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Defensive Counterintelligence Measures: 1983 Marine Barracks Beirut Lebanon Cory M. Frazier INTL 410: Counterintelligence Dr. James Hess 12 November 2023

Frazier 2 In the early 1980s, tensions were flaring within the Middle East between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). These tensions were exacerbated by an ongoing Lebanese civil war. In August of 1982, a multi-country peace keeping force arrived in Lebanon as part of cease-fire agreement between Israel and the PLO. However, in September the President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, sparking a wave of violence across Lebanon in retaliation for the assassination. By early 1983, the situation appeared to stabilize, which quickly changed in April of 1983 with the car bombing of the U.S. embassy in West Beirut. Later that year, Israel and Lebanon signed a formal peace agreement. On the morning of 23 October 1983, a Mercedes dump truck packed with over 12,000 pounds of explosives ran through the gate of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and detonated by the barracks. The explosive laden dump truck ripped the building from its foundation, imploding it almost instantly. The explosion killed 241 Marines and sailors, becoming the costliest day for the Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945, and ushering in the unofficial start of the modern era of terrorism. 1 Immediately following the attack, US forces withdrew from the area and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger convened a commission, the Long Commission, to examine the circumstances of the attack. The Long Commission examined nine different elements to include rules of engagement, intelligence, the mission, security, etc. and made conclusions and recommendations in December of 1983. 2 The four core tenants of counterintelligence are deter, detect, deceive and neutralize. 3 1. “1983 Beirut Barracks Bombings,” Encyclopædia Britannica, October 16, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/event/1983-Beirut-barracks-bombings . 2. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist ..., accessed November 12, 2023, https://irp.fas.org/threat/beirut-1983.pdf.

Frazier 3 3. A Grounded Theory of Counterintelligence, accessed November 12, 2023, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26201945#:~:text=At%20its%20core%2C%20the%20theory,proliferation%2C %20competitive%20advantage%2C%20and%20so.

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Frazier 4 These tenants apply both offensive and defensive counterintelligence. When assessing an operation, unit or facility for their counterintelligence posture, these are the tenants that are normally analyzed. One highlighted point noted by the Long Commission was the lack of focused intelligence and inability to process raw intelligence. The ground forces commander was receiving large volumes of threat related information but was overwhelmed with information and terrorist attack warnings. This same problem was highlighted after the attack on the U.S. embassy is Beirut. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts previously warned about the lack of security and noted the embassy was highly vulnerable to vehicular bombing. 2, 4 The embassy was not prepared to deter a terrorist attack. Analysts within the DIA and intelligence community (IC) warned of possible terrorist attacks leading up to both attacks, showing the detect capability. However, this detect capability essentially overwhelmed the ground forces with reports of possible terrorist activities. Between May and October 1983, the ground forces commander received over 100 reports of possible terrorist attacks. 4 Moreso, the commander was not receiving timely intelligence tailored to his needs, necessary to defend against a broad spectrum of threats. 2 Without tailored intelligence, the commander would have to digest raw information, and make decisions based off the information at hand. Overwhelmed with information, the commander would eventually become complacent and value safety over security, one of the many findings of the Long Commission. With the lack of ability to deter the terrorist attacks, the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) lacked the ability to deceive and neutralize. The Long Commission noted a lack of Human Intelligence support as well as counterintelligence Marines lack of training. The

Frazier 5 4. “They Came in Peace,” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 22, 2013, https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/566917/they-came-in-peace/. counterintelligence Marines training consisted of a five-day Air Force lead course. This training did not properly equip the Marines to provide the support necessary for the highly dynamic environment in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Long Commission found the only training was a one hour class provided by a counterintelligence Non-Commissioned Officer on loan from the U.S. Army 4th Psychological Operations Group. This lack of training, on the unit level, and the counterintelligence personnel level, impeded the unit’s ability to neutralize threats. 3 General Paul X. Kelley, the 28th Commandant of the Marine Corps, went public in December of 1983, stating the Marine Corps was unable to find any intelligence that would have alerted the commander to this new and unique threat. The Marines on the ground lacked the training and experience to analyze information regarding this new and unique threat, modern day terrorism. The Marine contingent deployed to Beirut with the same intelligence structure it would on a conventional deployment. However, these conventional deployments in 1983 consisted of port calls in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Baltic. These environments varied vastly to the complicated and dynamic environment in Lebanon. These conventional deployments did not focus on terrorism, and the counterintelligence specialists focus would like be counterintelligence support to force protection in regard to petty crime and focusing efforts on insider threats in regard to espionage. The world had not yet seen the damage and destruction terrorism could do, and would continue to do until the present day. Thes statements by the Commandant of the Marine Corps would be refuted by other members of the IC, stating there was an above normal flow of information to the Marines on the ground regarding threat

Frazier 6 information. However, the IC aggreed the problem wasn’t the flow of information, it was the lack of analysis, which degraded the unit’s ability to detect, deceive, deter and neutralize. 5. Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley, “Intelligence: Too Much Information, Too Little Evaluation,” The New York Times, December 11, 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/11/world/the-marine-tragedy-intelligence-too-much- information-too-little-evaluation.html. Complacency was the last point noted by the Long Commission. The Long Commission found the MAU commander moved all the personnel on the ground to the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) HQ, citing safety for the decision. Marine sentries on four separate posts were not allowed to load their weapons, again with safety as the concern. The explosive laden dump truck traveled directly between two of these sentries, with the Marines unable to react due to the restraints of the Rules of Engagement set by the MAU Commander and BLT leadership. The MAU Commander perceived his mission to be more diplomatic than military, viewing the physical presence of the MAU to be enough to deter any threat. The largest threat to the MAU commander was small arms and mortar fire. Due to this threat, he placed special emphasis on peaceful neutrality and prevention of military action. These restraints resulted in the catastrophic loss of life and hindered the ground forces ability to neutralize and deter enemy forces to include terrorists. President Regan would go on to sign National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, “Combatting Terrorism.” This directive would significantly shift policy from reactive to defensive in regard to anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. It increased awareness of the serious and rising threat of terrorism around the world. NSD 138 laid the groundwork for the Department of Defense to conduct counterterrorism operations worldwide and enabled the IC to provide the DOD targets and better threat related information. 4, 6 Due to the recommendations by the Long Commission, the Department of Defense would go on to create fusion centers to aid in

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Frazier 7 the processing of raw information. These changes would ensure all military units around the world were equipped to detect, deter, deceive and neutralize the enemy, no matter the location. 6. “National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, “Combatting Terrorism",” NSDD - National Security Decision Directives - Reagan Administration, accessed November 12, 2023, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/. References 1. “1983 Beirut Barracks Bombings.” Encyclopædia Britannica, October 16, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/event/1983-Beirut-barracks-bombings. 2. A Grounded Theory of Counterintelligence. Accessed November 12, 2023. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26201945#:~:text=At%20its%20core%2C%20the %20theory,proliferation%2C%20competitive%20advantage%2C%20and%20so. 3. “National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, “Combatting Terrorism".” NSDD - National Security Decision Directives - Reagan Administration. Accessed November 12, 2023. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/. 4. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist ... Accessed November 12, 2023. https://irp.fas.org/threat/beirut-1983.pdf. 5. Taubman, Philip, and Joel Brinkley. “Intelligence: Too Much Information, Too Little Evaluation.” The New York Times, December 11, 1983. https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/11/world/the-marine-tragedy-intelligence-too-much- information-too-little-evaluation.html. 6. “They Came in Peace.” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 22, 2013. https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/566917/they-came-in- peace/.

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