Shafer

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1 MORAL REALISM Moral realism, in simple terms, posits that there are moral facts that are objective and independent of human perceptions. Shafer-Landau defines moral realism as the belief that there are moral features of the world that are independent of our views, perceptions, and beliefs about them (Shafer -Landau 2013). He interprets moral realism as the position that ethical statements can be objectively true or false, akin to statements about the natural world. For example, concepts such as stealing is wrong (Dean, Lecture 3.1, 03:55-04:50) and 'compassion is good' are taken to have definite truth values. Landau illustrates this interpretation by explaining that moral statements are meant to represent the world accurately and are backed by a demonstration of existing moral properties. Shafer-Landau's counters objections to non-natural morality by arguing that moral truths are relative, do not depend on natural facts, and can be the basis for beliefs and actions a rational The position is based on proving the existence of unnatural morality and Shafer-Landau 's defense that if unnatural morality can provide an account of our moral intentions and obligations, it is coherent and logical, thus qualifying it as valid in ethical terms (Shafer -Landau 2013) . This defense reflects his commitment to distinguishing between moral facts and natural facts and emphasizes the need for a non-natural approach to moral philosophy. In this essay, we will examine Shafer-Landau's moral realism framework, its defense against objections, and its implications within the broader discourse of moral philosophy. Additionally, I will draw on Charles Taylor's discussion of ethical relativism to further contextualize the debate. Shafer -Landau’s moral realism is based on the proposition that morality is objective and independent of human beliefs, feelings, or assumptions. He argues that objective moral phenomena, like natural phenomena such as gravity, are the basis for objective moral truth.

2 MORAL REALISM According to Shafer-Landau, certain actions are it's inherently right or wrong, and that sets the objective basis of morality in its ethical framework. Shafer-Landau defends moral realism by dealing with objections to incorrect moral assumptions. He combats the epistemological objection that non-natural morality would be mysterious and incomprehensible and the metaphysical objection that such a virtue would not have its causal effects by his responses, Shafer -Landau reveals a gloss of paradoxical yet revealing truths about ethics, thus providing a strong framework for understanding objective ethical truths. (Shafer -Landau 2013). In "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Non-naturalism," Shafer-Landau presents and addresses several objections to ethical non-naturalism, a position within moral realism that posits the existence of objective moral facts irreducible to natural properties. One significant objection revolves around the epistemological challenge, questioning how individuals can access moral truths if they are non-natural and thus not directly observable or empirically verifiable. This objection raises concerns about the accessibility and credibility of moral knowledge within the framework of ethical non-naturalism. Ethics is an important part of philosophy. In ethics, we ask questions about what is right or wrong, and how people should behave. This area of learning is important because it deals with fundamental aspects of human behavior and decision-making. Looking at the relationship between ethics and metaphysics, we examine how our beliefs about the nature of reality affect our moral beliefs. For example, if a person believes in moral realism, he believes that there are moral truths that exist outside of human opinion. This approach is consistent with the Shafer- Landau framework of moral realism, which holds that there are objective moral realities.

3 MORAL REALISM Similarly, when we think of morality alongside knowledge, we are interested in our sense of what is morally right or wrong. Ethical thinkers might wonder how we can be sure of and understand these implicit moral truths. Shafer-Landau addresses these concerns by emphasizing the role of rational reason and moral intuition in the acquisition of moral truth and demonstrates the compatibility of morality with epistemology. (Dean, Lecture 3.1, 09:30-13:17). Another notable objection pertains to the metaphysical challenge, which questions the causal efficacy of nonnatural moral properties. Critics argue that if moral properties are distinct from natural properties, they would lack causal influence and explanatory relevance, posing a significant challenge to the coherence of ethical non-naturalism. Moreover, Shafer-Landau addresses objections related to moral motivation, which question whether moral realism can adequately account for the motivational force of moral beliefs and values. By engaging with these objections, Shafer-Landau aims to defend ethical non-naturalism and affirm the plausibility of moral realism as a philosophical position. Through a critical examination of these objections and their implications, Shafer-Landau elucidates the strengths and challenges of ethical non- naturalism, contributing to the broader discourse on moral philosophy. The epistemological objection criticizes non-natural morality by pointing out how individuals may perceive moral facts as non-natural and not directly accessible through observational experience. This objection emphasizes the importance of acquisition, emphasizing the knowledge gap in the belief in moral principles. Shafer-Landau distinguishes between responding to this objection by recognizing moral truths a priori and based on them. While it may be true that we cannot observe moral nature directly when we observe natural phenomena, Shafer-Landau argues that we can still understand moral truth through rational reasoning and

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4 MORAL REALISM moral intuition. He argues that as we rely on our sensory experiences to reveal the truth about the material world, we can depend on our moral intuition to provide moral insight. (Shafer -Landau 2013). Furthermore, Shafer-Landau's emphasizes the role of moral intuition as a reliable source of moral knowledge. While moral instincts are not infallible, they provide a rational basis for moral judgment and guide moral decision-making. Shafer-Landau argues that moral instincts are embedded in the human psyche and are developed through experience and reflection. Individuals develop moral emotions through exposure to moral ideas and values in their environment, which shape their moral attitudes and guide their moral reasoning. Furthermore, Shafer-Landau rejects the idea that moral forms must be known as accurate. He argues that many properties we accept as accurate, such as mathematical truth or aesthetic value, are not directly observable but known by rational thought. (Shafer -Landau 2013). By comparing morality to that of these other unobservable factors , Shafer-Landau bolsters his case for epistemic access to morality truths in a non-genetic system of morality. Shafer-Landau's response to the epistemological objection emphasizes the role of rational reasoning and moral sentiment in attaining moral truth. By clarifying the epistemological basis of moral knowledge, Shafer-Landau shows how non-biological morality can function as a coherent and realistic moral framework. The metaphysical objection challenges ethical non-naturalism by questioning the causal efficacy of nonnatural moral properties. Critics argue that if ethical objects differed from natural objects, they would have no causal effects on the world and, therefore would not be explanatorily irrelevant. This objection raises concerns about metaphysical coherence with ethics if not for its naturalness and its ability to provide a comprehensive account of moral details. Shafer-Landau

5 MORAL REALISM addresses this objection by first distinguishing between ontological and causal explanations. (Shafer -Landau 2013).While it may be true that morality does not directly shape events in the world, Shafer-Landau argues that it still plays an important role in informing our moral decisions and behavior. According to Shafer-Landau, moral virtue is the basis for our moral decisions and actions, providing the ultimate explanation for why we judge this. Moreover, Shafer-Landau argues that unnatural morality can fit the causal effect of morality in a broader causal framework. Although morality does not operate according to a causal framework like biological virtues, it contributes to our understanding of ethical issues and provides a solid basis for ethical inquiry. Moral qualities are shown to influence human behavior indirectly through their role in shaping ethical attitudes and guiding ethical decision-making processes. Moreover, Shafer-Landau argues that ethics can have a causal effect on the world through its impact on social norms and institutions. Moral norms shape collective action and help shape the social norms that govern human interaction. Thus, although morality does not have a direct causal effect on individual behavior, it plays a vital role in shaping the moral climate of society and influencing the course of human history. Overall, Shafer-Landau’s response to the metaphysical objection highlights the explanatory power of moral realism in accounting for metaphysical phenomena. By clarifying the role of morality in shaping human behavior and social norms, Shafer-Landau reaffirms the relevance and utility of non-biological morality as a legitimate moral framework. In his discussion of moral relativism, Charles Taylor examines cultural variation in moral beliefs and practices. Moralism holds that moral truths are not objectively true for all people and are not specific to cultures or countries. Taylor acknowledges that cultural conceptions of

6 MORAL REALISM morality differ but rejects the idea that these diversities corrupt moral realities. Instead, he argues that moral realism can accommodate cultural differences and still contain objective moral truths. Taylor's approach complements Schaefer-Landau's moral realism by emphasizing the importance of cultural context in shaping moral beliefs. (Taylor 1954 ). Moral realism, although implying the existence of objective moral facts, does not deny the influence of cultural factors on moral judgments. Shafer-Landau's response to the objection to moral realism illustrates the flexibility of the theory to account for different moral perspectives. Shafer-Landau's defense of moral realism offers a comprehensive response to objections raised against ethical non-naturalism. By addressing concerns about the epistemic accessibility and metaphysical relevance of moral properties, Shafer-Landau elucidates the coherence and plausibility of moral realism. Furthermore, as articulated by Taylor, his engagement with ethical relativism underscores the compatibility of moral realism with diverse cultural perspectives. Through a thorough analysis of Shafer-Landau's arguments and their implications, this essay demonstrates the robustness of moral realism as a framework for understanding objective moral truths in a complex.

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7 MORAL REALISM Works Cited Shafer-Landau, R. (2013). Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), *Ethical Theory: An Anthology* (2nd ed., pp. 54-62). Taylor, P. W. (1954). Four Types of Ethical Relativism. The Philosophical Review, 63(4), 500–516. https://doi.org/10.2307/2182287 Shafer-Landau, Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism, UCI, CA. Lecture 3.1

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