MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
9th Edition
ISBN: 2810022149537
Author: Baye
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter CS, Problem 7CBE
To determine
To explain: The recommendation regarding the current
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Unit VI Assignment
Instructions: This assignment has two parts. Answer the questions using
the charts.
Part 1:
Firm 1
High Price
Low Price
High Price
8,8
0,10
Firm 2
Low Price
10,0
3,3
Question: For the above game, identify the Nash Equilibrium. Does Firm 1 have a
dominant strategy? If so, what is it? Does Firm 2 have a dominant strategy? If so,
what is it?
Your response:
not use ai please don't kdjdkdkfjnxncjc
Chapter CS Solutions
MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
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- Ask one question at a time. Keep questions specific and include all details. Need more help? Subject matter experts with PhDs and Masters are standing by 24/7 to answer your question.**arrow_forward1b. (5 pts) Under the 1990 Farm Bill and given the initial situation of a target price and marketing loan, indicate where the market price (MP), quantity supplied (QS) and demanded (QD), government stocks (GS), and Deficiency Payments (DP) and Marketing Loan Gains (MLG), if any, would be on the graph below. If applicable, indicate the price floor (PF) on the graph. TP $ NLR So Do Q/yrarrow_forwardNow, let us assume that Brie has altruistic preferences. Her utility function is now given by: 1 UB (xA, YA, TB,YB) = (1/2) (2x+2y) + (2x+2y) What would her utility be at the endowment now? (Round off your answer to the nearest whole number.) 110arrow_forward
- Problema 4 (20 puntos): Supongamos que tenemos un ingreso de $120 y enfrentamos los precios P₁ =6 y P₂ =4. Nuestra función de utilidad es: U(x1, x2) = x0.4x0.6 a) Planteen el problema de optimización y obtengan las condiciones de primer orden. b) Encuentren el consumo óptimo de x1 y x2. c) ¿Cómo cambiará nuestra elección óptima si el ingreso aumenta a $180?arrow_forwardPlease draw the graph for number 4 and 5, I appreciate it!!arrow_forwardnot use ai pleasearrow_forward
- not use ai pleasearrow_forward• Prismatic Cards: A prismatic card will be a card that counts as having every suit. We will denote, e.g., a prismatic Queen card by Q*. With this notation, 2.3045 Q would be a double flush since every card is a diamond and a heart. • Wild Cards: A wild card counts as having every suit and every denomination. Denote wild cards with a W; if there are multiple, we will denote them W₁, W2, etc. With this notation, W2 20.30054 would be both a three-of-a-kind (three 2's) and a flush (5 diamonds). If we add multiple wild cards to the deck, they count as distinct cards, so that (e.g.) the following two hands count as "different hands" when counting: W15 5Q and W255◊♡♡♣♣ In addition, 1. Let's start with the unmodified double-suited deck. (a) Call a hand a flush house if it is a flush and a full house, i.e. if all cards share a suit and there are 3 cards of one denomination and two of another. For example, 550. house. How many different flush house hands are there? 2. Suppose we add one wild…arrow_forwardnot use ai pleasearrow_forward
- In a classic oil-drilling example, you are trying to decide whether to drill for oil on a field that might or might not contain any oil. Before making this decision, you have the option of hiring a geologist to perform some seismic tests and then predict whether there is any oil or not. You assess that if there is actually oil, the geologist will predict there is oil with probability 0.85 . You also assess that if there is no oil, the geologist will predict there is no oil with probability 0.90. Please answer the two questions below, as I am trying to ensure that I am correct. 1. Why will these two probabilities not appear on the decision tree? 2. Which probabilities will be on the decision tree?arrow_forwardAsap pleasearrow_forwardnot use ai pleasearrow_forward
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