Military Deception in the Civil War: Rosecrans' Strategy

Essay Three Cory M. Frazier INTL 413: Denial and Deception Professor Paul Cooke 29 October 2023

Frazier 2 Denial and deception operations know no timeline, being mentioned in recounts of battles going back millennia. Whether deceiving the enemy on the battlefield during the American Civil War or denying the enemy use of critical combat communications abilities, denial and deception operations will always exist on the battlefield. All of these operations can be broken down into six principles: Focus, Objective, Centralized Planning and Control, Security, Timeliness and Integration. In 1863, America was at the height of the civil war, a mere 90 years after it declared its independence from British rule. There was fierce fighting throughout the young country between the Confederate soldiers and Union Army. On 16 August 1863, Union Major General William S Rosecrans would embark on the most strategic deceptions of the war known as his Chickamauga campaign. His primary objective was to get his army across the Tennessee river and avoid being detected by Confederate General Braxton Bragg. Bragg at the time held the strategically important rail center of Chattanooga. Rosecrans would send a bulk of his army southwest toward a series of small river crossings and feint an incoming attack on Chattanooga. Using his mounted brigade and small unknown trails, the brigade would move east and then ultimately south toward Chattanooga. With the bulk of his army southwest, Bragg began to believe the attack would come from the north. Further, Rosecrans soldiers would send pieces of boards down the stream, build fires at night indicating large camps, even have soldiers pound on barrels to convince Bragg a large force would soon conduct boat crossings and an attack was imminent.

Frazier 3 An attack was imminent, but it did not come from the north like Bragg thought. Before Bragg could react, he found himself screened by 9,000 cavalrymen who crossed the river undetected from the south. With the troops to the south, Bragg found himself indefensible and withdrew his forces on 7 September. Not only was Rosecrans successful in his mission of crossing the Tennessee river undetected, but he also took Chattanooga without a struggle. 1 With core tenants in mind, Rosecrans operations met all six principles of military deception. Focus Military deception operations should target the adversary decision maker capable of causing the desired action. The primary conduit to the decision maker is the adversary’s intelligence apparatus or in this case the scouts. 2 Rosecrans knew if he sent a bulk of his army to the north, Bragg would believe the impeding attack would come from the north shifting his focus away from the southern flank. This is a direction representation of Focus, Bragg was expecting an attack from the north, and shifted his focus away from the southern flank, opening him up to the surprise brigade. Objective The objective of military deception operations is to focus actions and resources to cause an adversary to take, or not to take, specific actions. 2 Rosecrans deception operation of troop movement to the north coupled with the deceptive impending boat crossings, caused Bragg to await an attack from the north and not reinforce 1. HistoryNet Staff, “Hoodwinked during America’s CIVL War: Union Military Deception,” HistoryNet, October 20, 2016, https://www.historynet.com/hoodwinked-during-americas-civl-war-union-military-deception/?f.

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Frazier 4 2. JP 3-13.4, military deception - National Defense University, accessed October 29, 2023, https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13-4_MILDEC.pdf.

Frazier 5 the southern flank. This operation successfully deceived Bragg into believing the Union Army’s objective was an assault from the north, causing inaction on his part to not focus on the southern flank as well. Centralized Planning and Control Military deception operations should be centrally planned and directed. This is required to avoid confusion and to ensure all elements portray the same story and do not conflict. 2 All elements of the chain of command understood the deception operation. Brigadier General William B Hazen conducted the feint attack on Chattanooga while Colonel John T. Wilder blazed the trail. Hazen took it upon himself to further the deception operation and build fires and throw boards in the water to give the impression boat crossings were taking place. 1 This is a perfect example of this tenant as all elements understood what needed to be done in support of the deception operation. Security Successful operations require strict security, applying a strict need to know criteria to each operation and employ active operation security to deny critical information from escaping. 2 This is tenant is present due to Bragg being caught so off guard by the large presence of troops to the south, he had no other choice but to retreat. 1 If Bragg had any indication of the southern exploit, he would have quickly closed the flank. Timeliness The operation requires careful timing and must provide sufficient time for its portrayal. 2 Hazen waited three weeks to further sell the deception. During this time, he continued to feint attacks and conducted operations to convince the enemy the attack was

Frazier 6 coming from the north. 1 If he had not waited, it is likely the enemy would have become suspicious due to the time it takes to move such a large force across unforgiving terrain. Integration The deception operation must be fully integrated with the operation it is supporting. The operational concept must occur as part of the development of the commander’s concept of operations. 2 Rosecrans needed all three corps to cross the mountains in Tennessee. This is a monumental task as all this movement takes place on foot or horseback. He integrated the deception operation of deceiving the enemy of his point of crossing, with his main mission of crossing the mountains. By integrating the deception with the main objective, he was successful on both accounts. Military deceptions operations at their core remain the same regardless of the time. The same six core tenants can be applied to deception operations conducted in the 1800s as they can be in the 2020s. The only change is specific considerations must be accounted for due to increases in technology. The same feint attack likely would prove unsuccessful due to the use of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. This does not mean deception operations cannot happen, one must continue to think outside the box and be creative.

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Frazier 7 Bibliography JP 3-13.4, military deception - National Defense University. Accessed October 29, 2023. https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13- 4_MILDEC.pdf. Staff, HistoryNet. “Hoodwinked during America’s CIVL War: Union Military Deception.” HistoryNet, October 20, 2016. https://www.historynet.com/hoodwinked-during-americas- civl-war-union-military-deception/?f.

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