Corruption_in_Ghana_A_Question_of_Modern

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Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 1 Corruption in Ghana: A Question of Modernization? Word Count: 2490 1. Introduction Ghana was the first sub‐Saharan Africa country to gain independence in 1957, and like most African countries its history includes periods of authoritarian rule, coup d'états and economic challenges (Tettey et al 2004). Over the past decade however, Ghana seems to be taking advantage of its immense natural resource endowments ‐ the latest being oil ‐ and has exhibited strong growth and potential on both the economic and governance fronts (African Economic Outlook 2012). Ranked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as one of ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2011 1 , the low middle‐income country recorded average GDP growth levels of about 5.8% from 2001‐2010 (World Development Indicators). In 2009, U.S. President Obama selected Ghana for his premier visit to the African continent; a testament to the country's strides as a maturing democracy. Despite its successes, corruption in Ghana is still very high. The country performed poorly on TI’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ranking 69 th out of 182 countries surveyed. The 2011 Voice of the People Survey (VOPS) by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) 2 reports that 92.4% of 2096 survey respondents considered corruption to be “a serious problem” in the country. Furthermore, 60% of Ghanaians surveyed under Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) believed that corruption in Ghana had increased from 2006 to 2011. Although illegal, bribery is the predominant form of corruption in Ghana (GII 2011, pg. 17). According to the African Union, 25% of the combined GDP of African states is lost to corruption each year, amounting to $148 billion (U4 Anti‐Corruption Resource Center 2007). Thus, Ghana’s high corruption holds serious implications not only for the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutions, but also for its economic development and poverty reduction efforts 3 . There have been many studies examining the background and characteristics of corruption in developing countries. One of the more predominant institutional explanations put forth by the economist Samuel Huntington suggests that corruption increases during periods of rapid modernization and political change and is fueled by changing values and norms, new sources of wealth and power, and increased government intervention and bureaucracy. This paper examines Huntington’s theory on modernization and corruption, highlighting key lessons for Ghana. First, an overview of key corruption theories is presented, followed by an analysis of Huntington’s theory on corruption and modernization, focusing on the aforementioned factors. Finally, recommendations are made on lessons Ghana can learn from Huntington’s research. 1 MyJoyonline.com News Article: http://business.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201110/75427.php 2 Transparency International’s local chapter in Ghana. 3 Over 50% of Ghana’s population of 24 million live on less than $2 a day (WDI).
Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 2 2. Conceptual Framework Definitions As defined by the Merriam‐Webster online dictionary, culture is “the customary beliefs, social forms and material traits of a race, religious, or social group.” Another definition by Bates & Plog (2004), quoted by Jonas Hjort describes culture as: The system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors and artifacts that members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning (Hjort 2010). Given the complexity of corruption, there is no standard definition. However, it is generally considered as a violation of public trust for the individual interest of oneself or another. Transparency International (TI) describes corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” (Transparency International 2011), while the World Bank calls it “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank 2007, pg. 8). Huntington describes corruption as being “behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends.” These definitions are typically criticized as being too narrow and Western; giving birth to terms like Thomas de Sardan’s “corruption complex” which goes “beyond corruption in the strict sense of the word, to include nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, influence‐peddling, prevarication, insider trading and abuse of the public purse” (de Sardan 1999). Consequently, corruption takes many forms, including “bribery (use of reward to influence decisions of people in positions of trust), nepotism (patronage based on ascriptive relationship rather than merit) and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private benefits)” (Osei‐Hwedie 2000). Corruption Theories There are inadequacies in defining and measuring corruption; most definitions tend to embody value judgments. As de Sardan notes, “corruption is almost unanimously experienced as an evil or even as a calamity”. Furthermore, there are underlying assumptions, usually based on the Western experience. For instance, the World Bank definition of corruption assumes the existence of a public office, which should be used entirely for public purposes. While this might be the case in most Western societies, it might not necessarily be true for African societies. Consequently, the question of who defines corruption and what assumptions or perceptions go into defining it – and by extension, measuring it – is important. Most people recognize and openly condemn corruption, however the percentage of individuals who engage in bribery and other corrupt acts is quite high (Miller 2006). Why do people engage in the very corrupt acts they openly condemn? Some theories suggest that corruption is at its heart a question of morals and internal values; that “bad” or “wicked” people engage in corruption. However, morality alone cannot address the issue of corruption in its entirety.
Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 3 “At best, values may influence behavior. At worst, values may exist only in a world of ideals and self‐delusion, without much impact on actual behavior. We need to measure values independently of behavior, and then weigh the impact of these internal values against the impact of external pressures on actual behavior” (Miller 2011, pg. 371). Consequently, many social scientists explore the underpinnings of corruption through the principal‐agent model. The model examines corruption under a cost‐benefit analysis. If a rational, self‐interested agent considers the benefits of engaging in a corrupt act to outweigh the costs of corruption, he will engage in corruption. The probability of not getting caught greatly influences the final decision of the rational, self‐interested agent. According to the principal‐agent model, corruption can be reduced if a principal puts incentives, checks and balances in place in order to dissuade an actor from acting in a corrupt manner. Some of these include increased monitoring, punishment, and strict criteria in selecting agents. While the principal‐agent problem is criticized as not being universally applicable, the majority of economic papers on corruption use it as their point of reference. Social theories argue that “corruption is perpetuated by social norms” (Truex 2011). Notable proponents of the social norms argument are Andvig & Moene (1990), Goel & Rich (1989), and Miller (2006); the latter of whom argues that the incidence of corruption depends on how corruptible or accepting of corruption members of society are. Truex (2011) also distinguishes between internal values and external values or social norms that perpetrate corruption: “An important point, one frequently forgotten during abstract discussions of equilibrium and strictly dominant strategies, is that so‐called corruption norms are perpetuated not because citizens believe corruption and malfeasance are desirable outcomes, but because the behaviors deemed legally and officially corrupt are often justified by local social practices” (Truex, 2011, pg. 1134). 3. Corruption and Modernization While corruption might seem more evident in some cultures than others, it is most prevalent when a country is undergoing “rapid social and economic modernization” (Huntington 1999). Huntington’s argument falls into the category of social and institutional explanations. In this case, it “seeks the causes of corruption in cultural institutions, poverty, temptation, imperfect system of laws, and political change” (Osei‐Hwedie 2000). Consequently, Huntington ascribes increased corruption in developing countries to changing value systems; the creation of new sources of wealth and power; and increased centralization and bureaucracy. Changing Value Systems Through colonization and the subsequent adoption of colonial institutions in the post‐colonial era, African countries like Ghana imported Western elements like language, education, governance and bureaucratic structures into their traditional societies. The result is somewhat of an “identity crisis” for African nations, and indeed, a meeting of two worlds ‐ one modern and the other traditional. The fabric of developing countries, including those on the African continent, was
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Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 4 especially influenced by the import of different values, and with it, “new standards of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt” (Huntington 1999). Huntington argues that as a country modernizes, people take on universalized and achievement‐based norms in lieu of their traditional group welfare norms. In the Ghanaian context this might be relatively more individualistic and reduce the emphasis on extended family networks. With this new orientation, the “circle of trust” turns around with people re‐aligning their loyalty and identification towards the nation‐state. There is also a growing emphasis on equal rights and obligations, and individuals who are re‐socialized due to exposure to the West begin to perceive their native values and norms differently: “Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing society is thus in part not so much the result of deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior. New patterns of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt” (Huntington 1999, pg. 378). Traditional Ghanaian culture typically does not distinguish between public roles and private interest. Under the system of communal property, traditional leaders acted as custodians and had both the responsibility and obligation to offer rewards and employment to family members. Such a leader was considered to be acting in the public interest, and therefore couldn’t formally be accused of being corrupt for using a public resource for his family or kinsmen. In cases where theft or resource misuse occurred, there would be punishment ‐ sometimes as little as a fine, other times as large as banishment from the kingdom. With modernization however, that distinction has become clearer, and accepted by the majority of Ghanaians, and public officials who ignore the distinction are labeled as corrupt. The introduction of competition and achievement standards has also influenced community‐ based societies in developing countries. Nepotism has resulted from a desire to see family members up the ladder of successes versus others (Huntington 1999), with people going to lengths to favor members of their ethnic groups over others. A typical example of this in Ghana is when public officials select unqualified family members or friends for jobs and deprive more qualified applicants of opportunities. Beyond the obvious favoritism that nepotism is based on, it reinforces the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of public institutions since these individuals generally don’t have the skills or knowledge for the job. New Sources of Wealth and Power According to Huntington modernization creates new sources of wealth and power in developing countries, which are not yet defined by traditional norms or accepted by dominant groups in society. Developing country natives find few opportunities for accumulating wealth through private activity since there’s a traditional preference for public interest and economies are dominated by foreign companies and investors. The newly wealthy can afford to buy political power, and proceed to
Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 5 increase both their wealth and political clout through the resources they tap into. Politics thus becomes the “road to wealth” (Huntington 1999) and leads to patron‐client networks through which resources are redistributed (Smith, 2003, pg. 706). In Ghana’s case, many people sell their votes and secure jobs through their patron “connections”. Loyalties are redefined and the preference is for “informal, personal ties over “rational” Weberian bureaucratic rules and regulations” (Smith, 2003, pg. 706). At the very extreme, the new elite class could essentially capture the system. “There is thus the corruption of the poor and the corruption. The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an office or decision) is sold for private gain” (Huntington 1999, pg. 379). Increased Centralization and Bureaucracy A final catalyst of corruption under modernization is the increase in centralization and bureaucracy. As more regulations and bureaucratic structures are put in place, the tendency for disadvantaged groups to flout or bypass them altogether increases, and with it, the number of corrupt acts. “Multiplication of laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption” especially “in a society where corruption is widespread (Huntington 1999). Huntington points out that the degree of corruption produced depends on both the nature of traditional society and of the modernization process; there is less corruption in modernizing feudal states than in centralized bureaucratic societies. Additionally, customs, trade and tax collection sectors of government tend to be rife with corruption in developing countries like Ghana. Corruption also depends on whether there are several competing systems or cultures in the traditional society, and if not, what the degree of social stratification is. In Ghana alone there are nine major ethnic groups, some of which are quite distinct from others and thus have different agendas. The ethnocentrism that is evident even at the highest level of leadership means that non‐represented or disadvantaged groups are more inclined to break the law and engage in corruption in order to get what they want. The “general absence of rigid class divisions” in many African societies also means people can easily shift between poverty and wealth and the motivation for higher income and social standing fuels corruption (Huntington 1999, pg. 383). 4. Lessons for Ghana While corruption is typically viewed as a negative, some social scientists, including Huntington, suggest that it might offer some benefits. He argues that in bypassing traditional laws and bureaucratic regulations, corruption could help stimulate economic development and end up being “a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization”. This however, is only possible if corruption is not yet pervasive in a society (Huntington 1999, pg. 386). The level of corruption in Ghana points to the increasingly bureaucratic nature of governance as well as the existence of irrelevant laws. By ridding the country of defunct laws and ensuring proper representation of groups in parliament the government could take concrete steps towards reducing corruption levels. Huntington refers to party patronage as “only a mild form of corruption” and emphasizes that the “corruption of one governmental organ may help the institutionalization of
Jemila Abdulai Paper 1 ‐ Rewrite Corruption in Developing Countries (Melissa Thomas) 6 another” (Huntington 1999, pg. 386). In as much as Ghana’s political parties have played a huge role in spurring the countries anti‐corruption efforts, less than a third (21%) of Ghanaians believed those efforts to be effective (GCB, 2010‐11). This reflects the need for real measures towards reducing corruption, especially where law enforcement and behavioral change are concerned. Political organizations that exercise effective authority and organize group interests beyond family and clan are essential. On a larger scale, the country needs to create opportunities for private wealth creation so as dissuade the use of political power for wealth. Finally, the conflict between modern and traditional norms presents “opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither” (Huntington 1999). A clear distinction between not just public and private roles, but traditional and modern norms needs to be made under the country’s constitution so as to prevent the blurring of these lines.
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