference (corporate privileges of estates, church, guilds, provinces, towns, etc.) ■ Varied dialects, customs ○ French revolution (1789-99) ■ Overthrow of society of privilege first ■ Then monarchy - incompatible with revolution ■ Revolutionary principles - liberty fraternity equality - seen as general, universal ■ Replace these with national sovereignty Benedict Anderson The origins of national consciousness ● A fundamental transformation in the history of Marxism and Marxist movements is upon us ○ Most visible signs are the recent wars between vietnam, cambodia and china ■ First war to occur between regimes whose independence and

○ Andrew Heywood - 1020E textbook definition: ■ A system of generalized commodity production, featuring: ● Productive wealth, mainly private ● Market principles ● Wage labour ● Profit and other material incentives ● Capitalism: Rival Interpretations ○ Liberal: (conservative party economic views) ■ Adam smith: “commercial society” ● Emerges from the late medieval Italian and Dutch cities ● Spreads to the atlantic coast and beyond ● Creates ‘middling classes’ ■ Adam Smith: Markets are: ● Spontaneous ○ Not institutions ○ Man made rules governing markets ● Driven by self-interest, profit orientation ● Sites of decentralized, independent decision-making by sellers and buyers ● Economic growth via competition and specialization ○ Division of labour ○ Comparative advantage ● State society relations: ○ Individualism ○ Limited role for the state ○ Liberal conception of Political development ■ Historical Trajectory – Lipset: ● Industrialization matters – but what is it? ○ Dramatic growth in productivity ○ Mechanization, factory production ○ Shift of resources from agriculture to manufacturing ● Industrialization: linked to urbanization, literacy expansion, values change- and democracy (aka “political development) ○ Many historical liberals believed that good things came together ● Social changes key ○ Economic development producing increased income greater economic security and widespread higher education largely determines the form of the ‘class struggle’, by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist view of politics” (p.59) ● Competition, not conflict ● Effects ○ Marginalize radicals ○ Broaden middle class to the point of newer universality ○ Inequality does not disappear, but “the wealthier a country, the less is status inferiority experienced as a

directly face each other ● Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of the class ○ When they have the upper hand put an end to all ■ Feudal ■ Patriarchal ■ And idyllic relations ○ Set up Free trade ○ They cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, thereby the relations of production and with them the who relations of society ○ Converted all types of professionals to wage-laborers ○ Torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced family relations to money relations Lipset: The social Bases of Politics ● Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office ○ The most common generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy ● To test this he uses various indices of economic development ○ Wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education and computed averages for the countries which have been classified as more or less democratic in the anglo-saxon world and europe and in latin america ○ The average wealth degree of industrialization and urbanization and the level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries ● The inverse relationship between national economic development as reflected by per capita income and the strength of communists and other extremist groups among western nations is seemingly stronger than the correlations between other national variables like ethnic or religious factors Przeworski and Limongi Modernization: theories and facts ● What makes political regime rise, endure and fall ○ The main question is whether the observed close relation between levels of economic development and the incidence of democratic regimes is due to democracies being more likely to emerge or only more likely to survive in the more developed countries ○ That question is answered using data concerning 135 countries that existed at any time between 1950 and 1990. ○ We find that the level of economic development does not affect the probability of transitions to democracy but that affluence does make democratic regimes more stable

■ Leaders rule in their own interests, not that of the public ■ Some groups benefit but others excluded further affecting state legitimacy ■ If political parties are too weak to deliver patronage, reliance on prebendalism: provision of executive offices as benefits ■ Which creates an enlarged stat that is extremely expensive and highly inefficient ○ National integration is extremely challenging: ■ (a) colonialism often disregarded national communities in governing, drawing artificial territorial boundaries ■ (b) newly independent states were deeply divided on multiple bases: ethnicity, language, religion ■ ( c) the unity of the independence struggle was temporary - social differences soon reasserted themselves ■ (d) especially amidst neo-patrimonialism - distribution of spoils to existing social groups, reinforcing narrower identities and attachments ■ Which are relied upon for the delivery of basic goods and services ○ India's complexity: ■ A great many bases for social division: religion, caste, language, religion ■ Unlike africa, some common historical reference points ■ But differences reinforced by more systematic colonial reliance on categories for subjects: caste, tribe, religion ■ And divide-and-rule strategies against anti-colonial mobilization ■ But there is no easy path to a nation-state, although this western- inspired aspiration remained in place - perhaps the state could create a nation ■ Set against the “two-nation theory’: one Hindu nation, one muslim nation ■ This was the basis for partition in 1947 - highly contentious, violent, and involving a mass population movement ○ New states, new nations? ■ Pakistan: the muslim league emphasies a muslim nation, pursued through Islamization campaigns ■ India: the Indian National congress imagines a secular nation that transcends religious and other divisions ○ There are seen as the best available materials for nation formation ○ But the attempt exposes tensions and exclusions: ■ Religious uniformity is lacking in pakistan, and further partition will come in 1971 ■ Many in india remain frustrated by the emphasis on secularism rather than hinduism, some minority groups feel disregarded ● After effects ○ Mahatma Gandhi is assassinated by an extremist supporter of a Hindu India ○ Jawaharlal Nehru carries forth a secular and modernizing approach to governing India ○ Tudor: ■ The variation in the independence movements shapes the ability of

the post-independence party t o broker social compromise; pakistan’s later start limits its capacity to construct a broad coalition and keep the military at bay ○ The congress party gradually yields its dominant status ○ With as its main rival the hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ○ Which channels hindu nationalism largely though party competition in the indian democracy Van De Walle Reading ● Clientelism exists in all policies ○ The form it takes , its extent, and its political functions vary enormously, however, across time and place ● This chapter analyzes the persistence and evolution of political clientelism in sub-saharan africa since independence ○ Pervasive clientelism was a hallmark of the region's non-democratic states until their transition to multiparty politics in the 1990s. ○ To what extent will these practices persist, now that democratic politics, however imperfect, has become the norm in the region? ○ The second half of the chapter examines the likely evolution of political clientelism in the new multiparty electoral regimes of sub- saharan Africa. ● A comparison of this region with the regions examined by other contributions to this book confirms an argument made by Kitschelt and Wilkinson ○ That the structural characteristics of the country determine the nature of the clientelistic politics. ○ The african cases discussed in this chapter have a lower level of economic development and smaller, poorer, state structures than those discussed in the other chapters ○ This impacts the nature of clientelism in the region ● In sub-saharan africa, a pervasive form of elite clientelism, prebendalism, actually involves relatively little patronage Tudor Reading ● This chapter seeks to explain this surprising divergence in political order in India and Pakistan ○ The core argument developed is that this early, stark difference was a direct result of the kinds of social coalitions and political parties constructed during each countries respective struggle for national liberation ○ Though these elites were pursuing similar goals of power they did so at different times, and from different positions within the colonial power structure. As a result, they forged different kinds of coalitions, evolved nationalist programs with different levels of specificity, and constructed movements with different degrees of organizational complexity

Week 7 Logics and Patterns of Development in the Global South Readings: ● Gunder Frank Reading ○ Hypothesis for Under Development in South American Countries ■ Underdevelopment is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development, capitalism. ■ Satellites experience their greatest economic development when their ties to their metropolis are weakest ● Due to autonomous industrialization and growth ■ Regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past ● Sugar exporting west indies ● Northeastern Brazil ● Ex mining districts in Brazil Lecture: ● Developmental Aspirations Mid-20th Century ○ Liberal expectation: including the south in an international trading system would bring development as it had in the west ○ Colonialism was not seen as an impediment to development ○ US President Harry S. Truman ■ “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientifics and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (1949) ○ Tied in with US security aims was an interest in demonstrating the superiority of capitalism as a source of development ● Modernization Theory ○ Great optimism for universal development ○ WW Rostow: 5 common stages of growth: traditional society; preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, high mass consumption ○ Results uneven in 1960s, but signs of significant progress: ■ Growth rates ■ Life expectancy ■ Broader provision of such public goods as education and healthcare ■ Green revolution - agricultural production improves ○ Societies move from tradition to modernity: ■ Traditional: ascription, low social mobility, extended kinship structure, elitist and hierarchical political authority ■ Modern: achievement, high social mobility, nuclear families, dynamism and rational-legal authority ■ The two ways of life clash, modernity prevails ■ But modernizations failures are attributed to the strength of the

traditional impulse, or insufficiently modern attitudes and beliefs ■ Latin America: Catholicism, feudal values, indigenous populations, and aristocratic influence can explain weak entrepreneurial activity ○ But: Tradition is a residual category - all that is not modern ● Modernization: effects ○ But the benefits were concentrated in a few successful southern states, with the rest still experiencing weak growth and/ or high levels of poverty ○ Results much less impressive as of the late 1960s - in terms of malnutrition, unemployment and inequality ○ This approach attributed developmental inadequacies not to its basic propositions, but rather to set of impediments seen as peculiar to the south ● Import substitution industrialization: Latin America ○ Cold war brought return to colonial trade relations: client states as providers of raw materials, purchasers of manufactured goods ○ Latin america respond in the 1950s and 60s with ISI: ■ Aim to create domestic manufacturing, give jobs to local workers, provide cheaper goods at home, and export some abroad ■ Tariffs protected the domestic market so ‘infant industries’ could grow by replacing imports ■ Some state subsidies and state ownership to stimulate targeted industrialization ○ Problems with ISI: ■ Domestic markets not large enough ■ Still importing: technological know-how and machine tools and parts ■ Domestic actors resisted giving up tariffs and subsidies as required ■ And bureaucratic authoritarianism: as domestic markets saturated, growth stunted, leading to massive popular unrest, and military coups justified by the need for public order and economic management ● Dependency Theory ○ Built on key insights of ISI: need for domestic industrial development ○ But represented a radical response to perceived failures in development under modernization and ISI ○ Dependency: when a countries economic development is heavily conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy ○ Dependency theory argues that capitalist development of a dependent country is rendered very unlikely, even impossible, by the structure of exchange relations ○ Inspiring revolutions in places like Cuba and Nicuaragua ● Dependency Theory Pt 2 ■ Rejects the emphasis on the individual nation-state and onn cultural struggles within them (tradition versus modernity) ■ Nation-states must be placed within the context of the global political economy - a new level of analysis ■ Lenin was right! Capitalism operates on the global scale, serving as the main influence on national development ■ The global capitalist system is interconnected but highly unequal ■ Countries at the center of the system develop by underdeveloping others - core versus periphery

■ The core economies in the global south do the same to their satellites, and so on down the line ■ Southern production responds to the needs of the metropolitan economy, not its ■ So, the benefits of capitalism don’t trickle down ■ The bourgeoisie may remain weak and compromised, acting in the service of the metropole ■ Frank: the further from global capitalism, the more developed ■ This system began in the 16th century, with the emergence of colonial relations: southern resources for western manufacturing ■ Over time, the system is increasingly irreversible - supported by sustained differences in state strength ● Developmental states ○ Japanese successes noticed early 1960s - reliance on exports confirms conventional account ○ On closer look the case wasn't so straightforward ■ Too much state involvement - against model calling for small states that support property rights and contracts and get out of the way ■ Model soon extended to authoritarian south korea and taiwan ■ Pro-development state challenges neo-utilitarian approach - state officials always seek corrupt gains ○ States vary: predatory, developmental, intermediary ■ Predatory ● Marketization of state: “holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument convertible into illicit acquisition of money or other goods” (p. 570) ● Spending goes not to development, but to power via patronage ● Society remains fragmented into groups competing for favours ■ Developmental ● Autonomy - a cohesive, merit and expertise-based bureaucracy capable of formulating and pursuing a goal regardless of the demands of dominant social groups ● Embeddedness - well-established networks which permite the state to learn what is needed by business elites to drive development ● Embedded autonomy - the capacity to provide guidance and resources to economic actors to unlock unseen potential ● Enable “development of a bourgeoisie orientated to long-term profit-based productive investment” (p. 570) ○ Gershenkron ■ Strong states are required and will emerge: ● Early industrializers accumulated capital slowly, in small mill and mines, before investing in ever more capital-rich industries ● So these industrializers operated as individual entrepreneurs and felt no need for help from institutions ● Later industrializers had to accumulate capital more quickly, which required innovative contributions from banks and then the state

● The later the industrializers, the more reliant on the state ○ Japan ■ Key to Japanese success: ● Industrial strategy devised by state - ministry of international trade and industry (MITI) ● Use of financial institutions to divert savings to investment ● Disciplined support – state reorientation of production from domestic to export markets ● Pick winners - sectors and firms within them ● Tariffs and import restrictions protect emerging industry ● Subsidies and low interest loans enable industrial development ● Public risk absor ○ Why there? ■ East Asia ● Strong states before foreign investment appears ● States acquired autonomy as japanese colonialism weakened dominant landed class ● Assembling a pro-growth political coalition was easier ■ Latin america ● Awash in foreign investment before states could become strong ● Landed class remained strong on the ground ● Assembling a pro-growth coalition require tougher negotiations ○ Neoliberalism ■ Japanese model ran into difficulties in the ‘lost decade’ (1991-2001) ■ The global ‘lost decades’ (1980s-90s) saw the emergence of a debt crisis, as demand for exports dropped, prices of primary commodities fell, and loans were simply too easily available ■ Creditor countries and international financial institutions reschedule debts in exchange for structural adjustment and reduced public spending ■ The washington consensus forms in the 1990s - program: cutback, liberalization of trade and investment, privatization of deregulation ■ India shifts from state-driven growth model to neoliberalism 1991 Week 8: civil society and social capital ● Defining civil society ○ A sphere of social interaction between the state and the private sphere, a sphere of associations (especially voluntary), social movements, and public contact and communication ● What can civil society do? ○ Cultivate personal virtue

○ Recreate bonds in fragmented modern society ○ Broaden sense of self-interest ○ Enable collective action ○ Protect society against state intrusion ○ Serve as a school for democracy ● Civil society’s effects ○ But it can also create inequality ○ Karl Marx: ■ Civil society emerges as the bourgeoisie throws off the fetters of feudalism (Burgerliche Gesellschaft) ■ Bourgeois civil society: individualism, atomization, and the instrumentalization of people ■ Its freedom enables deepening of inequality ● Civil society includes state ○ Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: ■ Applied marxism: state monopolized truth, undermined societal freedom and independence ■ Real civity society: not just a strong society, but also a strong state ■ A western development - so don’t engage in “a naive universalization of one rather fortunate kind of man” ● The state and civil society ○ Jacob levy: ■ State is what liberates us from the lack of freedom in civil society ● Putnam on social capital ○ Revives republicanism: ■ Anti-monarchism - no ■ Emphasis on civic virtue and the pursuit of the public good - yes ■ “Civic community” - participation, emphasis on public good, trust, tolerance ■ BUT - attainable based on self-interest rather than virtue ○ Is this possible? ■ Marxism: after the revolution ■ Nationalism: with nation formation ■ Putnam: only in a civic community - it’s not who or when but where you are ○ Structure of the study ■ Question: what explains government performance? ■ Occasion: introduction of new italian regional governments as of 1970 ■ Define success ● Effectiveness ● Responsiveness ○ Could it be civicness ■ Question: does successful democratic government depend on civic society ■ Civic community: rich in (1) active participation, emphasizing public good over private ends, (2) solidarity, trust and tolerance ■ How can we tell ● Establish syndrome of civicness - measured by associational

activity, union membership, newspaper readership, political participation, etc. ● Establish that these measures are highly intercorrelated ● Test relationship between civicness and institutional performance ○ Social capital is the key ■ Social capital: norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement ● Social: trust is an emergent property of society - norms, networks, trust - not individuals ● Capital: trust builds through use, “investment” ● Example: rotating credit associations ■ Social capital spurs economic development, makes democracy work, makes people happier ■ Two possible equilibria ● Never cooperate - so who will start? (south) ● Brave reciprocity - dont be first to defect (north) ■ These social conventions influence self-interested action ○ How did northern Italy find its groove? ■ Division of Italy into: ● Norman monarchy in the south, and ● Republican city-states to the north ■ Monarchy: relationships vertical, hierarchical ■ City-states: relationships horizontal, at least amongst the elite ■ These differences prove remarkably durable ○ Criticisms of Putnam: Italy ■ Norman rule - why so different in its effects in England? ■ The ‘dark side of social capital’ - equally characteristic of criminal gangs? ■ Where is fascisim in Putnam’s Italy ■ Italy’s ‘southern problem’ - quasi-colonialism? ■ Transmission - republics vanish, civicness endures over the century, but how? ○ Criticism of Putnam: USA ■ 6(a) Italy: Social capital lasted centuries - through wars, revolutions, nation formation, economic crises and democratization ■ USA: it was rapidly depleted due to the effects of… television! ○ Communications and community ■ Can the new communications technologies rebuild the community? Possibly but: ● We tend to limit contact to people like ourselves ● Electronic communications may lack the intimacy and sensitivity of face to face

Week 9: Authoritarianism ● Regime Change 1: sources of authoritarianism and totalitarianism ○ Classifying authoritarian regimes ■ Authoritarian regime featuring rule ● Not by the people ● But by a constitutionally unaccountable leader, group, or organization ● Not selected by the people ■ So if democracy features free and fair elections, authoritarians either don’t hold them, or manufacture victories in them ○ Varieties of authoritarianism ■ According to rulers and their legitimacy formula ■ Personal dictatorship/sultanism - charisma ■ Monarchical rule - tradition, heredity, divine right ■ Military rule - superior performance: end to disorder, development ■ One-party rule/totalitarianism - ideological justification ■ Post-totalitarianism - de-ideologized, performance criteria ○ Varieties of authoritarianism ■ II. according to the range of ambition: ● Authoritarianism is predatory rule: ○ Accepts apolitical civil society ○ Actively undermines explicitly political associations and organizations ● Totalitarianism is transformative rule ○ Nazism - Hitler sought purification ○ Communism - Stalin pursued forceful creation of ‘new soviet man ○ Totalitarians sought state control over society - undermining pluralism, mobilizing people ○ Modern regimes requiring high state capacity ○ Sources of authoritarianism ■ Economic ● Underdevelopment ● Alexander Gershenkron - may be required to solve problems faced by later industrializers ● Economic crisis ● Resource curse/trap ■ Cultural ● Some religions not suited to democracy (Max Weber) ● Asian values (Lee Kuan Yew) ● Hierarchical patterns of social authority ■ But ● Religions broadly interpretable ● Cultural case repeatedly proven wrong - democracy seems quite adaptable ● High social capital alone is not enough - germany (Sheri Berman)

○ Totalitarianism ■ Term originated in Italy of 1920’s ● Destruction of independent civil society ● Pursuit of fundamental unity of state and society ● Incorporation and mobilization of masses - by a single party ● Focus of energies exclusively on ideological goals ● Employment of censorship, surveillance, propaganda violence, terror ■ Applied first primarily to fascist germany and italy then extended in cold war to soviet union and its satellites ■ Challenges liberal modernization theory (e.g. Lipset) ■ Barrington Moore’s 3 routes to modernity ● Liberal democratic ● Fascist ● Communist ○ Fascism ■ Apple to Italy 1922-43 and Germany 1933-45 ■ Southern and eastern europe: Traditional dictatorships or proto-fascist regimes ○ Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (2004) ■ Facism ● A form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants… abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals or internal cleansing and external expansion ○ Fascism’s Contradictions ■ Facism is ● anti-modern (liberalism, rationalism, socialism) - but embraced modern forces and features above all modern nationalism and the state ● Anti-capitalist - but marshalled modern economic might ● Anti-conservative - but revealed in tradition ○ Facism’s variation ■ Minorities: ● Germany: racist and brutally anti-semitic ● Italy: fascist movement initially integrates Jews, engages in smaller subversions ■ Regime character ● Italy: “semi pluralist” (stanley Payne) - a corporatist state with monarchy ● Germany: rapid dismantling of german democracy in every respect, hegemony over pluralism ○ Sources of Fascism ■ Some major factors ● Late and incomplete nation-formation

● Effects of WWI - devastation, imperial collapse, new states ● Russian revolution fear of communism ● Frailties of young democratic institutions ■ What happened to social capital? Why didn't it make democracy work? ■ Berman: parties as key intervening factors - friendly amendment to Putnam ○ Stalinism ■ By 1924, from proletarian internationalism to ‘socialism in one country’ ■ Force collectivization of agriculture ■ Rapid industrialization based on heavy industry ■ Command economy, 5 year plans ○ Nazism and Stalinism ■ Similarities ● Use of powerful modern state, and a single party in a transformative enterprise - “continuous revolution” (michael mann) ● Don't overstate it: “working towards Hitler” (Ian Kershaw) and Stalin’s rabid purge of competent officials ● Political violence: concentration camp and gulags; millions killed; terrorism as a tool of rule ■ Differences ● Soviets absorbed society and economy ● National vs. class revolution ● Character and extent of territorial ambition ○ North Korea ■ Is north korea totalitarian ● Surveillance ● Social control ● Repression ● Prison camps ■ However, Juche is a regime ideology, self-reliance is not transformative, pointing to the limited capacity of the state ● Bernstein’s methodology - Russia cultural and China share: ○ Communist regimes ○ New leaders amidst crisis ○ “Determined to revitalize and reinvigorate the ruling parties and redirect their people’s energies in more productive directions” (p. 40) ○ But the results differ: ■ USSR: end of CP rule, partition of Union, and loss of superpower status ■ China: rising economic and military status, which party adapts to or leads ● China vs. USSR: Institutionalism ○ Institutions (formal and informal system of rules) determine outcomes ○ Institutions generate self-reinforcing dynamics, path dependence ○ Change is problematic: ■ Powerful external force disrupts path dependence or

■ Incremental change - e.g. layering, conversion, drift ■ Depends on strength of forces for change, strength of forces resisting change ■ USSR: simultaneous reform in three domains , not one: the economy, the military-industrial complex/foreign policy, and the political system ■ Gail Lapidus: successful reform “would entail radical changes not only in the organization of the Soviet economy, but also in social and cultural policy, in the nature of soviet political life, and ultimately in the allocation of status, power and rewards throughout the Soviet system” ■ Aimed also “to cut the… huge military budget and to end the cold war” ■ Effect: much more powerful and wide-ranging resistance to change, amplified by democratization ■ China is better positioned for economic reforms: ■ Chinas backwardness - “This enabled the country’s leaders to start economic reforms at the periphery” ■ “Decentralization made it possible to defer reform of the centrally planned economy, which was the core economy, until the 1990s” ■ Household responsibilities system and township and village enterprises: partial changes, within context of existing system, that gradually overcome system (layering) ○ Soviet wage and pension security discourage risk-taking ○ Soviet agriculture larger, more industrialized, and more bureaucratized - harder to dislodge: ■ Bureaucratic barriers: “a path-dependent legacy” with impact “long after the agricultural sector had become the recipient of huge states subsidies and investments during the Brezhnev era” (Bernstein, p. 49) ○ Timing and sequencing ■ Chinese reforms came after radical and disruptive great proletarian cultural revolution (1966-76) ■ Soviet reforms came after stability of Brezhnev and successors ■ Soviet economic reforms failed, but china’s brought unprecedentedly high growth rates (10 percent over the next 30 years) Readings: Dictators and Dictatorships (Ezrow and Frantz ● Defining Dictatorship ○ Linz ■ Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism, without intensive or extensive political mobilization and in which a leader or a small group exercises power within formally ill defined limits but actually quite predictable ones ○ Huntington (similar to Linz) ■ Authoritarian regimes are characterized by a single leader or group of leaders with no party or a weak party, little mass mobilization and limited political pluralism ○ Acemoglu and Robinson (contrary) ■ Argue that dictatorships are regimes in which the government

represents solely “the preferences of a subgroup of the population” ■ non-democracies are “for the elite and the privileged” where decisions are made either by a single individual, the elite, a junta, or an oligarchy. ○ Brooker ■ Definition focuses on the election process ■ Defines dictatorship as the “theft of public office and powers” ○ Przeworski (definition used for this article) ■ Regimes in which those who govern are selected through contested elections ■ Dictatorships are not democracies ● Theoretical backgrounds ○ Totalitarianism ■ Huntington ● Rule by a single party led by an individual with a powerful secret police and a highly developed ideology ● Government has total control of mass communications and social and economic organizations ● Aim to create and ideal society through government propaganda ■ Hannah Arendt ● Highlights the uniqueness of totalitarianism calling it a new and extreme form of dictatorship comprised of “atomized, isolated individuals” ● Using stalin and hitler argues ideology plays a prominent role in totalitarian regimes ● Common thread is that leadership wants to transform human nature by providing complete road map for the organization of human life ● Leadership seeks to exert full control over society subjecting citizens to omnipresent terror to ensure compliance ● Critical actors ○ Leader ○ Secret police ○ The party ■ Friedrich and Brzezinski ● Highlight 6 features of totalitarian dictatorships ○ Implementation of official ideology ○ A single political party ○ Party control over the mass communications ○ Party control over the military ○ A central economy ○ And a secret police ● Totalitarianism is a new from of government seeking a social revolution based on the leaderships ideological assumptions ● Power is wielded without restraint ● Leader has greater power than party and possesses religious or charismatic appeal

○ North Korea ■ Similar to totalitarianism ■ State’s ideology is “Juche” ● Only way to understand this ideology is to “follow the leader and the party” ○ Totalitarianism vs authoritarianism ■ Authoritarian regimes (Linz) ● Ideology is weak ● Goal is to depoliticize and demobilize society ● Small degree of pluralism ● Political parties are devoid of ideology and don’t play an important role ● Regime does not exercise total control ● Terror and propoganda used but not to the same extents as totalitarian regimes ■ Totalitarian regimes (Linz) ● Goals are social revolution to transform human nature ● Ideology plays a strong role ● Terror is used heavily to achieve these goals ● High level of organization and total control ● Leader secret police and party are key ● Mass mobilization ○ Beyond totalitarianism ■ One party dictatorship (Huntington and Moore) ● Revolutionary ○ High level of charisma ○ Social dynamism is high ○ High level of party discipline ○ High role of ideology ○ Strategies for achieving goals are subordinate and annihilate social divisions ○ Low level of institutionalization ● Established ○ Moderate level of charisma ○ Social dynamism is unimportant ○ Moderate level of party discipline ○ Pragmatic role of ideology ○ Achieve goals through administrative means and mediating policy initiatives ○ High level of institutionalization ■ Military rule (perlmutter) ● Arbitrator ○ Time limit to military rule ■ Willing to return to barracks after disputes are settled ○ Goal of the military is to settle disputes ○ Concerned with professional improvement ○ No independent political organization

○ Accepts existing social order ○ Civilian-orientated, fears civilian retribution ● Ruler ○ No desire to return to the barracks ○ Goal is to maximize time in power being convinced military rule is the only alternative to political disorder ○ Politicizes professionalism ○ Strong political organization ○ No confidence in existing order and challenges civilian rule ○ Not civilian orientated and little fear for civilian retribution Week 10: Regime Change and Waves of Democratization ● Defining democracy ○ Liberal democracy ■ Competition or contestation ■ Participation or opposition ■ Rule of law - civil and political rights ■ The institutionalization of uncertainty (Adam Przeworski) ■ “Protected consultation” (Charles Tilly) ■ John Markoff - no stable definition, as each round of political struggle changes our conceptions and expectations of democracy ○ Does democracy come in waves? ■ Systematic shifts of regime type in a great many countries in a defined stretch of time ■ Outstripping shifts in the other direction ■ If so, then democratization should not be studied exclusively at the national level - search for common causes ■ Does it come in waves? ● First wave (1828-1926) - due to ○ Economic development, industrialization ○ Growth of restless new classes (middle and working) ○ War (WWI led to male worker and female enfranchisement) ● First reverse wave (1922-42) - due to: ○ Russian revolution ○ Great depression ● Second wave (1943-1962) - due to: ○ End WWII ○ Delegitimization of authoritarianism ○ Economic reconstruction ● Second reverse wave (1958-75) - due to: ○ Underdevelopment ○ Crisis of development

● Third Wave (1974 on) - due to: ○ Legitimacy crisis ○ Economic development ○ International support ○ Catholic church ● Begins with Portugal, 1974 - causes: ○ Failed colonial wars ○ Revolt within the military ○ Stimulating widespread popular mobilization at home - “Carnation revolution ● Transitions to democracy ○ A voluntarist model - agency temporarily supplants structure ○ “Transitions to democracy” possible regardless of structural conditions ○ Recognizing “the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected events, insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even in definition of political identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals, are frequently decisive…” (Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, 1986) ● Transitional actors ○ Key: responses of elites, as well as masses ○ Strategic interaction key - involving: ■ Hard-liners ■ Soft-liners ■ Social moderates ■ Social radicals ○ Within context of imperfect information ○ These actors are not social classes ● Transition process ○ Begins with elite split (soft liners from hard liners) - based on concern over regime legitimacy and durability ○ soft -liners reach out to social moderates - offering liberalization of economy, society, limited political change ○ The aim is to stabilize situation, preserve regime ○ Based on soft-liners’ belief in the existence of many social moderates, and their willingness to support limited institutional change ● Transitions to democracy or dictatorship ○ With this opening comes rapid increase in the politicization and mobilization of civil society ○ Key characteristics of the politics of transition: “ hope, opportunity, choice, incorporation of new actors, shaping and renewal of political identities” (O’Donnell and Schmitter)

○ The resulting interactions will determine whether the transition will lead to democracy or renewed dictatorship ○ If society mobilizes and radicalizes too much, too fast, then repression by hard-liners (if they still can) ○ If society insists on more, but remains sufficiently moderate, then elites may participate in democratization ● Case study: Russian Democratization ○ Declining legitimacy of USSR - limits to dictatorship of the proletariat? ○ Weakening of performance-based legitimation - declining economic performance: ■ Soft incentives ■ Inability to shift from extensive to intensive industrialization ● Gorbachev as soft liner ○ Responded to perceived decline in legitimacy of regime ○ Reformed to preserve: ■ Perestroika - restructuring ■ Glasnost - openness, publicity ■ Arms reductions -- to free up resources for reforms ○ Reached out to moderates, but failed to control results from 1989-91: ■ Single-party elections ■ End to party’s leading role ■ New parties, associations, multi-party elections ■ Nationalist revolts, suppressed to mollify hardliners ■ Gorbachev opts for Soviet Presidency ■ Russian Commmunist Party forms ■ Coup August 1991 Readings: Moller and Skaaning democratic waves (chapter 5) ● First (long) wave (1828-1926) ○ Western europe, north america, australia, new zealand, parts of latin america, central and eastern europe ● First reverse wave (1922-42) ○ Central and eastern europe, parts of latin america ● Second (short) wave (1943-1962) ○ Countries liberated/occupied by a western allies, parts of former european colonies, and latin america ● Second reverse wave 1958-75 ○ Former colonies and parts of latin america ● Third wave 1974-

○ South europe, latin america, southeast asia, africa, and the former communist countries (the middle east as the only major exception) ● Five important factors (Huntington) ○ Legitimacy crisis ○ Economic development ○ International influence ○ New stance of the catholic church ○ The “snowball” effect ● Conclusion ○ Huntington's analysis has been agenda setting, its greatest merit being that it has directed attention to the international dynamics which have tended to mutually reinforce either democratization or de-democratization ○ Indicators that the wave metaphor is problematic ■ Draws no distinction between abrupt and gradual developments including pivotal conjuntures ■ Unclear whether a stagnant period or an actual decrease separates two different waves Transitology (Chapter 9) ● Was welcomed by academics and practitioners as it offered a stimulating, novel take on regime change but also because it supported the growing optimism on behalf of democracy in structurally unpropitious countries ● The assumption that the transition period is a process in which the background structures are next to important is problematic ● Agents choices have so far not seemed to pave the way for the development of inclusive citizenship rights and the rule of law ● It is necessary to integrate agency-oriented and structure oriented accounts precisely due to their considerably overlapping explanatory power ● Fundamentally about whether we ought to perceive various explanations as supplements or alternatives to one another The Rise of competitive authoritarianism Levitsky and Way ● Defining competitive authoritarianism ○ Competitive authoritarian regimes violate the criteria for democracy frequently and at high systemic levels falling short of democracy ○ They also fall short of full-scale authoritarianism ■ Incumbents cannot be eliminated and violations of democratic rules are not open ■ Bribery and co-optation are used ■ Meaningful democratic institutions are in place creating arenas through which opposition forces may pose significant challenges ○ Four arenas of democratic contestation ■ Electoral arena ■ Legislative arena ■ Judicial arena ■ The media ○ Inherent tensions ■ Authoritarian governments may coexist with meaningful democratic

institutions as long as incumbents avoid egregious rights abuse and do not cancel or openly steal elections ■ This does create an inherent source of instability ■ There are legal and societal barriers to influencing these elections giving incumbents the chance to actually win elections ■ Succession is not democratization ● While incumbent turnover has resulted in democratic transitions other examples have seen the continuation of authoritarianism ○ Paths to competitive authoritarianism ■ Competitive authoritarian regimes have clearly proliferated in recent years ■ First path ● The decay of a full-blown authoritarian regime ● Established authoritarian regimes were compelled often by a combination of domestic and international pressure either to adopt formal democratic institutions or to adhere seriously to what had previously been facade democratic institutions ■ Second path ● Collapse of an authoritarian regime, followed by the emergence of a new competitive authoritarian regime ● Weak electoral regimes emerges by default in the wake of the breakdown ● The government lacked the capacity to consolidate authoritarian rule ■ Third path ● Decay of a democratic regime ● Deep and often long standing political and economic crises created conditions under which freely elected governments undermined democratic institutions via a presidential “self- coup” or through selective, incremental abuses ■ Prospects for both full scale authoritarianism and full-scale democratization remained bleak ○ Conceptualizing nondemocracies ■ It is clear that early hopes of democratization in much of the world were overly optimistic ■ Many authoritarian regimes survived the third wave and in the ones that collapsed democracy was not yielded seeing new forms of non democratic rule ■ Some forms of authoritarianism such as totalitarianism and bureaucratic authoritarianism have become more difficult to sustain ■ A range of other nondemocratic outcomes also gained in importance including other types of hybrid regimes, postcommunist patrimonial dictatorships, and cases of sustained state collapse

Week 11: Transitions and Waves ● Transitions and waves ○ Third reverse wave? Some signs of authoritarianization ○ But Levitsky and Way: ■ Emergence of hybrid regimes combining democratic and authoritarian features ○ Deep challenge to transitology - - hybrid regimes that are sustainable rather than merely transitional ○ Levitsky and Way: ■ Post-Cold war world: authoritarianism harder to sustain - pro- democratic US, EU ■ Many countries lack the conditions for democracy: development, middle class, strong state and civil society ■ While lacking the elite cohesion and state capacity required to impose dictatorship against societal resistance ■ The result: neither democratic ■ Nor fully authoritarian ■ But still authoritarian ● Is competitive authoritarianism still here? ○ Levistsky and Way: ■ Yes in, 2019 ○ Why? ■ Competition brings some level of uncertainty ■ US and EU are not the pro-democratic powerhouses they once were ■ But there are still roughly as many CA regimes as in the 1990s (35 then, 32 now) ■ The model survives where weak institutions permit the playing field to be tilted but not trashed ■ Or where populist leaders weaponize grievances to overcome resistance to a tilted playing field ■ Competition is hard to eliminate without a popular alternative to democracy ○ Institutionalizing Democracy ■ Two Major Pathways: ● Monarchical Path ○ Keep (and control) the king ○ France 1791 Constitution ■ Autocracy or ■ Constitutional ● Real Monarchy or ● Parliamentary ● Republican Path ○ Kill or remove the king ○ American Constitution ■ Collegial or ■ Presidential

● Weak or ● Strong ○ Purge or ○ Semi ○ Constitutional monarchy - features ■ Acknowledged, formal limits to monarchical prerogative ■ Constitution disperses at least limited power to representative assemblies, courts - mixed constitution ■ Benjamin Constant: monarchy as “neutral power” guaranteeing institutional balance in the polity ○ Constitutional monarchy in france ■ France 1791 ● First constitution of the french revolution ● Revolutionaries: monarchy, though weaker, to bring stability to new order ● King gains legislative veto, right to appoint and dismiss ministers ● Unstable - (i) veto merely suspensive ○ (ii) separation between assembly and ministry too complete ■ Within two years, king Louis XVI beheaded ■ France set on “revolutionary” path (Bagehot): ● Republics ● Restorations ● Bonapartist authoritarianism ○ Parliamentary Monarchy ■ Evolves in England from the 17th to 19th centuries ■ Political role of monarchy gradually declines, replaced by largely ceremonial role ■ Political role of house of lords also shrinks ■ Shift of executive functions to cabinet, “the efficient secret” (Bagehot) ■ Parliamentary regime - fusion of executive and legislative power (concentration rather than separation of powers) ■ Elasticity and continuity ○ Republicanism ■ A policy without traditional legitimacy of monarchy ■ Presidential republicanism ● Seen as necessary in America due to larger scale ● President at first indirectly elected, electoral college as mediating body ■ Essence of presidentialism ● President holds executive power ● Separate election of executive and legislative ● Divided, not fused or concentrated government - mutual independence ■ France ● Revolutionary origins - France: parliamentary

republican regime, 1875 ● Key: establishing that prime minister, not president, truly leads the government (1876-77) ■ Semi-Presidential ● Lane: european strong presidentialism ● Features a strong and independently elected presidency and a prime minister as head of state governing ● France since 1958: ○ President appoints and dismisses prime minister - may disregard composition of assembly ○ Cohabitation - parliamentary majorities cannot be ignored ○ Today’s choice ■ Presidentialism ■ Semi-presidentialism ■ Parliamentarianism - with either a monarchy or a weak president as head of state ○ Perils of Presidentialism? ■ Indivisible prize - ‘winner take all’ ■ Fixed term - inflexibility ■ President both partisan and national leader ■ Governing coalitions hard to form ■ Dual democratic legitimacy - Impasse ■ Tendency to use extra-constitutional means to break impasse ■ USA as the stable case? ● “Diffuse” American parties? Centrist, moderate electorate ● No - increasing polarization in the last few decades ● Elections messy, nastym but still open and clear ● Although signs of erosion of electoral integrity ● Trump, like Obama, got two years without serious danger of executive-legislative danger ■ From Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (2007) : ■ Failed Coalition building and executive legislative deadlocks not empirically linked to collapse of presidentialism ■ Instead, democracies following dictatorships headed by professional military 70 percent more likely to fail ○ Lijphart - Westminster Model ■ Keys to the majoritarian model: ● Government should be by the majority ● Even if it is a bare majority ● representing less than a majority of voters ● With an opposition party in place ● To challenge and replace the government ■ Key to consensus model

● Government should be by larger majorities ● Consisting of as many parties and representatives as possible ● Emphasizing negotiation at the expense of quick action and clear accountability ● A fewer complete changes of government Readings: Constitutions and political theory Lane ● Constitutional monarchies ○ Prevailing type of constitutional government in the 1800s within europe ○ Involved the combination of monarchical rule with some dispersion of powers to other bodies like the national assembly or the courts ○ Goal is to somewhat limit the power of the king or queen in different ways ○ The archetype of a constitutional monarchy is the french 1791 constitution which served as a model for constitutional diffusion ■ King seen as the guarantee for the stability of the state ○ Royal autarchy was practiced in some states as well ○ The english constitution a living unwritten constitution couldn’t be classified as a constitutional monarchy at the beginning of the 19th century, it was a form of parliamentarism ● Presidential republicanism ○ The american constitutional experiment favouring a big republic could not employ existing forms of republican government ■ The choice of a president elected by the electoral college was made ○ Only Brazil chose the french model but transformed to the american model in 1891 ○ Question is why presidentialism works so differently in the US compared to south america ■ Under presidentialism the temptation to resort to military government in the face of political opposition is strong ■ South america doesn't have the checks and balances institutionalized in the american system ○ The french and american model constituted two basic modes of constitutionalist governments ● Parliamentarism ○ First parliamentary republic created in France 1875 ○ The english constitution from 1867 comprises a most general analysis of parliamentarism as a regime ○ The english constitution ■ Gives a voice to the british people (expressive) ■ Instructs the people on vital matters (teaching) ■ Tells the rulers about events in the realm (informing ■ Legislation ■ Finances, in particular the introduction of new taxes ○ The peculiar contribution of the british practice is the concept of the cabinet as distinct from the queen

○ Bagehot identified two internal conditions as absolutely vital for parliamentarism ■ The right of the cabinet to dissolve parliament ■ The right of the queen to name new peers for the house of lords ○ Bagehot external conditions ■ Mutual confidence of the members of the lower house ■ A calm national mind ■ Rationality ○ Baghot found four types of political regimes ■ Parliamentary ■ Presidential ■ Hereditary ■ Revolutionary ○ Parliamentarism became the constitutional device by means of which the powers of the king and queen could be abolished without the introduction of a republic. ● Parliamentarism vs presidentialism ○ Five models for executive institutions ■ Monarchy w parliamentarism ■ Monarchy w/o parliamentarism ■ Weak presidentialism or presidential parliamentarism ■ American presidentialism ■ European strong presidentialism ○ Parliamentarism along with the handling of the relationship between the people and the executive and legislative powers also involves ■ The vote of no-confidence on the part of parliament towards the cabinet ■ The right to dissolve parliament on the part of the premier ■ The right to call a vote of loyalty towards the cabinet on the part of the premier ■ The right of parliament to appoint or accept a premier ■ The right of the premier to appoint ministers in the cabinet The perils of presidentialism Linz ● Parliamentary vs. Presidential systems ○ A parliamentary regime is one in which the only democratically legitimate institution is the parliament ○ In a presidential system, an executive with considerable constitutional powers is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence ■ Two things about this system stand out ● The presidents strong claim to democratic legitimacy ● His fixed term in office ■ Legislators can also claim democratic legitimacy ● Paradoxes of presidentialism ○ While parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political process, presidentialism makes it rather rigid

Majoritarianism and Consensus ● Westminster model ○ Single-party governments - majority vs opposition, rotation in office with elections ○ Cabinet dominance over legislature ○ Made possible by the disciplined two-party system ○ Majoritarian electoral system - single-member district ● Consensus Model ○ Executive power-sharing - coalition governments, more continuity in office ○ Balance in executive - legislative relations ○ Multiparty system ○ Proportional representation electoral system - multi-member districts ● Lijphart - Consensus Best ○ Key to consensus performance: ■ High quality of democracy - participation incentives ■ Greater tendency to share wealth ■ Appropriate regime for deeply divided societies (postcolonial) - coalition governments, cabinets integrate diversity ■ Majoritarianism sees less continuity in governments and policies - wild swings with fresh election ● Electoral system reform? ○ Liberal party of canada 2015 campaign pledge ■ We are committed to ensuring that 2015 will be the last canadian election conducted under the first past the post voting system ■ But – institutionalism: electoral ● Force for change ○ Partisan interests: majority imposition ■ How strong is the desire of the major parties for reform in UK or Canada ■ Both parties prefer alternating single-party governments ■ And recognize that PR could splinter parties ○ Minority bargain ■ UK Liberal Democrats had leverage after 2010 ■ Coalition bargaining with conservatives led to referendum - - ‘no’ won 68-32% ■ Canada: no coalition governments, and NDP lacks leverage with current minority government ○ Popular pressure: mass revolt: ■ Signs of outright system failure (italy) or deeply unpopular economic changes (New Zealand) ■ UK - Brexit and pandemic failures, but Labour party is renewed and both believe they can win ■ Canada - few signs that simply replacing party in power is no longer enough for voters ○ Mass disillusionment ■ Some signs in the UK, and in canadian provinces ■ But this rarely brings change

■ And disaffection with elections may no longer be strong enough in Canada ○ Will change come to the UK, Canada? ■ Force for change not yet powerful enough ■ Referendum requirement: a powerful impediment to change ● Failed in UK, Canadian provinces ● Low information voters a big problem ● Reform possible if resistance to change reduced - possible to just legislate electoral reform in majoritarian fashion ● UK: referendum the norm; Canada too? ○ Populism: what's the big idea? ■ Anti-elitism: Casts elites as self-interested and corrupt - necessary but not sufficient ■ Emphasis on ‘the people’ - understood as ● Victimized - stolen from, diminished in status ● Virtuous - pure, authentic, the salt of the earth ● Possessing common sense - - wiser than the so-called experts ● Homogeneous - singular, speaking with one voice, a general will ● Sovereign - the final word, against elites and others ○ The big ideas ■ Mudde: a thin-centred ideology ● Compatible with different ideologies ● Dependent on a ‘host’ ideology ● Based on class, nationalism, and so on ■ So populist tend to be ● Left leaning in latin america and southern europe - class ● Right-leaning in Northern Europe and North America - nation ○ Is populism democratic ■ Pushes controversial issues onto the political agenda: immigration, european integration, austerity’s impact ■ Giving voice to people who feel left behind by democratic institutions ○ Populism’s pitfalls ■ Its in tension with liberal pluralism - holding that modern societies are necessarily divided into legitimate groups based on perspective and interest ■ Against pluralism, populism holds that: ● The ‘will of the people’ ● As interpreted by the leader ● Should prevail over rival views - they betray the people ● And liberal institutions - the courts, the civil service, the media ● Mudde: “an illiberal democratic answer to problems created by an undemocratic liberalism” ■ Populists have often operated within the constraints of liberal democracy ■ But this logic supports authoritarian tendencies as well: ● Undermining legitimate opposition - they don’t speak for ‘the people’ !

● And reworking electoral systems to favour the party in power ● Ziblatt and Levitsky: how democracies die ○ Institutionalized uncertainty may give way to excessive certainty - the end of crucial democratic norms of mutual toleration and self-restraint ○ Party effects ■ Democracy depends on strong parties and party system - parties anchored in social groups, competition stabilized ■ Weyland: populism should generate a new, well-organized cleavage - nor class or ethnicity, but the populists against their rivals ■ But populist leaders rely instead on personal charisma ■ “That is sustained by direct, noninstitutionalized connections to a heterogenous, amorphous, and largely unorganized mass of followers” ■ Which provide substantial freedom of maneuver ■ But weakens parties, disrupts party systems ■ And anti-populists are not a coherent group ○ Why populism now? ■ A broad phenomenon, broad causes? ■ Economic factors: ● Disappearance of reliable high quality jobs ● Neoliberalism - growth, flat wages, perceived unfairness ■ Cultural factors: ● Nationalist resurgence - take back our country and way of life ● Status decline for traditionally privileged groups ■ Political factors ● Unresponsive governments and parties ○ From marxism to the third way and beyond ■ Revolutionary communism - late 19th/early 20th centuries ● Socialist international and national ■ Evolutionary socialism - turn of 20th century ● Due to ○ Recognition of problems with revolutionary path ○ Opportunities presented by democratization ■ Paper stones and political coalitions - interwar years ● Due to ○ Recognition of lack of working class majority ○ Varied voting preferences of workers ○ Left parties begin to embrace cross-class coalitions (agrarian or liberal parties) ■ Postwar consensus 1950s-1970s ● Moderation of social democratic parties ○ E.g. bad godesberg, 1959: West German SPD promises ● Key features ○ Unprecedented prosperity ○ Keynesianism - counter-cyclical demand management ○ Welfare state - systemic risk reduction

○ Adaption by conservative parties ■ The third way - beginning in the 1990s ● Response to neoliberalism ● Cross-class emphasis - community, nation and its values ● Responsibility and rights ■ Third way backlash? ● Mirror image of postwar consensus ● Left pulled too far to the centre? To the market? To culture and identity instead of capitalism ● Or is it no longer possible to appeal to increasingly complex and fragmented societies based on an economic message? ● Berman: return to class! Readings: Mudde Populism reading: Populism is an essentially contested concept, given that scholars even contest the essence and usefulness of the concept, while a disturbingly high number of scholars use the concept without ever defining it. Though it is still far too early to speak of an emerging consensus, it is undoubtedly fair to say that the ideational approach to populism is the most broadly used in the field today. This chapter outlines the ideational approach to populism, presents the author's own ideological definition, discusses its key concepts (ideology, the people, the elite, and the general will), and highlights its main strengths—i.e. distinguishability, categorizability, travelability, and versatility—compared to other approaches.