H100A_Argumentative Essay

docx

School

Command & General Staff College *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

H100

Subject

History

Date

Feb 20, 2024

Type

docx

Pages

Uploaded by CommodoreTreeRat40

How have the theories of either Carl von Clausewitz or Antoine Henri Jomini (not both) influenced warfare since 1815? MAJ Jamie DeSpain H100: History, Theory, Doctrine, and Practice 04 January 2024

Contemporary military strategies owe their foundations to historical military theorists. Antoine Henry Jomini was one theorist who influenced warfare since 1815. Jomini, possessing a positive view of warfare, theorized elements of success from his experiences on the winning side. 1 Jomini captured what he thought were essential elements of warfare success in his Summary of the Art of War . Three theories in the book help form his Fundamental Principle of War: decisive points, offensive primacy, and concentration and mass. 2 These three theories each responded to a battlefield challenge, demonstrated battlefield success, and have applications in later wars. Jomini influenced warfare since 1815 through his theories of decisive points, offensive primacy, and massing forces. Jomini’s first theory which influenced war since 1815 is the theory of decisive points. Jomini explicitly stated this theory as “to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army… upon the decisive points of a theater of war.” 3 Jomini is defining an objective of an operation or a goal a force seeks. This translation of decisive point to objective has textual support in Makers of Modern Strategy . The text highlights how a decisive point, according to Jomini, is “a point… whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy.” 4 This decisive point definition links directly with present day military operations. Contemporary operations focus on an objective, either terrain, location, or an enemy force to degrade that enemy’s ability to fight. Jomini developed this maxim from his experience with Napoleon Bonaparte. Jomini witnessed battles where opposing forces were “simply maneuvering for some limited advantage.” 5 Lack of a clear objective, regardless of the period, leads to prolonged campaigns with unclear outcomes. Jomini observed Napoleon meet this challenge by fighting engagements with clearly identified decisive points. Specifically, Napoleon found decisive points “that, if lost, would ‘dislocate and ruin’ the enemy.’” 6 Naturally, Jomini theorized decisive points as central in battlefield 1

accomplishment given Napoleon’s success in prioritizing decisive points. The American Civil War highlights an application of Jomini’s decisive point maxim. Dennis Hart Mahan, an 1830s instructor at the US Military Academy, favored Jomini’s teachings. 7 Major General Henry Hallack, one of Mahan’s students, exercised a decisive point-based strategy in the Western Theater in 1862. Hallack focused Union forces toward capturing enemy logistic bases rather than directly combating the enemy formations. 8 His strategy allowed Union forces greater advance into enemy territory and enabled eventual Union victory in the West. Jomini saw a necessity for decisive point-based operations and codified the theory based on its positive outcomes. The theory’s use in the Civil War serves to reinforce its influence on warfare since 1815. Offensive primacy is the second Jominian theory influencing warfare since 1815. Jomini describes the theory as using a deliberate, concentrated attack on the most crucial enemy defenses. 9 The result is an overwhelmed enemy and an attacking force pushing through defensive formations. Jomini’s Napoleonic experience provides the foundation for this theory as in the decisive point theory above. The 1805 Austerlitz Campaign provides one of Napolean’s earliest examples of prioritizing offensive operations. Napoleon exercised an offensive plan using speed and initiative to attack Third Coalition Austrian forces. 10 The focus on offense developed from a necessity to confront and defeat multiple enemies. His efforts, by design, caught enemy forces off-guard and follow-on actions ensured his momentum. Napoleon marched from the Rhine to the Danube in only twenty-six days while significantly disrupting enemy strategy. 11 The 1805 Battle of Austerlitz provides additional application of Napoleon’s offensive primacy. Napoleon’s constant, extensive, and quick movements ensured French victory. His tactics prevented the enemy’s ability to “gather their forces or their senses” by keeping them off balance. 12 Inherently, Jomini gravitated toward the offensive primacy theory because he saw its successful application 2

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version

Access to all documents
Unlimited textbook solutions
24/7 expert homework help

by Napoleon. Jomini’s opinion stood that any method other than offensive action as negative. 13 Pre-World War Two German preparations show how Jomini’s offensive primacy influenced warfare sixty-plus years after his death. Prusso-German military thought prioritized Napoleonic offense since the mid-nineteenth century. 14 Consequently, German planners favored offensive primacy and built strategy as students of this thought. German pre-World War Two plans called for “the highest…operational capability and offensive potential.” 15 Their focus on offensive primacy proved valid with Germany’s offensive into Poland in 1939. Back to Jomini, he saw the necessity for offensive primacy and the success Napoleon achieved as a result. Mid-1930s German war plans further reinforce how Jomini’s theory influenced warfare since 1815. The theory of concentration and mass is Jomini’s final theory influencing warfare since 1815. Jomini emphasizes mass and concentration multiple times within his four maxims constituting the Fundamental Principle of War. However, its mention in maxim one underscores the importance of mass and concentration. Maxim one states, “to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, upon the decisive points.” 16 Simply put, Jomini tells readers to use the bulk of a force at the critical point or objective of an operation. Using one’s concentrated mass increases the likelihood of success in achieving the objective by overwhelming the enemy. This strategy meets the challenge of quickly defeating an enemy force. Jomini learned the advantages to mass and concentration from both study and experience as in the two previous theories above. Jomini first recognized the importance of mass and concentration through studying Frederick the Great’s strategy in 1757. That example saw Frederick use mass and concentration successfully on a smaller Austrian force at Leuthen. 17 That historical context laid the base for his theory with Napoleon’s tactics adding further reinforcement. Jomini later witnessed Napoleon mass his forces against specific enemy points in multiple instances. 18 Additionally, Napoleon stated, “in 3

battle skill consists in converging a mass of fire upon a single point.” 19 This quote shows Napoleon’s preference for using mass and concentration and battlefield success proved its application. Given this, Jomini naturally trended toward including mass and concentration as a central theory for success conduct in war. Codifying the concentration and mass theory laid groundwork for the theory’s influence in more recent historical examples. Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan favored concentration and mass but applied the theory in naval warfare. Mahan said that “concentration was ‘the predominant principle’ of naval warfare.” 20 Mahan took a previously land-based concept and applied it to naval combat. Jomini’s influence extended far beyond the battlefields of Europe to provide a basis for American naval strategy. Jomini’s mass and concentration theory also influenced American pre-World War Two planning. American strategists planned for 215 divisions as the “core…theory of a war of mass and concentration. 21 The desire for such a large force further reinforces the influence of Jomini’s concentration and mass theory. As in the two previous theories described above, this theory followed a similar path. Jomini saw the successful application of mass and concentration and recorded the theory as fundamental. Later generations then took Jomini’s theory and applied it to their strategies. These later applications demonstrate Jomini’s theory’s influence since 1815. Baron Antoine Henri Jomini’s theories have influenced warfare since 1815. Jomini developed his decisive points, offensive primacy, and mass and concentration theories through study and experience on Napoleon’s staff. The study and experiences validated the theories as successful in overcoming battlefield challenges. Codifying the theories enabled application by military leaders in later generations. Examples above show application in the Civil War, nineteenth century naval strategy, and pre-World War Two. His theories’ uses by later generations underscore their influence since 1815. Jomini’s theories also provide significance to today’s 4

military professionals. His principles provide strategic insights rooted in experience and historical application. The experiential and historical foundations provide today’s military professional with a sense of surety when applying these theories. The decisive points theory applies to today’s battlefield through planners orienting operations toward objectives. Today’s commanders exercise offensive primacy theory through speed, surprise, and violence of action. Finally, current strategists prioritize mass and concentration through considering friendly versus enemy force ratios. This relevance to today’s professional further indicates the influence of Jomini’s theories on warfare since 1815. 5

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version

Access to all documents
Unlimited textbook solutions
24/7 expert homework help

1 Thomas M. Huber, “Jomini” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2022), 2; excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021), 226. 2 Department of the Army, CGSC, Blackboard, “H106,” Jomini: History, Theory, and Doctrine, (31- 04-01) accessed October 8, 2023, https://cgsc.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-1382986-dt-content- rid-23759439_1/institution/CGSC/AY21-22/ADL_PH2/Student/H100/H106/interface/interface.html? unlock 3 Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War (Paris: Giguet et Michaud, 1805), 8; excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021), 234. 4 Peter Paret, et al., ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 154. 5 Ibid, 154. 6 Ibid, 154. 7 Huber, “Jomini,” 2. 8 Paret, et al, Makers of Modern Strategy , 429-430. 9 Jomini, Summary of the Art of War , 8. 10 Steven T. Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2022), 6-7; excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021), 118- 119. 11 Ibid, 7. 12 Ibid, 7. 13 Paret, et al, Makers of Modern Strategy , 168. 14 Ibid, 296. 15 Ibid, 568. 16 Jomini, Summary of the Art of War , 8. 17 Paret, et al, Makers of Modern Strategy , 169. 18 Ibid, 169. 19 Ross, “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare,” 2. 20 Paret, et al, Makers of Modern Warfare, 457.

21 Ibid, 685. Bibliography Department of the Army, CGSC, Blackboard, “H106,” Jomini: History, Theory, and Doctrine, (31-04- 01) accessed October 8, 2023, https://cgsc.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-1382986-dt- content-rid-23759439_1/institution/CGSC/AY21-22/ADL_PH2/Student/H100/H106/interface/ interface.html?unlock Huber, Thomas M. “Jomini.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2022, 2. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings , 226. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021. Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri. Summary of the Art of War . Paris: Giguet et Michaud, 1805, 8. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings , 234. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021. Paret, Peter, et al, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. Ross, Steven T. “Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2022, 2-7. Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings , 114-119. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2021.

H100A_Argumentative Essay

Related Documents