Assignment #4 - Fernie Memorial Arena Incident

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School

Fleming College *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

MISC

Subject

Mechanical Engineering

Date

Dec 6, 2023

Type

pdf

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Uploaded by AmbassadorTankVulture29

Assignment #4 - Fernie Memorial Arena Incident Course Name: Occupational Healthy and Safety Management Name: Merlin Shajumon Student ID: 219905181 Instructor Name: Sarah Gayer

Q1. Could a similar incident have occurred in your workplace (Why or why not?) I work in a restaurant, and compared to the Fernie Memorial arena, our system is different, less intricate, and less advanced, thus the likelihood of an incident like the one there happening here is remote. However, it's critical to be knowledgeable about any potential risks that can exist in a restaurant setting. Here are a few instances: • Dough Mixers: When using dough mixers, contact with the spinning blades might result in hand injuries. • Walk-in Freezer/Refrigerator: Getting trapped inside a walk-in freezer or refrigerator is a possible risk. Condensation may also make the floors slick in some regions, raising the danger of accidents. • Burner or stoves: Getting in touch with hot ranges or stove surfaces poses a burn danger, and there is also a chance of electric shocks, spills of flame or hot liquid and trips and falls due to open burner or stove doors. • High Shelves: Extending too far to reach objects on high shelves might cause muscle strain. Additionally, when items are taken off these shelves, there is a chance that they will fall. • Lifting: Moving bulky, heavy items around the restaurant might cause muscular strain. • Liquids or spills on the Surface: Any liquids that spill or substances on the floor could pose a trip and fall risk, leading to possible injury. To protect the safety and wellbeing of individuals working in the restaurant, it is imperative to address these possible hazards and adopt the proper preventive measures. Q2. What hazards were they aware of? Which ones did they miss? Corrosion brought on by ageing resulted in the development of a small hole in the chiller at the Fernie Memorial arena. Unfortunately, the required repairs were not made during the 2017 summer seasonal outage. As a result, the chiller was restarted on October 16 without attending to the pinhole problem. The operators were also not aware that brine had gotten into the compressor oil. Therefore, only a small number of the previously shut valves were examined. The following day, there was a major ammonia leak. The event was cited as the result of a failing refrigeration system and several years of ignored warnings by WorkSafeBC, a workplace safety organisation. According to a news source, WorkSafeBC has issued eight citations to the City of Fernie for breaches of the Workers Compensation Act and Occupational Health and Safety Regulations. A workplace ammonia exposure management strategy is also missing, as well as frequent workplace inspections that should have been done to avoid hazardous working conditions. The refrigeration company in question, Toromont Industries Ltd. (CIMCO Refrigeration), was also found guilty of two infractions by WorkSafeBC. These infractions involve failing to protect the safety and health of CIMCO employees, which includes starting maintenance work without properly removing and controlling any workplace dangers.

Q3. What specific control strategies (e.g. engineering, administrative or personal protective equipment) did the employer have in place to reduce risk? What control strategies should they have had in place? The company lacks thorough control methods to lessen the risks associated with ammonia exposure. Personal protective equipment (PPE), personal ammonia exposure monitors, a backup team, or dedicated emergency responders weren't in place. Additionally, the employees lacked access to full facepiece respirators that were effective. The only mechanism they had was an automatic alarm from an ammonia gas detector that would alert the security firm and fire department in the event of an emergency. The following control strategies ought to have been used by the organisation, as per to the Technical Safety BC report: • recognising the threat that ammonia leakage poses and making sure that such hazards are professionally disclosed. • creating policies for owner upkeep and organisational planning to manage and prevent dangers. • ensuring that operators, mechanics, and owners' representatives are informed regarding ammonia-related safety procedures. • preparing and building a backup coolant system in case of refrigerant leaks. • By developing an open culture around technical systems and keeping communication with the public transparent, it is possible to guarantee that knowledge about potential risks is freely shared. Adopting these control measures would have improved everyone's working conditions and helped reduce the hazards related to ammonia exposure. Q4. What was the arena management’s main concern? Could this have led to the death of the workers? The video unequivocally demonstrates that repairing and restoring the compressor was the arena management's top priority to save the curling rink. However, due to the uncertainty surrounding the ammonia presence at the time, this choice tragically resulted in the death of a worker. The municipal officials had originally intended to substitute the air compressor in 2013 at a cost of $70,000, according to the Technical Safety BC (TSBC) study. But because of money issues, they put off replacement till 2014 and subsequently dropped it entirely from their budgeting. The investigation claims that "the choice of how to handle the leaking chiller had an important part in the development of the incident." It goes on to describe that once the leaky chiller was restarted, actions and choices were made in reaction to a succession of malfunctions that cascaded, exceeding the knowledge and contextual awareness of individuals involved in those activities. A chiller typically lasts around 20 and twenty-five years on average. The Fernie chiller had been in operation for 31 years when it failed. Clearly, the awful fatalities may have been prevented if the administration had given this issue sufficient thought.

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Q5. Where the workers following proper protection when going into the arena to fix the problem? Would the outcome have been different if they had followed proper protection protocol? The employees that arrived to address the issue lacked the necessary safety measures. The video shows that they were not using personal ammonia exposure monitors, protective clothing, and gear (PPE), backup teams, or emergency personnel. Ammonia is a very unpleasant gas that can irritate the skin, eyes, digestive system, respiratory system, and eyes. It creates an alkaline solution called ammonium hydroxide when it combines with moisture found in the human body's mucous membranes. The length of time and the ammonia's concentration all affect how much harm an individual will experience. At 300 parts per million (ppm) in the air, there is an imminent threat to life and health. First responders should wear a Level A protective suit and a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) that has been certified by NIOSH for use in hazardous environments. Up until monitoring establishes the presence and amounts of the pollutant, level A protection should be kept in place. To lessen contact with the eyes and respiratory system when ammonia concentrations are below the IDLH limit (300 ppm), full-face respirators with ammonia cartridges can be utilised. P100 filters should be added to the cartridges in high-humidity conditions to remove mist. Multi- functional atmosphere-supplying respirators can be utilised when working on refrigeration systems that could potentially leak ammonia or have unknown exposure levels. Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is frequently used in situations involving an ammonia leak and unknown airborne contaminants. In all Canadian locations, SCBA breathing protection is allowed while accessing potentially dangerous environments. The safe work procedure for compressor room maintenance, as detailed in the incident report by WorkSafeBC, calls for the use of PPE, including a full-facepiece respirator with air-purifying cartridges. However, none of the personnel involved in the deadly incident were wearing or having any respirators, and none were discovered at the scene of the occurrence. They were found to be using half-facepiece respirators, which are not compliant with the requirements for personal protective equipment because they do not offer eye protection, have a lower protection factor, or satisfy the standards for personal protective equipment. The workers in Fernie were never given full-facepiece respirators, according to WorkSafeBC's findings, making it difficult for them to adhere to all safety regulations. Therefore, this tragedy may have been prevented if the personnel had adhered to the recommended protection protocol.