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Happy Land Social Club Fire 1990
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Institutional Affiliation
Course Title
Date
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Contents
Overview
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The building
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Fire department response
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Fire incident description
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Statistics of the fire
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Results of the fire investigations
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Lessons learned
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Final Outcome
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Summary
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Overview
The terrible fire that occurred at the unlawfully operating Happy Land Social Club
was one of the most egregious fire mishaps to occur following the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory
disaster. Numerous Hondurans celebrated the Easter holiday in the club when it caught fire,
killing 87 people and injuring many more. Many people died due to the lack of oxygen
caused by the smoke they breathed in. The perpetrator, who was eventually identified as Julio
Gonzalez, set fire to the club after a fight with his ex-girlfriend, who worked at the club's coat
check room.
The building
The Happy Land Social Club was housed in a 1921 brick structure on Sothern
Boulevard, Bronx, New York City. The Happy Land Social Club was housed in a brick
structure of standard construction. A normal structure has a non-combustible exterior and
inside that can be either combustible or non-combustible. The structure's interior was finished
with 3/16-inch wood paneling(Bukowski & Spetzler, 1992). The ceilings on the first level
were low-density fiberboard tiles in the lobby and bar and gypsum board elsewhere. Furring
strips were inserted beneath the floor joists for the fiberboard tiles, furring strips were laid
over the plaster for the paneling(Bukowski & Spetzler, 1992), and the 2nd floor had partial
sprinklers. The structure was built in 1921 and was initially utilized as a retail store. In 1961,
the property owners constructed an unauthorized second story(Mulligan, 2001). Automatic
sprinklers were installed in 1966 and found unserviceable in 1971when the building was
inspected. The management repaired the sprinkler issue with the building in 1981. Multiple
violations were issued in 1981-1982 because it lacked several requirements, and the second
floor operated a social club without permission(Mulligan, 2001). The building owner
received violation orders in 1988 for various issues, including no internal fire alarm, an
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unserviceable sprinkler system, and a lack of emergency lighting. Carl Rubman purchased the
building in 1989 from Alex DiLorenzo, who had owned it since 1988, and the Happy Land
Social Club burned down in 1990(Daily News, 2015).
Fire department response
Commissioner Carlos Rivera oversaw the New York fire department that responded to
the Happy Land Social Club fire, and the Chief of Department was Joseph M Deme. The
department serviced a 320-square-mile region and employed 11,723 people. It had 210
engines, 142 ladders, and 5 rescue cos. At 3:44 a.m., firefighters from Engine 48 responded
to an alarm from the Emergency Response System after originally responding to another fire
alarm. Later, engine 88, ladders 58 and 38, and battalion 18 chiefs arrived(Firehouse, 2016).
Due to the fire venting from the two front doors, the officer of Engine 45 ordered using a 2-
1/2 inch hand-line, where the fire was first toned down in one door, then the other. After
extinguishing the fire, the firefighters moved into the structure with little vision. One search
crew discovered a badly burned victim in the rear and immediately reported it. Three
additional victims were discovered as the search went farther into the back, while another
team uncovered a body in the rear bathroom. As they made their way to the second story, one
corpse was located on the stairwell, and when they arrived at the mezzanine level, what
firefighters assumed were garbage heaped on top of one another turned out to be
bodies(Firehouse, 2016). Another crew uncovered another pair of corpses near the front end
of the mezzanine. According to fire crews, several sprinkler heads had triggered, driving the
smoke lower. Another crew entered the exposure from the back mezzanine and burst the
partition wall, where they discovered numerous victims and evacuated them from the
exposure. One firefighter recalls wading over remains for around 20 feet(Firehouse, 2016).
Nearly 15 victims were discovered in the rear bathroom, bringing the death toll to 87.
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Fire incident description
Gonzalez went to Happy Land Social club to ask for forgiveness from his girlfriend.
When the girlfriend refused to accept the apology, Gonzalez was thrown out of the club by a
bouncer. (Maykuth, 1990). Furious at this gesture, he went to a nearby gas station, bought
fuel, and proceeded to the club premises. The fuel he purchased was poured at the exit, which
was the only exit, and lit (Diebel, 2015). The entrance door was open when the gasoline was
poured before being burned, while others were shut entirely (Bukowski & Spetzler, 1992). An
employee in the cloakroom noticed the fire and yelled fire, and was joined by another
employee and two guests.
The four fled the premises through the north external entrance since the employee
knew of a second exit and had a key. When another employee saw the fire, he proceeded to
the second story to inform the customers. Two persons exited the building via the front
stairwell, while another was badly burned in the fire(Ishak, 2021). During this time, the fire
expanded to combustible interior materials, causing heat and smoke to spread throughout the
club via the rear stairs. As the chaos intensified as individuals attempted to flee through the
single door, several were trampled. Others hid behind the bar or under the table(Ishak, 2021).
The smoke quickly spread throughout the building, resulting in a limited clean air supply. In
the end, 61 males and 26 women were discovered, with six being stepped on at the entrance,
while many others were found holding hands, beneath tables, or behind the bar.
Statistics of the fire
The fire incident resulted in the death of 87 people. When firefighters got on the site
on March 25, 1990, they discovered 68 fatalities upstairs, 19 of which were on the stairs or
the ground level; fortunately, there were only six injuries due to the fire, including Gonzalez's
ex-girlfriend. There were no firefighter fatalities at the scene.
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Results of the fire investigations
According to the findings of the investigations, the entry doors remained open
throughout the incident, contributing to the incident; there was a lack of emergency escape
routes, proper lighting, and an effective sprinkler system. The only system was on the second
floor, far from the fire. If there was a functional sprinkler, then the fire could activate it within
7 seconds after ignition, and the fire would have most certainly been extinguished by the
system in the doorway(Bukowski & Spetzler, 1992). Investigators determined the fire's cause
to be arson. The investigators also determined that the building lacked various permits and
continued to operate despite multiple orders to stop it. As a result, the owner of the building
Jay Weiss and landlord Alex DiLorenzo were arrested and fined $150,000. Outside of court,
the plaintiffs reached a $15.8 million settlement with the victims' families. Julio Gonzalez, on
the other hand, was sentenced to 25 years consecutive in prison for each of the victims that
died(Ishak, 2021). Julio died in 2016 after serving only 25 years in prison.
Lessons learned
As a result of the incident, several lessons were learnt, and safety measures have been
implemented to ensure future safety. The first lesson was that field firefighters require further
training regarding fire systems and building plan revision. They must get extensive training to
know when a sprinkler system is needed within the building and when the concerned
authority should review structural alterations. As a result, they are entirely aware of what they
are doing while performing audits(Mulligan, 2001). Another lesson learnt was the need to
provide incentives for life safety improvements. There was no incentive to encourage
property owners to install life-saving equipment owing to various causes, including restrictive
legislation and renters refusing to install fire systems since it would not benefit them
financially.
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Another important lesson gained was the importance of maximizing interagency
interactions. When performing their duties, all departments must work together closely and
coordinate their action. Another important lesson was that fire stations needed to be
computerized for company commanders and building departments to make fast decisions
when dealing with law enforcement officers. Other lessons gained included the importance of
public education about fire systems and the installation of 24-hour contact centers for
occupancy dangers(Mulligan, 2001). The requirement for violators to be penalized quickly,
aggressive fire protection programs and all large structures should be separated into smaller
buildings to manage fire areas.
Personally, I have learnt the following lessons: it is important to have a proper follow-
up system in city authorities. This will ensure that all recommendations towards safety
standards are followed and that if owners fail to do so, they are barred from operating the
premises. This would involve a regular visit by law enforcement while they are on duty to
ensure the building remains inactive and violators arrested. 2: The other important thing I
have learned is the need for fire awareness\education and building code benefits as a
requirement for the business before issuing their permit. Business owners need to attend those
classes to gain the required knowledge. This will enable them to understand better how the
fire system works and show them the benefits of the building codes and why they are
important. Also, regular citizens can be educated about fire handling, such as what to do
when smoke fills the air. 3: I believe this type of building occupancy and any other building
should be linked to the fire department reporting system as the nature of those buildings as
people heavily occupy them. During a fire, people will panic and run for their lives, causing
commotions. Therefore, the fire department will not receive the call and dispatch its units on
time. If the building is linked to the system, firefighters are alerted instantly and respond
immediately, saving many lives.
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4:I learnt that I should be more aware of each building I enter and pay close attention
to the provided safety codes within the building. I should also know the nearest exit places
for a quick getaway in an emergency. If I suspected the building did not comply with the
safety codes, I should leave the building. 5: I value the safety of myself and the people
around me. Therefore, I will share this fire event with my family members and friends and
educate them on the importance of building safety codes and standards and regularly
maintaining fire safety equipment.
Final Outcome
Following the fire, one of the first laws created was the tight enforcement of
construction licenses. The mayor formed a commission to investigate illegal clubs, totaling
227 clubs. Also, the New York City Department of Buildings stepped up its investigations
into buildings deemed closed but operating. It also imposed controls on escape-room sections
to protect members from being trapped during a fire. As a result of the bad fire, the criminal
justice system underwent significant change, including implementing several regulations and
limiting the rights of criminal defendants, such as Mr. Gonzalez, by restricting their defense.
The United States Supreme Court ruled on this most recent legal development that States can
bar insanity defenses(Gilbert, 2020). Furthermore, several of these new laws emphasize the
necessity for a strict liquor license from the State Liquor Authority, emergency lighting, and
appropriate exit places within a building.
Summary
In summary, harmful incidents such as the Happy Land Fire demonstrated the limits
of the local judicial system in dealing with such incidents, which appear unreasonable but
continue to cost the lives of many innocent people. The reasons for such incidents are
numerous, but they all point to a lack of action by local authorities and a lack of emphasis on
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compliance with regulations that, as basic, as they appear, can avoid enormous human losses
and devastation. However, the problem is also a societal problem, so one of the adjustments
must be made to educate citizens about the general need for security measures and safety. I
believe that each one of us must play in preventing such incidents. Authorities should create
favorable laws, while citizens should follow those laws to ensure everyone is safe. Building
managers should not cut corners in the name of profits but should have their buildings fitted
with life-saving features.
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References
Bukowski, R. W., & Spetzler, R. C. (1992). ANALYSIS OF THE HAPPYLAND SOCIAL
CLUB FIRE WITH HAZARD I.
Building and Fire Research Laboratory : National
Institute of Standards and Technology Technology Administration
,
42
(3), 36–47.
https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=908806
Daily News. (2015, March 17).
Fire kills 87 people at the Happy Land Social Club in the
Bronx in 1990
. New York Daily News. https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-
crime/dozens-die-fire-illegal-bonx-social-club-1990-article-1.2152091
Diebel, M. (2015, March 25).
Happy Land, Triangle Shirtwaist fires happened same day, 79
years apart
. USA TODAY.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/03/25/triangle-shirtwaist-fire-and-
happy-land-blaze-new-york-city-on-this-day/70423212/
Firehouse. (2016, March 1).
Major Incident Coverage—Happy Land Social Club Fire
.
https://www.firehouse.com/operations-training/article/12168263/major-incident-
coveragehappy-land-social-club-fire
Gilbert, A. (2020, March 25).
How New York Changed After the Worst Tragedy Too Few
Remember -
. The New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/nyregion/happy-land-fire-bronx.html
Ishak, N. (2021, February).
Inside The Happy Land Fire That Devastated The Bronx
.
https://allthatsinteresting.com/happy-land-fire
Maykuth, A. (1990, March 27).
N.Y. fire suspect described as “down to his last hope.”
http://www.maykuth.com/archives/club90.htm
Mulligan, T. P. (2001, August).
Happy Land Fire: Have We Learned The Lessons
.
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https://www.tdi.texas.gov/fire/documents/fmhappyland.pdf
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