CONNECT F/MICROECONOMICS
21st Edition
ISBN: 2810022151240
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 5.A, Problem 3ARQ
To determine
Is the given statement is true or falls, why?
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Q6
c and D ( wrong)
Question 6
Logrolling refers to
O 1) choosing political platforms to appeal to special interests.
2) trading votes to gain support for legislation.
3) choosing political platforms to appeal to the "middle-of-the-road" voter.
4) gathering votes by pretending to support policies that appeal to voters.
5) c and d
1
1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?
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- If the tax code exempts the first $20,000 of income from taxation and then taxes 25 percent of all income above that level, then a person who earns percent and a marginal tax rate of $50,000 has an average tax rate of percent. O 15, 25 O 25, 15 O 25, 30 O 30, 25arrow_forward1.12. Consider a weighted voting method with 5 voters assigned weights17, 15, 14, 12, and 7, respectively, with a simple majority of the weightedvotes sufficient for victory. Explain why this method is in effect the(unweighted) simple majority method.arrow_forward4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?arrow_forward
- 4arrow_forwardSuppose that friends Jennifer, Stephanie, and Megan cannot agree on how much to spend for a bouquet of flowers to send to a person who allowed them to use her beach house for the weekend. Jennifer wants to buy a moderately priced bouquet, Stephanie wants to buy an expensive bouquet, and Megan wants to buy a very expensive bouquet. Assuming no paradox of voting, majority voting will result in the decision to buy Multiple Choice an inexpensive bouquet. a very expensive bouquet. a moderately priced bouquet. an expensive bouquet. Barrow_forwardNeed help with this. THanks!arrow_forward
- 1. A city has three equal-sized groups of people: (1) Type A people consistently prefer more public school expenditure; (2) Type B people prefer high levels of public school expenditure to low levels, and they prefer low levels to medium levels; (3) Type C people most prefer medium levels to low levels, and they prefer low levels to high levels. Will majority voting generate consistent outcomes in this case? (Hint: you should check if there are cycles in outcomes by changing the order of voting) A.True B. False 2. Suppose Florida government has asked you to design and evaluate the effectiveness of an education voucher program. What is wrong with simply comparing the educational performance of those receiving vouchers with those who do not receive vouchers? Explain.arrow_forward4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.arrow_forwardM7arrow_forward
- Suppose George made $20,000 last year and that he lives in the country of Harmony. The way Harmony levies income taxes, all citizens must pay 10 percent in taxes on their first $10,000 in earnings and then 50 percent in taxes on anything else they might earn. Given that George earned $20,000 last year, his marginal tax rate on the last dollar he earns will be rate for his entire income will be and his average tax O 10 percent; 50 percent O 50 percent; less than 50 percent O 10 percent; less than 50 percent O 50 percent; 50 percentarrow_forward2) What is straight-ticket voting? How does this help candidates in down ballot races?arrow_forward2. In this problem, you will compare the level of a public good chosen under majority voting to the socially-optimal level under three different sets of circumstances. Suppose first that individual i's demand curve for z is given by αi/z, where αi is a positive parameter. Instead of being linear, this demand curve is a hyperbola. Suppose further that z costs $1 per unit to produce (c = 1) and that this cost is shared equally among consumers. Therefore, cost per person is 1/n per unit of z. Then consider the three sets of circumstances listed below. Each situation has a different number of consumers in the economy and different collections of α values for the consumers. The number of consumers is denoted n and the vector of α values is denoted A = (α1,α2,...,αn-1,αn). Case 1: n = 7, A = (4, 2, 12, 4, 5, 13, 8). Case 2: n = 5, A = (10, 6, 11, 14, 8). Case 3: n = 9, A = (6, 9, 10, 4.5, 12, 7, 13.5, 8, 11). Using this information, do the following: a)For each case, compute the preferred z…arrow_forward
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