INTL301_Fusion Centers - Megan Patterson
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Fusion Centers 20 Years Later:
Still Defining a Purpose and Building a Network
Megan Patterson
U.S. Intelligence Community
Course number: INTL301
20 Feb, 2022
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Introduction
Calls to increase collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence agencies rose to the forefront of national security efforts following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Official state and major urban area fusion centers were established in an attempt to foster effective interagency and intergovernmental terrorism information-sharing (Gardner 2017, 1). The growing expanse of governmental agencies and technological applications coupled with the ever-present and adaptive threat of terrorism provides a stark reminder of how dependent the United States is upon relevant and timely information sharing - a task many scholars have stressed to be difficult to achieve. Efforts to establish and integrate partnerships and best practices of federal, state, local, and tribal entities through fusion centers are critical for homeland defense; however, the shift toward more proactive law enforcement with the help of these fusion centers still falls short of a fulfilling a long-term solution due to personnel, technological, and cultural challenges. Fusion Centers
Structure and Purpose
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created as a direct result of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Specifically tasked to prevent future terrorist attacks, DHS sponsored fusion centers owned by state and local agencies to form an unofficial national network (Gardner 2017, 1). Fusion centers, as the name implies, take on the role of integrating and analyzing existing streams of information to help drive actionable public policy and additional targeted collection (Rollins 2008, 10). DHS directly integrates into this process at select locations through assignment of a member from its Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). The FBI and additional agencies including NCTC, CIA, ICE, ATF, DEA, the Secret
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Service, and Homeland Security Investigations (HIS) are also regularly included in collaboration efforts (Gardner 2017, 108). No two fusion centers are alike, and the exact mission of each center remains consistent with specific needs of the state or major urban area that owns it (Gardner 2017, 57). Despite the varying additional focus areas, fusion centers all maintain primary roles of receiving and vetting suspicious activity reports (SARs) and disseminating relevant terrorism information to patrol officers. The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers defines priorities including four Critical Operational Capabilities: 1) Ability to receive information from federal partners, 2) Ability to analyze and assess local implications of threat information, 3) Ability to further disseminate information to state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector entities, and 4) Ability to gather, aggregate, analyze, and share locally generated information (Homeland Security 2021b). A recurring theme found in national strategies and initiatives directing homeland security and information
sharing is the requirement for expanded infrastructure and inter/intra-agency coordination and
partnerships with agencies of state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments as well as the private sector (Homeland Security 2021a).
Legal Framework and Oversight
Fusion centers operate under federal regulations while also incorporating any applicable state policies, laws, or regulations (Rollin 2008, 13). Regarding states’ legal authorities, recognition of the establishment of fusion centers ranges from nonexistent, to memorandums of agreements of the partnering agencies, to full state statute defining responsibilities; the theme throughout being that a majority are not recognized by a governor’s executive order or statutory legislation (Rollins 2008, 20). An ongoing challenge is for federal-level involvement to balance guiding but not dictating fusion center operations
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while also ensuring divested resources are coordinated to provide maximum return on investment (Rollins 2008, 37). Many fusion centers turn to 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 23 to guide criminal intelligence operations as it sets a standard for “reasonable suspicion” (Rollins 2008,
13). Additional components of the legal framework can be found in the Patriot Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) amendments which brought down what is known as the “FISA wall” restricting information-sharing among federal law enforcement agencies and the IC (Gardner 2017, 65). DHS, DOJ, and fusion centers acknowledge the protection of privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties (P/CRCL) as a key priority within efforts to support homeland security (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.) There are training resources and guidance available for fusion center personnel as required by the 9/11 Commission Act in addition to DHS assessments of the impact the Fusion Center Initiative had upon privacy and civil liberties published in 2008.
Additionally, there are several fusion centers that have taken the initiative of creating a governance board to serve an oversight function, some specifically citing concerns for civil liberties as the reason (Rollins 2008, 12). Impact and Trends
“Not only does good intelligence win wars, but the best intelligence enables us to prevent them from happening altogether.” - 9/11 Commission
Impacts and Potential Risks
A critical aspect of the intelligence failure on September 11, 2001 is that three of the hijackers involved had previous routine law enforcement encounters with local police officers
(Gardner 2017, 27). Because of this fact, the question remains whether the entire terrorist plot
may have been thwarted had there been an established flow of information-sharing between the federal government and local police. Unfortunately, while the creation of fusion centers
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has alleviated some concerns, there is still much to be learned and established to ensure these centers are not just providing a call to action for a false sense of security. The first formal assessment of fusion center capabilities was conducted in 2010 by federal, state, and local officials to identify fusion center trends of strengths and weaknesses (Homeland Security 2021b). One example of a weakness which has proven to be difficult to overcome are the varying agency cultures between law enforcement agencies and the IC (Gardner 2017, 36). Due to the non-traditional intelligence approach of focusing on every day, routine observations, fusion centers are reliant upon more traditional (and classified) intelligence to be provided by the greater IC (Gardner 2017, 43). Lacking a defined standard for operating procedures leaves individual fusion centers focusing efforts on tailored intelligence instead of
contributing and facilitating the larger national web initially envisioned (ACLU 2008). Obstacles also stem from working off various networks and the sensitive and classified nature
of federal intelligence (Gardner 2017, 103). Competing federal information systems inhibit true fusion capabilities and bog down fusion center personnel. A sampling of the numerous networks operated include: Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), HSIN-Secret, HSDN, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Federal Protective Service (FPS), and Regional Information Sharing Services (RISS) – to name a few (Rollins 2008, 30). This barrier is most evident for patrol officers and other fusion center customers who do not possess security clearances, preventing them from accessing or receiving classified federal intelligence. As for
those within fusion centers who do hold Secret and even Top Secret clearances, yet another barrier exists in the lack of content available on the HSDN and Secret level databases (Gardner 2017, 104). Maintaining federal agents in positions within fusion centers incurs additional costs and personnel strains on the lending agency (Gardner 2017, 106). The fusion center model originally stressed a physical space allowing for different agencies to share intelligence. With
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some agencies less willing or unable to commit personnel, some fusion centers have turned to
meeting virtually (Davis et al 2010, 47). Incentivizing ongoing participation without being co-located poses a new challenge that would need to be addressed if virtual environments are further pursued, especially considering the dynamic nature of a true fusion process that relies so heavily upon human synthesis of information and face-to-face interactions (Davis et al 2010, 48).
Most fusion centers fall to state police for management with approximately 20% managed by large urban areas; a statistic that comes into play when considering sources of funding (Davis et al 2010, 46). According to homeland security grant guidance, the majority of Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funding administered by DHS stem from four programs: State Homeland Security Program, Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention (LETTP) Program, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) grant program (Rollins 2008, 33-34). A stipulation of these funding programs is that at least 80% of all funds be passed to local jurisdictions.
Outlook
Undetected terrorist activities like the 2009 Fort Hood attack and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, among others, serve as a reminder of the suboptimal information-
sharing which fusions centers are still working to improve (Gardner 2017, 2). Former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, stated during his confirmation hearing that he was “aghast at the state of information technology across the community” (Gardner 2017, 66). Another critical shortfall lies in what some consider to be a pervasive culture of over-
classification. One way of to overcome the obstacle of over-classified documents and to potentially improve the sharing environment would be to increase the use of tearlines – a section of the report which strips sources and methods to then be releasable at a lower classification (Gardner 2017, 108). The fact remains, however, that most fusion center
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personnel affirm the physical presence of federal representatives is the best resource for fusion centers’ continued survival (Gardner 2017, 110). Some even went so far as to state a preference for having more embedded federal personnel with access to systems passing information instead of obtaining their own clearances and searching for themselves (Gardner 2017, 112). The IC and federal agencies have a primary responsibility to defend the nation from terrorism and foreign threats. Ensuring participation of all law enforcement agencies within a region, effectively managing information-sharing networks and key technologies, and establishing a functioning intelligence cycle process will help to ensure fusion centers remained focus on true “fusion” instead of becoming simply a point of dissemination (Rollins
2008). Partners at all levels of government continue to stress the need for unified and coordinated support for fusion centers. However, the maturation of statewide and national fusion processes supported with assistance from the federal government has been slow to progress and risks losing funding. Should federal funding decrease, fusion centers with statutory recognition in place and a framework for a cost-sharing model will be more likely to
survive a culling of excess funding (Rollins 2008, 20). Additionally, fusion center guidelines remain insufficient since they are voluntary, generic, and have not been adapted to address moving past the establishment phase of fusion center mechanics (Rollins 2008, 10). Conclusion
The creation of fusion centers reflected a greater national shift in how the U.S.
approached homeland security and protection of its citizens with information-sharing as a critical function for success (Gardner 2017, 4). However, information and intelligence sharing go beyond a simple institution, legislation, or being co-located with like-minded individuals. True fusion of intelligence and actionable analysis comes from having the right people, in the right place, at the right time. Without the requisite philosophical and
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organizational changes within the IC and law enforcement communities, fusion centers run the risk of losing momentum and falling short of expectations (Rollins 2008, 9). State and local law enforcement, with the help of fusion centers, are best positioned to notice and therefore act upon signs of a potential attack. DHS Secretary Chertoff described the desired end-state of fusion centers as a cross-country network visible from the top of the federal level
down to each individual community in order to leverage all available information (Rollins 2008, 9). While a nation cannot reasonably expect to have absolute security, nor absolute liberty, Congress and the country must continue to weigh the balance of the two as the fight against domestic terrorism shifts over time (Rollins 2008, 14).
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References
ACLU. 2008. “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers – Executive Summary.” Last updated July
29, 2008. https://www.aclu.org/report/whats-wrong-fusion-centers-executive-
summary
Bureau of Justice Assistance. n.d. “Privacy and Civil Liberties: Justice Information Sharing.” U.S. Department of Justice
. https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties
Davis, Lois M., Michael Pollard, Kevin Ward, Jeremy M. Wilson, Danielle M. Varda, Lydia Hansell and Paul Steinberg. 2010. “The Evolution of Fusion
Centers and Information-
Sharing.” Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security
, RAND Corporation. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1031nij.11 Gardner, Jeffrey V. 2017. “A Duty to Share: The Opportunities and Obstacles of Federal Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing with Nonfederal Fusion Centers.” Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=4873&context=dissertations
Homeland Security. 2021a. “Fusion Centers’ Support of National Strategies and Guidance.” Last updated March 24, 2021. https://www.dhs.gov/topic/fusion-centers-support-
national-strategies-and-guidance
Homeland Security. 2021b. “National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet.” Last updated December 16, 2021. https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet Johnson, B. R. 2007. “A Look at Fusion Centers: Working Together to Protect America.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76
(12), pp. 28-32. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2007- pdfs/dec07leb.pdf Rollins, John. 2008. “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress.” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL34070. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf
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